by Kudakwashe Kanhutu
Abstract
The Southern African Development
Community (SADC) is a regional economic community on the African continent made
up of 15 nation states. It aims to achieve economic development, peace and
security for its populations through
integration. There is an acceptance by SADC elites and academics that
integration is the best way to deal with the challenges in the region that
cannot be solved unilaterally. Still, the fact that SADC integration has not
deepened, raises the question that, if states see integration as the best route
to achieve their goals, why have they half-heartedly taken this route?
This paper relies on theories of
integration to try and ascertain the nature of the opportunities and contraints
to regional integration. The answer seems to be steeped in SADC’s history, which
fostered a respect for sovereign equality as inviolable. Indeed, a respect for
sovereignty can be seen to be the main factor that compounds other factors such
as underdevelopment and nationalist rivalry. My paper suggests that while most of
the factors are largely systemic, generational changes may lead to the most
important one, classical sovereignty, being tamed. Elites without liberation
struggle credentials may, in the future, be able to forge deeper integration. I
am basing this on a reading of the difficulties engendered by any history that
involves experiences of injustice or aggression. In the EC/EU experience,
France and Britain were still trying to prevent German reunification as late as
1990, based on their reading of Germany’s aggression from the 1930s.
List of Contents
Abstract………………………………………………………….1
Abbreviations ………………………………………………..….4
Introduction …………………………………………………..…5
Motivation…………………………………………………….....7
Relevance and Significance…………..………………………....8
Integration
Defined………….…………………………….…….9
Measuring Success?......................................................................9
Methodology……………………………………………..……..10
Chapter One
Literature Review………………………………………………11
Chapter Two
Theories of Integration…………………………………………15
Neofunctionalism………………………………………..……..16
Intergovernmentalism………………………………………….18
Chapter Three
Genealogy of SADC…………………..…………………….....19
FLS, SADCC to SADC……………………………......………21
The Frontline States…………….....……………..……………21
SADCC……………………………….…………………….…23
SADC………………………………………………….……...24
Chapter Four
Assessment of the Opportunities and Constraints…....……….25
Opportunities for
SADC…………...……………….…………25
Constraints to Regional Integration………………...…………27
Sovereignty………………………………...………………….27
Incompatible Political
and Economic Systems………..….…..28
Nationalist Rivalry……………...……………………………..29
Conclusion
What is the SADC Idea?……………..…………..……………30
What Stands in the
Way?...........................................................31
Bibliography…………………………………………………..33
Appendices
Map of the SADC Region…………………………………….36
Abbreviations
ANC – African National Congress
AU – African Union
CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy
EAC – East African Community
EU – European Union
EC – European Community
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
FLS – Frontline States
FTA – Free Trade Area
IMF – International Monetary Fund
LC – Liberation Committee
MNR – Mozambique National Resistance
MPLA - Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola/People's
Movement for the Liberation of Angola
OAU – Organisation for African Unity
REC – Regional Economic Community
SADC – Southern African Development Community
SADCC – Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme
UN – United Nations
UNITA - União Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola/National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
Southern African Development Community (SADC), 1980 – 2010: An assessment of the opportunities and constraints to regional integration.
Introduction
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is
a 15 member, nation state sub-regional grouping on the African continent whose core
objectives, as stated in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty, are; ‘achieving
development and economic growth, ensuring peace and security, and evolving
common political values, systems and institutions among member states.’
SADC is now a treaty based organisation, with a legal personality as of 17th
August 1992, having in its genealogy – of necessity – operated under a very
loose framework.
SADC has its roots in the Frontline States (FLS)
1974 – 1994, which in turn led to the formation of SADC’s direct forbearer: the
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 1980 - 1992. Each
permutation reflects a change in the challenges facing the sub-regional block. The
main imperative that gave rise to the FLS and SADCC was the need, in the first
instance, to coordinate actions that would liberate Southern African states
still under the yoke of colonialism.
With the achievement of independence in Mozambique (1975), Angola (1976) and
Zimbabwe (1980), the overriding imperative became ending the region’s economic
dependence on the Apartheid regime in South Africa; so as to realise the larger
goal of ending Apartheid in South Africa. When apartheid ended in South Africa,
the focus returned to ending economic dependence on the former colonial powers.
The argument made here is that political liberation from colonial powers is not
matched by liberation in the economic domain, the erstwhile colonial powers
still dictate economic direction for Southern African states.
My paper seeks to understand what the opportunities
and constraints are to regional integration in Southern Africa. The puzzle for
me is whether SADC is evolving into a ‘security community’ capable of
articulating a common foreign and security policy? SADC objectives and
communiques have set these ambitious goals as their targets, so I want to
understand the nature of the difficulties that are leading to suboptimal
results for integration thus far. I begin my enquiry with theories of regional
integration and their utility in understanding my subject matter. I then turn
to the empirical: the dynamics of regional integration in the SADC block.
Chapter 3 traces SADC’s historical development, and Chapter 4 discusses the
actual constraints and opportunities. In Chapter 4; I first discuss the opportunities,
then I will turn to the constraints. I will be trying to relate the
opportunities and constraints to the theories so as to better ascertain whether
these factors are systemic or agential.
The constraints are numerous in contrast to the
opportunities. In list form, some of the challenges identified by Chingono and
Nakana are; ‘nationalist rivalry; incompatible economic and political systems;
mono-cultural agro-based economies; debt and dependency; unjust international
economic structures; uneven benefits of integration; multiple memberships to
Regional Economic Communities (RECs); lack of grassroots support; poor economic
and political governance; disaffected stakeholders; and globalisation and its
ambiguities.’ I
will expand on some of these in Chapter 4; the assessment section of my paper.
In terms of the opportunities, they are quite paltry; to my mind, what most
qualifies as the opportunities tends to be challenges insofar as they are
forcing states to seek a union so as to solve the challenge. One positive
opportunity I will also expand on in the assessment section of my paper, is the
end of the destabilisation of Southern Africa that had been characteristic of relations
with Apartheid South Africa. Peaceful conditions must be an opportunity
for economic and political union.
Motivation
My interest in understanding SADC is grounded in the
fact that I am from the region and thus
have a personal stake in understanding the dynamics at play in the region.
In that regard, my study is an attempt to attain an enhanced understanding of
the nexus between development and security in Southern Africa. Security has now
been linked with development in current discourse. Each historical period has
different challenges and conceptions of security. There is, in this epoch, a
shift from the traditional understanding of security as territorial defence
against invasion by other states prevalent
in the Cold War era, to an elevation of non-traditional threats. The current
conception of security for international relations scholars and states is now
human security. Human security is seen to be best provided for under conditions
of economic development. A reading of the official pronouncements and academic
commentary on SADC, yields the understanding that the highest goal they are
aiming for is, indeed, human security.
I am also conversant with the extant tensions
between human security and state security despite that states have signed onto
the UN’s ‘freedom from want’ goals which are synonymous with the elevation of
human security. From a knowledge of these tensions, the undercurrent to my
study and my personal motivation, therefore, is what are the gains that can be
realised for human security through regional integration? State security –
properly conceived – should have human security as its bedrock. Indeed, there
is an acceptance in current discourse that some of the challenges that can be
existential threats to countries do not lend themselves to military solutions
or, further still, cannot be countered by unilateral actions.
An example particular to SADC is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. With this realisation
comes the understanding that an optimal performing SADC could be the best
vehicle to meet these non-military threats in the current security environment.
Relevance and Significance:
SADC has a basis and role in international order as conceived in the UN
Charter under Chapter VIII.
In this regard, my paper is a study of the building blocks of the new
international order: in this instance, this can be formulated as, SADC – African
Union (AU) – United Nations (UN). Indeed, Chapter VIII of the Charter envisages
that these regional organisations could play a gatekeeper role for the UN insofar
as they could be the first port of call for pacific settlement of disputes, and
maintenance of international peace and security.
The African Union itself is cognisant of the fact that it cannot possibly
manage every conflict and has thus outsourced responsibility to Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) of which SADC is one of five.
Although the experience with ECOWAS (another AU component REC) and its recent
inability to act over Mali belies the utility of RECs, the hope is still that
“regional
organizations have become important ‘gatekeepers’, influencing how issues are
framed and the range of plausible policy options available to the Security
Council.”
A further pertinent point which makes my study
relevant to EU policy, is the advent of
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Europe is forced by the current
strategic environment to shift from a European to a global focus.
The pressure would be eased on EU resources needed for activities such as
stabilisation, counter-terrorism, and combating general insecurity abroad, if
an understanding of SADC dynamics means EU – SADC relations enhance the
relative peaceful conditions in the region. The logic being that prevention is
better than cure. I have in mind here the fact that SADC states do not create
conditions of insecurity for Europe, while by comparison the instability in the
Maghreb has a direct bearing on EU security; abductions of EU nationals and
safe havens for terrorism. I therefore expect my study to be
relevant, insofar as we can accept that in the new global strategic
environment; insecurity anywhere can be insecurity everywhere.
Integration Defined
Some definitions suffice at this point. Ernst Haas
defined integration as “the process whereby political actors in several,
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations
and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”
What is relevant about this definition to SADC, is the question of awarding
integrative institutions the power to make decisions that were previously the
preserve of national governments. Another salient definition is offered by yet
another thinker, Karl Deutsch, who conceived it as; “a relationship among units
in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties
which they would separately lack.”
This definition is useful for understanding SADC because countries, especially
developing ones, cannot exercise autarky in economic affairs, thus integration
can create for them a larger market and award them all the putative benefits.
Measuring Success?
I have also chosen to pay attention to both
integration as a process, for the sake of discussing imperatives and
opportunities; and as an end state, so as to be able to measure the congruity
between SADC’s stated goals and achievements. It is, however, difficult to
measure success in human affairs based on end states as most endeavours are
open ended. Indeed, an end state is impossible to articulate in human affairs
as the desired ends are constantly evolving.
Success or failure therefore may be
viewed in terms of the three possible outcomes of integration credited to Leon
Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold by Haas. These are; ‘(1) the fulfilment of a
postulated task on the part of practices and/or institutions created for
integrative purposes; (2) the retraction of such a task (i.e., disintegration);
and (3) the extension of such a task into spheres of action not previously
anticipated by the actors.’
Of the above points, 1 and 3 would be successes, while point 2 would be
unmistakably a failure. The East African Community (EAC) founded in 1967 and
which collapsed in 1977 would be an uncomplicated example of a failure, if it
was not for the fact that it has since been re-established as of 2001.
The point I am making here is that a definite terminal condition is hard to
articulate in human affairs.
Methodology
My research design is qualitative: I am treating
SADC as one unit. This is a case study of a regional organisation, and I am
interpreting this case through theories of integration and international
relations, in deference to the disciplined - configurative case study strategy.
I am relying on integration theory developed for the study of European
integration, but I am aware of its limitations when applied to the developing
world. Liberal intergovernmentalism is the other set of lenses I will be using
in order to understand the features of SADC that defy the explanations made by
neo-functionalism. My research method has been Historical Process Tracing,
where I have been tracing SADC from its founding in 1980 till 2010. I have
focused on imperatives and milestones, and what effects they have had on its
constitution.
Chapter One
Literature Review
In this section I will look at what others who have
studied SADC have said are the constraints and opportunities. The general gist
of these assessments is that the nature of decision making in SADC is a great
constraint to integration, I find this to be valid. I will start with a paper
that discusses general difficulties for third world integration, then go
through to those that are specifically studying SADC. As will be shown in the
theories and history section, regional integration in the third world is made
difficult by the lack of conditions that encourage integration. The foremost
problem condition is underdevelopment which tends to make integrative schemes untenable
winner-takes-all schemes. The first paper I review understands this
complication and proposed a model that would help integration in spite of
underdevelopment. The proposed scheme has some features that can be said to be
reflected in the SADCC/SADC experience.
Writing in Underdevelopment, Dependence and Integration,
Andrew Axline lists the difficulties of trying to integrate when countries are
underdeveloped: some of the outstanding problems he identifies in such schemes
are trade diversion and polarization.
Trade diversion occurs when a regional grouping ends up replacing cheaper
imports from outside the block with expensive ones from partner countries.
Polarization, relatedly, refers to the fact that integration may actually
reinforce inequalities whereby ‘economic growth tends to concentrate in “poles
of growth,” the countries which are most economically advanced.’
I will not go into the specifics of each problem, but what they imply is that
the poorer states will be effectively eschewing one form of economic dependence
(on the West) and replacing it with another (on the regional hegemony).
This, indeed, is a challenge for integration in Southern Africa, as South
Africa; the more advanced economy, tends to get the lion’s share of benefits
from integration.
Axline proposes that
instead of a laissez faire
integration scheme typical of advanced economies, the third world would benefit
from a scheme that combines integration with
redistributive and corrective mechanisms for net losers in the scheme.
This is reflected, in one way at least, by the way SADCC/SADC initiated its
integration. Instead of having a supranational authority coordinating technical
tasks, the regional group assigned countries technical tasks to coordinate so
as generate income from the sector.
For example Swaziland was assigned Human Resources Development, Zimbabwe; Food,
Agriculture and Natural Resources, while Zambia was assigned Mining. This model
has been used throughout the SADCC/SADC years, with some changes that empower
the SADC Secretariat (a supranational body) only being proposed as late as
2001.
Chingono and
Nakana’s paper aptly titled The
Challenges of Regional Integration in Southern Africa does a great job of
listing, classifying and explicating the constraints to SADC integration. I
have already listed the constraints in the introduction and will expand on some
of them in Chapter 4 of this paper, so I will not say more on their work here.
Instead I will now turn to some works that have attempted to locate the
suboptimal performance in a lack of ownership of the process and involvement by
civil society. Writing in People, States,
and Regions Gina van Schalkwyk raises the point that for human security to
be achieved there has to be an input from the referent object of human
security; civil society. She says that although the rhetoric of human security
has found its way into government documents the practice does not reflect
rhetoric.
She then notes the tensions between human security and regime security, and
observes that governments still put regime survival before human security.
An impediment to integration. The reason she thinks is to blame for this, is
the nature of decision making (consensus among heads of states, which I argue
below is the hallmark of intergovernmentalism), weak SADC institutions, and a
lack of accountability to the general populace.
The same theme of lack of accountability to the
general populace is taken up by Takawira Musavengana in his paper The Proposed SADC Parliament. He
observes that the parliament has not been given the same powers or even
explicit recognition in the SADC Treaty.
His point of enquiry is whether the SADC Parliament could take the role of
holding the executives accountable as happens in national politics. He notes
the further difficulty that due to partisan politics in national politics, the
SADC parliament could end up being a rubber stamp for the executives as is
typical in authoritarian regimes.
The obstacle he sees as potent, as in Gina van Schalkwyk’s paper, is the
intergovernmental structure of SADC which vests all powers in the Summit of
Heads of Governments and Council of Ministers.
From the foregoing, it would seem the general populace are completely prevented
from making an input into SADC policies, but not necessarily, as Anne
Hammerstad’s paper can show us.
In Securitisation
From Below, Hammerstad explores the relationship between South Africa’s
immigration policy towards refugees from the economic crisis in Zimbabwe. She
records that the South African government turned a blind eye to the problem for
the sake of consistency with its ‘quiet diplomacy’ (a SADC endorsed position)
to the Zimbabwean crisis. But, since the xenophobic riots in South
Africa forced the government to reconsider its position, we can actually see
public action ‘uploading’ their preferences to the policy makers. We can also take
away from her paper the possibility of a conundrum for governments. In this
instance, should the governments allow free movement of persons as part of deepening
integration in the region, they could actually be creating conditions of
insecurity for the region as advanced economies become inundated with job
seekers. Which may result in the riots seen in South Africa in 2008.
Lastly, Rita Abrahamsen, argues in Development Policy and the Democratic Peace
in Sub-Saharan Africa that Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that were imposed by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) were responsible for exacerbating
underdevelopment and insecurity.
This paper is useful for my dissertation, for it exhibits that external factors
are also potent constraints for integration. The outstanding theme in the works
I reviewed seemed to be that the intergovernmental nature of SADC is the
greatest factor in regional integration. I explicate this factor more
throughout the paper starting with the next chapter which explores theories of
regional integration.
Chapter Two
Theories of Integration
The main purpose for including the theories I have
included is that they help explain what initiates and motivates integration,
and furthermore they evince the classic debate extant in integration studies. Theoretical
approaches to the study of regional integration tend to raise the debate as to
whether states are being inexorably subsumed into regional federal unions or if
they retain their freedom of choice on whether to integrate or not. Some
theories emphasize the supranational side of integration, where they posit that
once integration starts, it takes a life of its own and actually forces
governments to bend to its logic. Of the two theories I am relying on, neofunctionalism
can be argued to fall on this side of the debate. The other side of the debate says that
‘international institutions are epiphenomenal to state power and interests.’
This second camp is consistent with realist/neorealist conceptions of
international relations which say that integration is an instrument for state
power and will only be allowed to go ahead on that basis.
For regional integration as in other aspects of
international relations, it is a truism that no single theory can perfectly
explain all the features of a subject matter. Southern Africa especially,
readily admits this truism as the imperatives and conditions for integrating
are ever so different from those of post-World War II Europe which shaped
integration theory. Haas even accepted that his neo-functional model when
applied to the developing world, had ‘sufficed only to accurately predict
difficulties and failures in regional integration, while in the European case
some successful positive prediction has been achieved.’ It is with this in mind that
intergovernmentalism will be given consideration in this paper along with
neofunctionalism. I now turn to the theories proper and their utility for SADC.
Neofunctionalism
The main premises of neofunctionalism, based on a
reading of European integration in the 1960s are as follows; (1) integration begins with
the areas of ‘low politics’ but which are important for the economic sectors;
(2) this is followed by the creation of a high authority to oversee this
process; (3) which then creates pressures for integration in related sectors;
the ‘spillover’ effect.
From the foregoing, the next logical step is a deepening of economic
integration which then leads to the need for more supranational institutions and
inevitably, to political integration.
According to neofunctionalism, institutions once created ‘can take a life of
their own and progressively escape the control of their creators. Concerned
with increasing their powers, employees of regional institutions become agents
of further integration by influencing the perceptions of participating elites
(both private and public), and therefore governments’ (national) interest.’
SADC already has a Secretariat and a Tribunal; supranational bodies created in
deference to such integration logic. However, whether these institutions have
managed to dictate the pace of integration since their creation, is a different
matter altogether.
The foremost proponent of this theory, Haas,
postulated that ‘the decision to proceed with integration, or to oppose it,
depends upon the expectations of gain or loss held by major groups within the
unit to be integrated.’
There is thus, a realisation that there is an important role for political
elites or interest groups in starting the integration process. The expectation
was that once integration had been initiated in one area, it would then create
pressures for integration in other areas; the ‘spillover’ effect.
The imperative driving European integration was a
need to obviate the national rivalries that had led to the two world wars and
which could potentially lead to a third world war. Their preoccupation
therefore was with attainment of peace predicated on economic enmeshment. This
would be done by altering, drastically, the notion of sovereignty that had been
extant since the Peace of Westphalia. While peace can be said to be generally desirable to achieve economic goals, there may
be other goals that can still be placed above peace. For example, the FLS,
SADC’s precursor, started life helping armed struggles aimed at winning self-determination
for the black majorities in Southern Africa. The point I am making here is that clearly,
imperatives for integration in Southern Africa were quite different from those
of Europe. Southern African states were more concerned with gaining and consolidating
sovereignty which they had been denied by colonialism until the 1960s and as
late as 1980 and 1990 for Zimbabwe and Namibia respectively. This difference in
imperatives may be one reason why SADC may defy perfect encapsulation by the
neofunctionalist theory.
The other reason concerns a lack of the three
background conditions Haas noted need to be present for meaningful integration
to even be initiated. In fact, the question whether the tenets of
neofunctionalism could be used to explain integration in other regions in the developing
world where these three background conditions may be absent, elicited pessimism
from Haas. For him, the ‘three background conditions that made for successful
integration were pluralistic social structures, substantial economic and
industrial development and common ideological patterns among participating
units.’
Conditions which are generally lacking in the developing world. So a better
explanation for the third world integration schemes may rest on premises other than
neofunctionalist ones. The integovernmentalism approach might help in
explaining the dynamics of SADC integration.
Intergovernmentalism
Stanley Hoffman is the foremost earlier critic of
neofunctionalism. Intergovernmentalism rests on the premise that national
governments are still the primary determinant of whether integration goes ahead
or not. Hoffman thought that
neofunctionalism underestimated the importance of sovereignty as a barrier to
integration as was evinced by the ‘empty chair’ policy of Charles de Gaulle in
the European experience.
This is based on the realist/neorealist conception of international politics in
which states only use integration for their own national interests. The thinker
most often credited with the current form of intergovernmentalism is Andrew
Moravcisk. His liberal intergovernmentalism theory posits these two main
premises in relation to the study of European integration;
The first is that states are actors. The EU, like
other international institutions (SADC),
can be profitably studied by treating states as the critical actors in the
context of anarchy. That is, states achieve their goals through
intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, rather than through a centralized
authority making and enforcing political decisions…. The second basic liberal
intergovernmentalism assumption is that states are rational. Rationalism is an
individualist or agency assumption. Actors calculate the utility of alternative
courses and choose the one that maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under
the circumstances. Collective outcomes are explained as the result of
aggregated individual actions based on efficient pursuit of these preferences –
albeit subject to the information at hand and uncertainty about the future.
(emphasis own).
Thus the decisions to establish international
institutions lies in the hands of governments who will only do so given that a
calculation of their self-interests yields that integration is the best way to
achieve certain goals or meet the imperatives at hand. Moravcsik then advances
a three stage framework which explains the decision to integrate: states ‘first
define their preferences, then bargain to substantive agreements, and finally
create (or adjust) institutions to secure those outcomes in the face of future
uncertainty.’ States
hold all the cards in this formulation, hence intergovernmentalism.
In integration in developing countries, one problem
that can arise is that of polarization, whereby the more economically advanced
countries will attract development while the less developed ones become ‘poles
of stagnation.’ The question does arise then that since
benefits are not likely to be equally distributed, what incentives are there
for lesser powers to join an integration scheme. A model developed by economic
theory for third world integration suggests a mechanism for distributing
benefits to those states who may be losers due to such a union,
and SADC integration dynamics show that such a distributive model has been
attempted. I have outlined this model in the literature review section. I now
turn to SADC’s evolution through history so as establish the foundation for its
practices.
Chapter Three
Genealogy of SADC
“The first day of our political independence is the
first day of the longer and harder struggle for economic independence” – President Samora Machel of Mozambique.
The purpose of this section is to show how the SADC evolved in response
to the different challenges and opportunities as they presented themselves to
the grouping. It lays the ground for the next chapter which seeks to explain
these dynamics with a specific focus on the constraints and opportunities in
relation to my chosen theories. I lay out what the major factors affecting SADC
were at each stage of its development. Grounding the organisation in its
historical background also allows us to see how its modus operandi in its early days still does impact on its present
day mode of operation. Respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity seems
to be one such practice that SADC holds on to despite changes in the global
strategic environment.
So this chapter is concerned with the historical development of SADC,
but starts to elicit what the opportunities and constraints have been
throughout its history in preparation for a full assessment of them in Chapter 4.
While SADC does aspire to all the lofty goals that can be found in the preamble
of the UN Charter as well in the Treaties establishing the European Union,
there are greater limits to achievement of these goals by underdeveloped countries.
As an example, the outstanding limitation must be a lack of own resources; the
total SADC budget for 2007/8 was
USD$18.9 million.
This can be contrasted with budget for the EU, which, for the same year, was USD$155.
4 billion. Underdevelopment itself can be seen as the
first constraint to successful integration, for without funding, the regional
projects cannot be accomplished.
The founders of SADC were aware of the absence of choice under
conditions of underdevelopment so knew that economic development would be vital
for SADC. The
logical foundation for SADC thus should have been economic development first,
then any other integrative measures should have rested on the success of that. This
logic was however inverted out of
necessity, for according to Maxi Schoeman, SADC began life as a political
project. The
first imperative for SADC’s formation was the need to coordinate actions for
the liberation of Southern African states; a political project as can be seen
if we trace the genealogy of SADC back to the FLS days.
FLS, SADCC to SADC
The imperative behind the Frontline
States was liberating Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe from colonialism
and the ending of apartheid in South Africa. Thus in 1994, with the attainment
of majority rule in South Africa the FLS became defunct.[47] The FLS ran
concurrently with SADCC/SADC for a while
but did not last much longer after its mission was accomplished. The main
imperative that sustained SADC after the demise of FLS is the one it claims for
itself as seen in the Samora Machel quote above. The imperative is that political
liberation which came with the ending of colonialism and apartheid is not
accompanied by economic emancipation for the people of the region. It is SADC’s
stated goal to achieve economic liberation for the majority of Southern Africa.
Although economic liberation was implied during decolonisation, the foremost
challenge was gaining political freedom, which was the reason for the formation
of the Frontline States.
The Frontline
States
The timeline of the Frontline
States has this reading for the years of that the members joined; Tanzania,
Zambia, Botswana (1974) Mozambique (1975) Angola (1976) Zimbabwe (1980) Namibia
(1990) South Africa (1994). Noteworthy, is the fact that the year of a
country’s joining, with the exception of the founding states, is also the year
of liberation from colonialism/apartheid. The overriding imperative for the
formation of the forbearer of SADC was that of coordinating political actions
that would bring liberation to Southern Africa. The FLS was not divorced from
the work that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was doing in attempting
to achieve decolonisation. While the OAU’s Liberation Committee (LC) was
charged with this remit, the feeling was that it was too formal and too broad to
meet the needs of the sub-region effectively.
So what was needed was an organisation of states, closer to the countries that
remained under colonialism. A similar relationship still exists today between
the AU and SADC, where the expectation is that solutions to problems administered
at the sub-regional level would be more wieldy.
The FLS started life as an
informal forum for discussing the common problems among newly independent
states and those of liberation struggle movements. Maxi Schoeman points
us to the fact that the way the FLS operated, has a significant bearing on how
integration has developed in SADC today. He posits that regional integration
tended to be aimed at strengthening individual statehood and that pattern seems
to have taken root.
Some of the FLS practices were as follows, (1) ‘each state contributed
according to its means…. (2) There was constant and explicit recognition of
each other’s independent sovereignty and that this was not to be compromised
through cooperation …. (3) No formal agreements underpinned the establishment
of the FLS and in the case of SADCC there would be no Treaty.’
This kind of approach would place
the FLS in the intergovernmentalism camp if we apply our two theories of
integration to such a practice. The same practice, carried over to this day, means
that sovereignty can now be used by states so as not to sign up to any
supranational institutions that threaten its national interests. Which must
constrain regional integration. As the liberation goals were being achieved,
economic imperatives began to be the new challenges, especially in light of the
fact of apartheid South Africa’s destabilising policies against the Front Line
States.
The FLS response was to form SADCC, to focus specifically on the economic
imperatives.
SADCC
The Southern African Development Co-ordination
Conference (SADCC) was thus formed in 1980. Its goals were that ‘of promoting
regional co-operation through joint development projects, mobilising
development assistance and reducing the economic dependence of member states on
apartheid South Africa.’
In 1980, some countries that had not been part of the FLS were invited to join
SADCC, these were Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Apartheid South Africa itself,
was not a compliant opponent but was actively seeking to undermine and
destabilise the Frontline States. According to Malcolm Evans they were involved
in a ‘policy of Swaardmag (the power
of the sword)’ whose aims were to ‘smash the stability of the Front-line States
and blunt the development of SADCC while simultaneously striking at the African
National Congress (ANC) and its host nations.’
Part of the FLS commitment had been the hosting of ANC members who were fighting apartheid. Thus SADCC
countries had to contend with insecurity sponsored by South Africa, the most
notable being the use of proxy forces such as the ‘MNR in Mozambique, UNITA in
Angola, the Lesotho Liberation Army, the Zambian Mushala group and various
Zimbabwean dissidents.’
Changes in the situation in South Africa also led to
changes in the nature of the challenges facing SADCC. As majority rule beckoned
with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990, the regional block
began to reconfigure itself in anticipation of the pressing challenge of the
time. Once the existential threat posed by South Africa had been tamed, the
focus became achieving economic freedom which had, somewhat, been put on hold
by the fight against apartheid. A majority ruled South Africa and its strong
economy looked set to be an opportunity for integration. The decision was then
taken to formalise the organisation since the expectation, as articulated in
the Declaration and Treaty of the SADC,
was that the liberation of South Africa would, “…take the region out of
an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of cooperation; in a climate of
peace, security and stability.”
These new conditions were seen as opportunities for economic development
insofar as there is acceptance that there is a vicious cycle between insecurity
and underdevelopment.
SADC
The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
came into being on 17 August 1992, replacing the SADCC. More countries have
since joined the SADC; Mauritius (1995) DRC (1997), Seychelles (1997 left then
re-joined in 2008) and Madagascar (since
suspended after a military coup). SADC was now accorded a legal personality by
its founding Treaty, capable of entering into contract with other actors in
international relations.
The main innovation then, was that there was now a codification of practice for
SADC integration. The treaty sets out obligations and censure where member
states fail to meet these obligations. The signing of the Treaty and the
accession of more member states would suggest that states can see opportunities
in SADC. Having looked at its development through history, we can now attempt
to assess the opportunities and constraints to achieving the SADC idea.
Chapter Four
Assessment of the Opportunities and
Constraints
This chapter looks at the nature of the
opportunities and constraints for SADC integration. What conditions have
spurred or hindered integration? To what extent are the difficulties systemic
or agential? This section has as its foundation, the fact that we have already drawn
out from our theory and history, what SADC integration hopes to achieve. The
history of SADC has shown us that each challenge elicited the need for a
collective response. Neofunctionalism points us to the fact that supranational
institutions invested with the authority to act are likely to be more efficient
than uncoordinated, piecemeal national government initiatives.
Intergovernmentalism has been argued to insist that integration will only go
ahead insofar as governments see a benefit for their national interest and not
necessarily for the regional grouping per se.
With this in mind I first turn to the opportunities, then to the
constraints to regional integration in Southern Africa.
Opportunities for SADC
The starting point has to be the rationale for
integration in Southern Africa. Returning to one of the definitions we used for
integration by Karl Deutsch; we see that integration awards units capacities
that they would separately lack.
In this vein, Chingono and Nakana state that ‘the major rationale for regional
integration is the belief that there is strength in numbers and in unity, and
that this strength can speed up the pace of development as well as enhance
security. Cooperation and integration are a strategy for overcoming perceived
weakness and development obstacles.’
During the SADCC years, the strategy was cooperation which has turned to integration
in the SADC years, but, for the same aim of overcoming weaknesses. Integration
in the economic domain in Southern Africa is expected to make the region
internationally competitive, which would lead to realisation of the overarching
goals of ending dependence on Western economies, as well as poverty
alleviation. The
gains for peace and security are implied by economic enmeshment which, most
integration theories subscribe to.
Throughout the history of SADC from the FLS days, the
one main constraint that had stood in the way of integration was the existence
of apartheid and colonialism in some of the states that form the region, notably
South Africa. Although SADC does not have a formal criteria for accession, it
can be argued from practice, that the apartheid states and those under
colonialism would not be admitted into the grouping. The ending of apartheid
and attainment of majority rule in the whole region is therefore an opportunity
for the integration scheme to be implemented. This was akin to the attainment
of the third of the background conditions I mentioned in the theories chapter,
which Haas said needs to be there for integration to go ahead. This third
background condition is, ‘common ideological patterns among participating
units.’
I would qualify this, for my paper, with the word relative. For SADC, as we
will see in the discussion of the constraints, is not ideologically a unitary
block – and never has – even during the armed struggles. Regardless, success in achieving the liberation goals
presented SADC with the opportunity to integrate, since, as stated in the SADC
Treaty, peaceful conditions are conducive to economic growth and development.
An end to South Africa’s destabilisation activities
and the possibility of returning to full economic relations, is the biggest
positive opportunity for SADC. For, according to Blumenfeld, SADCC’s
dissociation with South Africa was also hurting their economies as the
landlocked countries depended on South African ports for their access to the
sea routes.
An end to South Africa’s support for destabilisation is also evident in the
ending of the conflicts in Mozambique and Angola, which meant resources that
were being used in conflict could be redirected towards development. Also, from
the intergovernmentalism perspective, the prevalence of issues in the current global
strategic environment that cannot be solved unilaterally by SADC governments, can
be argued as a spur for integration. I now turn to the constraints to
integration which I have observed are more outstanding than the opportunities.
Constraints to Regional Integration:
The constraints to regional integration in SADC are
the reasons why most of the goals articulated by the block have not been
achieved. The disconnect between stated goals and actions is easy to see. Some
of the missed targets are the Free Trade Area (FTA) which was supposed to have
been achieved by 2008, and a SADC Customs Union which was earmarked for 2010.
In the political and security domain, the DRC war (1998 – 2002) and SADC’s
response to it is an example of the divergences between the national governments,
which does not bode well for the articulated regional cohesion when facing
challenges to the block.
Sovereignty
The
most potent stumbling block to regional integration is the holding of
sovereignty as sacrosanct by governments in the SADC block. As I have noted
above, this is rooted in the practice that began in the FLS days and was
codified in SADC’s founding Treaty of 1992. Understandably, those who had been
denied access to self-determination and were denied rights on the basis of
non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states as articulated in
Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, will hold classical sovereignty in high regard
once they achieve it. Therefore, African states generally hold sovereignty as
inviolable. But pursued to its logical conclusion, classical sovereignty means
that SADC cannot evolve the common political institutions, since the grouping
cannot dictate to members which political ideology to follow. Below I will show
what sovereignty entails for SADC, starting with the incompatibilities it
fosters and maintains.
Incompatible
Political and Economic Systems:
I have
said above that the end of apartheid in South Africa meant there was a shift in
political ideologies that could allow integration to become conceivable,
without exception, in the region. I also hinted earlier that, even when the
Southern African community (FLS/SADCC) was united against apartheid, they were
not a monolithic block. Sesay argues that even in the early days; ‘they could
be categorised into various shades and leanings. On the one hand Mozambique and
Angola both styled themselves as Marxist-Leninist regimes, on the other
Botswana and Zambia pursued state capitalism, Tanzania meanwhile, is dedicated
to what Timothy Shaw has called a ‘transformationalist’ system, based on
policies of self-reliance.’
He adds that these ‘differences in economic, ideological and social patterns
(not forgetting of course the personalities of their leadership) led to various
preferences within the FLS in their support for the liberation movements.’
So, even
when these countries were faced by the existential threat that was apartheid South Africa, they still
differed substantially in approach due to their different internal systems. An
example of how potent these differences were for regional cohesion is that
during the Angolan civil war, the FLS states supported different sides in the
war. According to Sesay, ‘Tanzania and Mozambique supported the MPLA, but
Zambia gave tacit support to UNITA.’
These differences were also premised on what the various states perceived as
their national interest, largely economic interests since, indeed, developing
world economies are usually seen as competitive.
In this
vein, Chingono and Nakana observe that ‘SADC national economies are not
complementary, but instead structured in ways that promote competition for
Western markets and investment.’
This is a situation where the same countries produce the same products for
exports and by virtue of that have to compete for markets. This competition for
markets and investment leads to an even more potent political constraint to
integration; rivalry among member states.
Nationalist
Rivalry:
Nationalist rivalry is a really a clash of interests
predicated on the differences in ideology, economic systems, political systems
and expected benefits from integration.
There is thus, according to the same authors, (1) no common values beyond
rhetoric; (2) states do not want to surrender sovereignty to binding rules; and
(3) underdevelopment and size of economies and weak administrative capacity
undermines any SADC initiatives. This then means that, in reality governments
stand in competition with each other despite proclamations to the contrary.
Some examples suffice at this point which show how
potent this constraint is. The first one is in the SADCC years. Kato Lambrechts
records that Malawi was the only state in Southern Africa which maintained
relations with apartheid South Africa.
This must have been based on Malawi’s calculation of what its national interest
was from an economic and security standpoint. According to the rules of classical
sovereignty, this is admissible. The second example is of what happened during
the DRC war of 1998 – 2002, the SADC years. A split between two camps is said
to have become evident, where there was one camp with Zimbabwe, Namibia and
Angola who favoured a hawkish solution, and in the opposite camp was South
Africa, Botswana and Mozambique advocating a diplomatic solution.
Further, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola’s military intervention in the DRC war is
argued to have been based on narrow national interests rather than the regional
interest.
The important point to take from this chapter is
that opportunities to regional integration are quite paltry, but the challenges
are numerous and very potent. The outstanding constraint is sovereignty, which
is an umbrella for all the constraints, insofar as we have seen that the nation
state in SADC will place its national interest ahead of regional interests.
From all the foregoing, we can now say what insights our assessment of
opportunities and constraints to regional integration has yielded.
Conclusion:
What is
the SADC Idea?
A look at the Declaration, Treaty and Protocol of
the Southern African Development Community yields the insight that SADC is both
an economic and political project. This is an attempt to integrate both the
economic and the political domains. The SADC grouping thus takes upon itself
the role of improving the welfare of the people through economic development
and political best practices. The postulated evolution of common values is
based on the tenets of liberal democracy with the attendant practices of
observing human rights, freedom of association, freedom of worship and
universal suffrage. This is a logical postulate considering that SADC states
have a history of being denied these rights by colonialism and, their
liberation struggles were about achieving these rights. Political rights and
security of persons can only be achieved under conditions of prosperity. This
is the SADC idea. My question can then be rephrased to: why has this idea not
succeeded so far?
What Stands in the Way?
To answer that question my paper has relied on
theories of integration as lenses to assess developments in the region between
1980 – 2010. The main theories I chose are neofunctionalism and
intergovernmentalism. I chose these two theories as they can be seen to fall in
opposing camps of the integration debate. I have argued that the integration
debate is largely between these two camps: on the one hand, there is a view which
sees integration as inevitably leading to federal or federal like units, and on
the other, there is insistence that international organizations only exist to
the extent that nation states find them useful, so there is no automaticity to
integration. Both theories I chose illuminate some aspects of SADC even if it’s
only to show what has not been done. SADC indeed has a Secretariat and a Tribunal,
which are supranational bodies of a technical nature postulated by
neofunctionalism. The fact that SADC states have, so far, refused to devolve
power to these institutions leads us to explanations best made by intergovernmentalism.
I also looked at SADC’s evolution through history
in response to prevailing imperatives. The end of apartheid and the relative
peace that ensured was the great opportunity for integration, but classical
sovereignty still remains a constraint. Throughout history, constriction to
integration has thus been seen to be due to the fact that: SADC holds the
principle of sovereign equality as sacrosanct (owing to its history) and,
states have used SADC to consolidate sovereignty. This means that SADC cannot
dictate best practices to member states. Since SADC is not ideologically a
monolithic block – and never has – these differences translate into hindrances
to achieving an optimal performing international organization. They then
manifest themselves as national rivalries and other practices inimical to
deepening integration.
In terms of looking forward to possible solutions,
I also wanted to know whether the difficulties encountered by SADC are systemic
or agential. I realise that such a neat dichotomy cannot be made since
structure and agency cannot be easily extricated from each other. The one
prediction I can make, based on the European experience, is that a generational
change (an agential change) may also change the potency of classical sovereignty
(a structural condition) as a stumbling block to integration. European
integration in its early years was hindered by rivalries between France and
Germany based on the recent memories of World War 2. It seems, to my mind, that
sovereignty is still a strong referent object for Southern Africa, because it
was only recently attained by current SADC political elites. This may change in
the future as the sub-region’s identification with the liberation struggles
wanes.
Bibliography:
Chingono,
Mark and Steve Nakana. “The Challenges of Regional Integration in Southern
Africa.” African Journal of Political
Science and International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 10, (October, 2009): 396 –
408.
Menon,
Anand. “Security Cooperation Beyond the Nation State: The EU’s Common Security
and Defence Policy.” Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, (2011): 1 – 21.
Møller,
Bjørn. “Africa’s Sub-Regional Organisations: Seamless Web or Patchwork?” Danish
Institute for International Studies, Regional
and Global Axes of Conflict, Working
Papers, No. 56, (Aug. 2009): 1 – 31.
Sesay,
Amadu. “The Roles of the Frontline States in Southern Africa.” In eds. Olajide
Aluko and Timothy Shaw. Southern Africa
In The 1980s. London: George Allen and Unwin Publishers Limited, 1985.
Simmons,
Beth A. and Lisa L. Martin. “International Organizations and Institutions.” In
ed. Walter Carlsnaes et. al., Handbook of
International Relations, (London: Sage Publications, 2008).
Van
Nieuwerkerk, Antoni. “Security Co-operation in the Southern African Development
Community: Insights From the New Institutionalism.” Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol.
34, No. 2 (2006): 1 – 20.
