Applying the Tools of Conflict Analysis to the Rwanda Genocide

"Normal people do not know that anything is possible" - David Rousset.

Researching the dynamics of the Rwanda genocide at the University of Kent, Canterbury for the PO572 Module (Conflict Analysis and Resolution).

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu

Map and analyse a conflict of your choice drawing on relevant literature and theory. The first section should identify primary and secondary parties, positions, interests, needs and the strategic environment. The second section should apply one or more of the theories to analyse the conflict. The third section should analyse (using appropriate literature and theories) how it ended and whether the conflict termination has been short term or long term.

Introduction:

Rwanda became the byword for genocide after an estimated 800 000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred there over a 100 day period between 6 April 1994 and 18 July 1994 (Melvern, 2000). The killings were organized by Hutu extremists who feared losing their political and economic power to the Tutsi minority after the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) – the military wing of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) – invaded from its bases in Uganda (Melvern, 2000). While the actual genocide captured the most headlines, my paper is more focused on the conditions prior to the genocide.

It is difficult to discuss the Rwanda conflict without ultimately engaging with the genocide. I have, therefore, chosen the period between 1 October 1990 and 18 July 1994 as the period of the conflict I will talk about. The actual genocide is evidently a failure in the attempts to find a workable solution to the conflictual relations between Tutsis and Hutus ever since the colonially sanctioned Tutsi domination of Hutus ended in 1959 (Scrogie, 2004: 67). Paradoxically, the most significant failure is the Arusha Accords which – at face value – held great promise for a new democratic dispensation in Rwanda.

My paper will be arranged in this manner: in the first section of my paper, I will identify the primary and secondary parties in the conflict and their relationships. In the second section, I will turn to the theories of conflict to analyse the causal mechanisms in the Rwanda civil war. No single theory can capture the complexity of conflict, hence I will rely on theories such as, colonial legacy theory, collective fears for the future and horizontal inequalities. In the third section I will discuss the resolution. I will do this by focusing on the Arusha Accords and how failure in their implementation led to the genocide (Scrogie, 2004). The explanation that captures the essence of this failure is Barbara Walter’s critical barrier to civil war settlement theory.

Section I

Primary and Secondary Parties to the Conflict

A Brief History of the Conflict:

Ami R Mpungwe, the Tanzanian diplomat who was entrusted to mediate the Rwanda conflict on behalf of his president, records that the Rwanda conflict was one which was “deep-rooted, in both its historical and prevailing dynamics” (Mpungwe, 1999). He differentiates it from disputes over authenticity of elections results in Lesotho, and therefore suggests that the issues were genuinely intractable (Mpungwe, 1999). He intimates that, “these conflicts by their very nature and character, are extremely tenacious because they revolve around the fundamentals of human life: land, safety, security, identity, recognition, esteem and unhindered opportunities for human development as a whole” (Mpungwe, 1999). The conflict has its roots in the widespread colonial practice of ‘divide and rule’ which in Rwanda eventually meant Tutsis and Hutus being pitted against each other in a deadly adversarial relationship. Access to the human needs, listed above by Mpungwe, became dependent on which group you belonged to.

Most accounts of how the colonial powers had a hand in creating the above problem, agree that the colonial powers gave the Tutsi and Hutu classifications, the ethnic and racial superiority connotations which they originally did not have (Hintjens, 1999: 247). This began with Germany and was maintained when Belgium became the next colonial power (Hintjens, 1999). For now, it is sufficient to just highlight that the colonial powers had a hand in the problems which have beset Rwanda since its independence. The significance of that will become clearer in the second section of my paper when I talk about colonial legacy as a cause of the Rwanda conflict. The main point at this stage is to record that at independence there was violence as the Tutsis who had been favoured throughout the colonial period were ousted by the Hutu majority: the violence at that time claimed 10 000 Tutsi lives (Hintjens, 1999). Indeed, there is a history of cyclical pogroms against Tutsis by Hutus (1959, 1963, 1972 and 1994), as a result of the hate fostered when they (Tutsi) were made overlords by colonial powers while the Hutus were marginalised (Mpungwe, 1999). The root cause of the 1990 – 1994 conflict can be traced to these pogroms which led the Tutsis leave Rwanda and become stateless persons in neighbouring Uganda. When the Tutsis became persecuted in Uganda’s government (1982), a return to their homeland became an urgent imperative (Mpungwe, 1999). Before seeking to return home however, the Tutsis fought alongside Yoweri Museveni when he formed a rebellion which finally deposed Obote in 1986 (Melvern, 2000). With Museveni now in power in Uganda, the Tutsis now had an ally. As it is not within the scope of this paper to give a detailed history, I will now turn to the main parties to the conflict and what their grievances were.

Hutus vs Tutsis?

Fig. 1 Conflict Map

The Arusha Accords of 1993 are the best source for who the parties in the Rwanda civil war were and what they were fighting for. The main parties were the Government of Rwanda (GoR), which was a Hutu government, and their opponents were the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of exiles from Uganda seeking to return to their homeland (Scrogie, 2004: 67). As the RPF fighters were based in Uganda, there is a suspicion that units of the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces were fighting alongside the RPF, although this is always difficult to prove. What is more difficult to deny, is that Uganda gave bases to – and armed – the RPF (Melvern, 2000). My conflict map (Fig. 1) shows these relationships: where the primary paries are the GoR pitted against the RPF; and the secondary parties who supported the GoR in the civil war are France, Zaire, Egypt and Kenya, while the RPF was supported by Uganda (Prunier, 2010). I have chosen to focus more on showing alliances with primary actors, as direct clashes between the French and Ugandans would have been very minimal. A deviation is the conflict relationship between Uganda and Rwanda that is shown in Fig. 1, this is because of the level of dependency of the RPF on Uganda. Overall, my map tries to show which primary party the secondary parties put their support behind. Tanzania, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN) are also shown on the map but in the mediator’s role. Tanzania genuinely played an honest broker role and the OAU and UN were largely behind Tanzania’s lead in the mediation (Wage and Loigh, 2004).

Fig. 2 Rwanda Conflict Alliances

Although the GoR was a Hutu government, the character of the conflict was not strictly Hutu vs Tutsi. It has been said that if the Tutsi had not invaded on 1 October 1990, the Rwanda civil war would still have happened, but between Northern Hutus and Southern Hutus (Newbury and Newbury, 1995). A pertinent point is that the GoR was not a unitary actor having been, at the time, strong armed by the international community to end the one party state (Newbury and Newbury, 1995). It was thus a coalition of opponents. So, apart from the secondary parties, my map also shows the GoR’s alliances with various political parties and other non-state actors such as militias, it is thus difficult to pin down the GoR’s positions and interests. Fig. 2 shows more details of the non-state actors involved. The claim that there was a likelihood of war between Northern and Southern Hutus, prior to the RPF invasion, is based on the fact that there was discrimination and exclusion among the Hutus themselves on the two geographical locations. My map (Fig. 1) shows Coalition pour la Defence de la Republic (CDR) as an ally of the GoR, the CDR is an example of a Northern Hutu grouping that had its own agenda in the conflict: they were the hardliners (Newbury and Newbury, 1995). The other main political parties are represented on the map as the opposition for, although they were in a coalition with the GoR, they had their own agendas too which, on the most part, coincided with the RPF position (Newbury and Newbury, 1995). It was this coalition, with their disparate goals, that negotiated at Arusha.

Positions, Interests and Needs: Primary Actors

Fig. 3 Onion Analysis Rwanda

The consensus in the literature is that the RPF negotiated better at Arusha and so were able to articulate their positions and interests and got the most concessions, while the GoR, owing to its disparate power centres, fared very badly (Scrogie, 2004: 68). My onion analysis (Fig. 3) reflects this situation. I have been forced to award the GoR general human needs and not their clearly stated positions and interests for, it was that convoluted: the CDR was not interested in any settlement, the Mouvement Revolutionaire National Pour le Development (MRND) was ambiguous, while the other coalition partners may have wanted a settlement. The RPF on the other hand knew what they wanted and insisted on it. RPF positions and interests are listed on the right hand column of Fig. 3.

Other Interests and the Strategic Environment:

After the invasion by the RPF, France, Zaire, Egypt and Kenya came to the aid of Rwanda. Egypt allowed weapons sales to Rwanda, while Zaire, France and Kenya sent troops to defend the GoR (Prunier, 2010). France’s interest was defending a Francophone country against the perceived encroachment by the Anglo – Saxons, while Kenya and Zaire may have been interested in sovereign state under attack (Prunier, 2010). Despite Uganda denying any involvement, its interests can be seen as supporting allies and solving its Tutsi refugee problem. The conflict was framed differently too by different actors at its outbreak. The OAU framed it as an attempt by refugees to return home, while France and the GoR framed it as neighbouring state (Uganda) aggression (Melvern, 2000). To this end, Kenya and Zaire could legitimately come to the aid of Rwanda. The general strategic environment was whereby the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states had not yet begun to be seriously questioned. This would only come as a response to the shock of the genocide.

Section II

Analysing the Conflict:

The 1994 Rwanda genocide was used by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as a spur for the need to change the state sovereignty rules that have been in existence since the Peace of Westphalia (ICISS, 2001). It was his view that the failures of the international community in Rwanda were due to a deference to sovereignty over the protection of human rights. If it was not for that reason, the assumption is that the international community would have no fetters in using force to stop the violence there. I raise this point to try and discuss the situation in the context of the limits placed on the actors by the prevailing situation in 1994, mindful that African states are very vocal against any erosion to state sovereignty rules. This is important as my approach to discussing the causal mechanisms imposes upon me to mention the Arusha Accords and the failure of their implementation. Their implementation failed because there was no commitment to enforce them, perhaps owing to a defence to the sovereignty of the GoR. In any case, that failure has insights for my first theory below.

As I have stated above, this conflict cannot be explained by a single theory, the most significant theory for my conflict is the one proposed by David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild. This is the theory which proposes that collective fears for the future are a potent cause of conflict. The theory holds that “as groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult to resolve dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence” (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 41). These dilemmas are information failures, problems of credible commitment and the security dilemma (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 41). The theme that runs through these dilemmas is a high level of diffidence towards each other on the part of the groups in a conflictual relationship. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs then play on these fears to incite violence, especially if there is a history of violence between the groups (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 41). This was certainly the case in the lead up to, and during the genocide. To capture this dynamic, Lake and Rothchild (1996: 43) use Vesna Pesic’s quote that “ethnic conflict is caused by the ‘fear of the future,’ lived through the past.” Memories of violence in the past endure. With the adversarial relationship, due to colonialism, between the Hutus and Tutsis I posited in Section I of this paper, this theory is very apt for the conflict under discussion. In terms of elite mobilization for violence, the CDR can be seen as the group that played this role in Rwanda. Within the CDR was the group called the Akazu (little house or inner circle) which was the group that feared losing power to the RPF the most. This group then used the Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC) to mobilise ordinary Hutus in the politics of fear. The result was the genocide. Furthermore, the fact that the Arusha Accords failed is a testimony to the credible commitment dilemma this theory postulates. This is when absent enforcement action from a powerful outsider, ethnic groups fear the other will renege on agreements therefore they all seek to pre-emptively strike each other (Lake and Rothchild, 1996).

Regardless of the above insights, colonial legacy theory can also add something to the discussion of the Rwanda conflict. Colonial legacy theory argues that the ill effects of colonialism can still be the source of conflict even so long after colonialism ended. Bernard et. al. (2004: 229) posit that colonialism “creates patterns of development that leave countries highly dependent on exports from monocrop agriculture or resource extractive industries… which leaves many post-colonial economies vulnerable to volatile prices for primary goods on the world market.” This is one general part of the theory, the other part, which is more pertinent to my conflict, is the enmity such as the deadly rivalry created by the divide and rule tactic in Rwanda under colonialism. The Stanford Prison Experiment shows the susceptibility of human nature to such in-group/out-group constructs. Put together then, these two aspects of the colonial legacy mean that any economic pressures will create ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ as the two competing groups exclude each other on the basis of the perceived ethnic differences. In Rwanda, the Hutus were initially marginalized and they in turn marginalized the Tutsis on the basis of ethnicity. This dynamic has an overlap with Gudrun Ostby’s theory of horizontal inequalities. Ostby (2008: 143) posits that inequalities will lead to conflict if they are horizontal (between groups) rather than vertical (between individuals). 

The above theories (colonial legacy and horizontal inequalities) are salient because of the fact that Rwanda in the 1990s was experiencing severe economic problems and was on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programme (SAP) which coincided with the world wide crash of coffee prices – Rwanda’s monocrop (Clark, 2011). These pressures are said to have made the Hutu extremists hatch a plan for survival that depended on the elimination of Tutsi.

Section III

Conflict Resolution

The negotiations to end the Rwanda conflict seem to be the perfect antithesis to Roger Fisher and William Ury’s theory of principled negotiation. In principled negotiation, the focus is on these four points: “separate the people from the problem; focus on interests, not positions; generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do; and insist that the result be based on some objective standard” (Fisher and Ury, 1991: 10). The logic behind these postulates being that you will get a resolution that can actually be implemented, as no party would feel to have been tricked or coerced into settling – a genuine compromise. The negotiating tactics of the RPF at Arusha were that of hard bargaining and, as predicted by Fisher and Ury (1991), they produced a lop-sided agreement. Granted, it was not the RPF’s fault that the GoR was incoherent and that the ‘hurting stalemate’ was bearable for the RPF, still, the resultant genocide reverses all the gains the RPF thought it made at the Arusha negotiations. Strength, thus, becomes a weakness. The two main failures of Arusha were (1) the exclusion of the hardliners (who then became spoilers) owing to the RPF’s hard bargaining having won the day and, (2) the international community’s lack of will in underwriting the agreement (Scrogie, 2004). In the literature, the involvement of the international community, especially the UN and the OAU gives Arusha a Track One classification and, also since, the potential level of violence was very high given the history (Crocker et. al., 1999). What was lacking, as prescribed by the literature, was a willingness to use force to ensure the implementation of the Arusha Accords. I have pointed out that this may be down to either a respect for state sovereignty rules or, meddling by powerful players such as France (a permanent Security Council member) that had an interest in the conflict. The result is that the one mechanism which was supposed to ensure compliance; the UN peacekeeping force – United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR I) – was undermined, under-equipped and did not arrive in place on the scheduled time, which allowed the spoilers the time and space to carry out their genocidal plans (Scrogie, 2004). This is what Walter (1997) called the critical barrier to civil war settlement; in her conception, “most internal wars end with the extermination, expulsion or capitulation of the losing side.” She says negotiations fail because combatants are asked to disarm when there is no legitimate institution to guarantee their security (Walter, 1997). The way to overcome this barrier, which was missed at Arusha, is to have a robust force in place to implement and enforce sanctions against any breaches of the settlement. The international community, for whatever reasons, failed to underwrite Arusha. The conflict, as predicted by Walter, was then settled on the battlefield when the RPF captured Kigali from the GoR on 18 July 1994, putting an end to the genocide.

Conclusions:

My paper has attempted to show the three main steps to analysing conflicts those working in conflict resolution have to be conversant with. The first step is mapping the conflict so as to clearly understand the issues, parties and relationships involved. The second step is applying theories so as to better understand the causes of the conflict and, the third step is choosing the best conflict resolution tools having understood the nature of the conflict through steps 1 and 2. I have chosen the Rwanda conflict and discussed it in those three steps. The Rwanda conflict was steeped in the problems that arise from colonial legacies but it can be discussed in the same terms of the in-group/out-group dynamics that apply to all human conflicts. My paper highlighted the need for conflict resolution based on genuine compromises as lop-sided agreements are just a foundation for the next permutation of the conflict. The solution that finally ended the genocide in Rwanda was a military victory by the RPF, followed by the expulsion of the Hutus into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Whether this is a permanent or short term solution, remains to be seen, as it is not infeasible that one day the Hutus will be the invasion force demanding the right of return as the RPF did on 1 October 1990.

"Normal people do not know that anything is possible" - David Rousset

Bibliography:

Bernard, Michael et. al. (2004), The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48: 225 – 250.

Clark, Janine Natalya (2011), Between Theory and Practice: Conflict Resolution in Rwanda, in Wolff, Stefan and Yakinthou, Christalla (eds.), Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practice. London: Routledge.

Crocker, Chester et. al. (1999), Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

Fisher, Roger and Ury, William (1991), Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving in. New York: Houston Mifflin Company.

Hintjens, Helen M. (1999), Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2: 241 – 286.

ICISS (2001), “The Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Link available on Google Search.

Lake, David A., and Rothchild, Donald (1996), Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict. International Society, Vol. 21, No. 2: 41 – 75.

Melvern, Linda R. (2000), A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. London: Zed Books.

Mpungwe, Amir R., (1999), Crises and Response in Rwanda: Reflections on the Arusha Accords. Institute for Security Studies Monograph No. 36.

Newbury, Catherine and Newbury, David (1995), Identity, Genocide, and Reconstruction in Rwanda.  Reseau Documentaire Sur la Region des Grands Lacs Africains. Link available on Google Search.

Ostby, Gudrun (2008), Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No 2: 143 – 162.

Prunier, Gerard (2010), The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. London: Hurst and Company Publishers.

Scrogie, Lindsay (2004), Rwanda’s Arusha Accords: A Missed Opportunity. Undercurrent, Vol. 1, No. 1: 66 – 76.

Wage, David and Haigh, Lois (2004), A Case Study on the Arusha Peace Agreements. The Florida State University. Link available on Google Search.

Walter, Barbara F., (1997), The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 5: 335 – 364.

If I Were To Choose The Country Of My Birth...

"For if one should propose to all men a choice, bidding them select the best customs from all the customs that there are, each race of men, after examining them all, would select those of his own people; thus all think that their own customs are by far the best" - Herodotus of Halicarnassus, The Histories. 

Below is the Preface to Rousseau's discourse on the origins of inequality. In itself, the preface is a self contained unit which describes what the ideal republic ought to look like. The works that become classics or become listed as canons, tend to do so on merit. Now read on... 

"The Republics" by Kudakwashe Kanhutu

by Jean-Jacques Rousseau 

Dedication to the Republic of Geneva 

MOST HONOURABLE, MAGNIFICENT AND SOVEREIGN LORDS, convinced that only a virtuous citizen can confer on his country honours which it can accept, I have been for thirty years past working to make myself worthy to offer you some public homage; and, this fortunate opportunity supplementing in some degree the insufficiency of my efforts, I have thought myself entitled to follow in embracing it the dictates of the zeal which inspires me, rather than the right which should have been my authorisation. Having had the happiness to be born among you, how could I reflect on the equality which nature has ordained between men, and the inequality which they have introduced, without reflecting on the profound wisdom by which both are in this State happily combined and made to coincide, in the manner that is most in conformity with natural law, and most favourable to society, to the maintenance of public order and to the happiness of individuals? In my researches after the best rules common sense can lay down for the constitution of a government, I have been so struck at finding them all in actuality in your own, that even had I not been born within your walls I should have thought it indispensable for me to offer this picture of human society to that people, which of all others seems to be possessed of its greatest advantages, and to have best guarded against its abuses. 

If I had had to make choice of the place of my birth, I should have preferred a society which had an extent proportionate to the limits of the human faculties; that is, to the possibility of being well governed: in which every person being equal to his occupation, no one should be obliged to commit to others the functions with which he was entrusted: a State, in which all the individuals being well known to one another, neither the secret machinations of vice, nor the modesty of virtue should be able to escape the notice and judgment of the public; and in which the pleasant custom of seeing and knowing one another should make the love of country rather a love of the citizens than of its soil. 

I should have wished to be born in a country in which the interest of the Sovereign and that of the people must be single and identical; to the end that all the movements of the machine might tend always to the general happiness. And as this could not be the case, unless the Sovereign and the people were one and the same person, it follows that I should have wished to be born under a democratic government, wisely tempered. 

I should have wished to live and die free: that is, so far subject to the laws that neither I, nor anybody else, should be able to cast off their honourable yoke: the easy and salutary yoke which the haughtiest necks bear with the greater docility, as they are made to bear no other. 

I should have wished then that no one within the State should be able to say he was above the law; and that no one without should be able to dictate so that the State should be obliged to recognise his authority. For, be the constitution of a government what it may, if there be within its jurisdiction a single man who is not subject to the law, all the rest are necessarily at his discretion. And if there be a national ruler within, and a foreign ruler without, however they may divide their authority, it is impossible that both should be duly obeyed, or that the State should be well governed. 

I should not have chosen to live in a republic of recent institution, however excellent its laws; for fear the government, being perhaps otherwise framed than the circumstances of the moment might require, might disagree with the new citizens, or they with it, and the State run the risk of overthrow and destruction almost as soon as it came into being. For it is with liberty as it is with those solid and succulent foods, or with those generous wines which are well adapted to nourish and fortify robust constitutions that are used to them, but ruin and intoxicate weak and delicate constitutions to which they are not suited. Peoples once accustomed to masters are not in a condition to do without them. If they attempt to shake off the yoke, they still more estrange themselves from freedom, as, by mistaking for it an unbridled license to which it is diametrically opposed, they nearly always manage, by their revolutions, to hand themselves over to seducers, who only make their chains heavier than before. The Roman people itself, a model for all free peoples, was wholly incapable of governing itself when it escaped from the oppression of the Tarquins. Debased by slavery, and the ignominious tasks which had been imposed upon it, it was at first no better than a stupid mob, which it was necessary to control and govern with the greatest wisdom; in order that, being accustomed by degrees to breathe the health-giving air of liberty, minds which had been enervated or rather brutalised under tyranny, might gradually acquire that severity of morals and spirit of fortitude which made it at length the people of all most worthy of respect. I should, then, have sought out for my country some peaceful and happy Republic, of an antiquity that lost itself, as it were, in the night of time: which had experienced only such shocks as served to manifest and strengthen the courage and patriotism of its subjects; and whose citizens, long accustomed to a wise independence, were not only free, but worthy to be so.  

I should have wished to choose myself a country, diverted, by a fortunate impotence, from the brutal love of conquest, and secured, by a still more fortunate situation, from the fear of becoming itself the conquest of other States: a free city situated between several nations, none of which should have any interest in attacking it, while each had an interest in preventing it from being attacked by the others; in short, a Republic which should have nothing to tempt the ambition of its neighbours, but might reasonably depend on their assistance in case of need. It follows that a republican State so happily situated could have nothing to fear but from itself; and that, if its members trained themselves to the use of arms, it would be rather to keep alive that military ardour and courageous spirit which are so proper among freemen, and tend to keep up their taste for liberty, than from the necessity of providing for their defence. 

I should have sought a country, in which the right of legislation was vested in all the citizens; for who can judge better than they of the conditions under which they had best dwell together in the same society? Not that I should have approved of Plebiscita, like those among the Romans; in which the rulers in the State, and those most interested in its preservation, were excluded from the deliberations on which in many cases its security depended; and in which, by the most absurd inconsistency, the magistrates were deprived of rights which the meanest citizens enjoyed.  

On the contrary, I should have desired that, in order to prevent self-interested and ill-conceived projects, and all such dangerous innovations as finally ruined the Athenians, each man should not be at liberty to propose new laws at pleasure; but that this right should belong exclusively to the magistrates; and that even they should use it with so much caution, the people, on its side, be so reserved in giving its consent to such laws, and the promulgation of them be attended with so much solemnity, that before the constitution could be upset by them, there might be time enough for all to be convinced, that it is above all the great antiquity of the laws which makes them sacred and venerable, that men soon learn to despise laws which they see daily altered, and that States, by accustoming themselves to neglect their ancient customs under the pretext of improvement, often introduce greater evils than those they endeavour to remove. 

I should have particularly avoided, as necessarily ill-governed, a Republic in which the people, imagining themselves in a position to do without magistrates, or at least to leave them with only a precarious authority, should imprudently have kept for themselves the administration of civil affairs and the execution of their own laws. Such must have been the rude constitution of primitive governments, directly emerging from a state of nature; and this was another of the vices that contributed to the downfall of the Republic of Athens. 

But I should have chosen a community in which the individuals, content with sanctioning their laws, and deciding the most important public affairs in general assembly and on the motion of the rulers, had established honoured tribunals, carefully distinguished the several departments, and elected year by year some of the most capable and upright of their fellow-citizens to administer justice and govern the State; a community, in short, in which the virtue of the magistrates thus bearing witness to the wisdom of the people, each class reciprocally did the other honour. If in such a case any fatal misunderstandings arose to disturb the public peace, even these intervals of blindness and error would bear the marks of moderation, mutual esteem, and a common respect for the laws; which are sure signs and pledges of a reconciliation as lasting as sincere. Such are the advantages, most honourable, magnificent and sovereign lords, which I should have sought in the country in which I should have chosen to be born. And if providence had added to all these a delightful situation, a temperate climate, a fertile soil, and the most beautiful countryside under Heaven, I should have desired only, to complete my felicity, the peaceful enjoyment of all these blessings, in the bosom of this happy country; to live at peace in the sweet society of my fellow-citizens, and practising towards them, from their own example, the duties of friendship, humanity, and every other virtue, to leave behind me the honourable memory of a good man, and an upright and virtuous patriot. 

But, if less fortunate or too late grown wise, I had seen myself reduced to end an infirm and languishing life in other climates, vainly regretting that peaceful repose which I had forfeited in the imprudence of youth, I should at least have entertained the same feelings in my heart, though denied the opportunity of making use of them in my native country. Filled with a tender and disinterested love for my distant fellow-citizens, I should have addressed them from my heart, much in the following terms. 

"My dear fellow-citizens, or rather my brothers, since the ties of blood, as well as the laws, unite almost all of us, it gives me pleasure that I cannot think of you, without thinking, at the same time, of all the blessings you enjoy, and of which none of you, perhaps, more deeply feels the value than I who have lost them. The more I reflect on your civil and political condition, the less can I conceive that the nature of human affairs could admit of a better. In all other governments, when there is a question of ensuring the greatest good of the State, nothing gets beyond projects and ideas, or at best bare possibilities. But as for you, your happiness is complete, and you have nothing to do but enjoy it; you require nothing more to be made perfectly happy, than to know how to be satisfied with being so. Your sovereignty, acquired or recovered by the sword, and maintained for two centuries past by your valour and wisdom, is at length fully and universally acknowledged. Your boundaries are fixed, your rights confirmed and your repose secured by honourable treaties. Your constitution is excellent, being not only dictated by the profoundest wisdom, but guaranteed by great and friendly powers. Your State enjoys perfect tranquillity; you have neither wars nor conquerors to fear; you have no other master than the wise laws you have yourselves made; and these are administered by upright magistrates of your own choosing. You are neither so wealthy as to be enervated by effeminacy, and thence to lose, in the pursuit of frivolous pleasures, the taste for real happiness and solid virtue; nor poor enough to require more assistance from abroad than your own industry is sufficient to procure you. In the meantime the precious privilege of liberty, which in great nations is maintained only by submission to the most exorbitant impositions, costs you hardly anything for its preservation.  

May a Republic, so wisely and happily constituted, last for ever, for an example to other nations, and for the felicity of its own citizens! This is the only prayer you have left to make, the only precaution that remains to be taken. It depends, for the future, on yourselves alone (not to make you happy, for your ancestors have saved you that trouble), but to render that happiness lasting, by your wisdom in its enjoyment. It is on your constant union, your obedience to the laws, and your respect for their ministers, that your preservation depends. If there remains among you the smallest trace of bitterness or distrust, hasten to destroy it, as an accursed leaven which sooner or later must bring misfortune and ruin on the State. I conjure you all to look into your hearts, and to hearken to the secret voice of conscience. Is there any among you who can find, throughout the universe, a more upright, more enlightened and more honourable body than your magistracy? Do not all its members set you an example of moderation, of simplicity of manners, of respect for the laws, and of the most sincere harmony? Place, therefore, without reserve, in such wise superiors, that salutary confidence which reason ever owes to virtue. Consider that they are your own choice, that they justify that choice, and that the honours due to those whom you have dignified are necessarily yours by reflexion. Not one of you is so ignorant as not to know that, when the laws lose their force and those who defend them their authority, security and liberty are universally impossible. Why, therefore, should you hesitate to do that cheerfully and with just confidence which you would all along have been bound to do by your true interest, your duty and reason itself? 

Let not a culpable and pernicious indifference to the maintenance of the constitution ever induce you to neglect, in case of need, the prudent advice of the most enlightened and zealous of your fellow-citizens; but let equity, moderation and firmness of resolution continue to regulate all your proceedings, and to exhibit you to the whole universe as the example of a valiant and modest people, jealous equally of their honour and of their liberty. Beware particularly, as the last piece of advice I shall give you, of sinister constructions and venomous rumours, the secret motives of which are often more dangerous than the actions at which they are levelled. A whole house will be awake and take the first alarm given by a good and trusty watch-dog, who barks only at the approach of thieves; but we hate the importunity of those noisy curs, which are perpetually disturbing the public repose, and whose continual ill-timed warnings prevent our attending to them, when they may perhaps be necessary." 

And you, most honourable and magnificent lords, the worthy and revered magistrates of a free people, permit me to offer you in particular my duty and homage. If there is in the world a station capable of conferring honour on those who fill it, it is undoubtedly that which virtue and talents combine to bestow, that of which you have made yourselves worthy, and to which you have been promoted by your fellow-citizens. Their worth adds a new lustre to your own; while, as you have been chosen, by men capable of governing others, to govern themselves, I cannot but hold you as much superior to all other magistrates, as a free people, and particularly that over which you have the honour to preside, is by its wisdom and its reason superior to the populace of other States. 

Be it permitted me to cite an example of which there ought to have existed better records, and one which will be ever near to my heart. I cannot recall to mind, without the sweetest emotions, the memory of that virtuous citizen, to whom I owe my being, and by whom I was often instructed, in my infancy, in the respect which is due to you. I see him still, living by the work of his hands, and feeding his soul on the sublimest truths. I see the works of Tacitus, Plutarch, and Grotius lying before him in the midst of the tools of his trade. At his side stands his dear son, receiving, alas with too little profit, the tender instructions of the best of fathers. But, if the follies of youth made me for a while forget his wise lessons, I have at length the happiness to be conscious that, whatever propensity one may have to vice, it is not easy for an education, with which love has mingled, to be entirely thrown away. 

Such, my most honourable and magnificent lords, are the citizens, and even the common inhabitants of the State which you govern; such are those intelligent and sensible men, of whom, under the name of workmen and the people, it is usual, in other nations, to have a low and false opinion. My father, I own with pleasure, was in no way distinguished among his fellow-citizens. He was only such as they all are; and yet, such as he was, there is no country, in which his acquaintance would not have been coveted, and cultivated even with advantage by men of the highest character. It would not become me, nor is it, thank Heaven, at all necessary for me to remind you of the regard which such men have a right to expect of their magistrates, to whom they are equal both by education and by the rights of nature and birth, and inferior only, by their own will, by that preference which they owe to your merit, and, for giving you, can claim some sort of acknowledgment on your side. It is with a lively satisfaction I understand that the greatest candour and condescension attend, in all your behaviour towards them, on that gravity which becomes the ministers of the law; and that you so well repay them, by your esteem and attention, the respect and obedience which they owe to you. This conduct is not only just but prudent; as it happily tends to obliterate the memory of many unhappy events, which ought to be buried in eternal oblivion. It is also so much the more judicious, as it tends to make this generous and equitable people find a pleasure in their duty; to make them naturally love to do you honour, and to cause those who are the most zealous in the maintenance of their own rights to be at the same time the most disposed to respect yours. 

It ought not to be thought surprising that the rulers of a civil society should have the welfare and glory of their communities at heart: but it is uncommonly fortunate for the peace of men, when those persons who look upon themselves as the magistrates, or rather the masters of a more holy and sublime country, show some love for the earthly country which maintains them. I am happy in having it in my power to make so singular an exception in our favour, and to be able to rank, among its best citizens, those zealous depositaries of the sacred articles of faith established by the laws, those venerable shepherds of souls whose powerful and captivating eloquence are so much the better calculated to bear to men's hearts the maxims of the gospel, as they are themselves the first to put them into practice. All the world knows of the great success with which the art of the pulpit is cultivated at Geneva; but men are so used to hearing divines preach one thing and practise another, that few have a chance of knowing how far the spirit of Christianity, holiness of manners, severity towards themselves and indulgence towards their neighbours, prevail throughout the whole body of our ministers. It is, perhaps, given to the city of Geneva alone, to produce the edifying example of so perfect a union between its clergy and men of letters. It is in great measure on their wisdom, their known moderation, and their zeal for the prosperity of the State that I build my hopes of its perpetual tranquillity. At the same time, I notice, with a pleasure mingled with surprise and veneration, how much they detest the frightful maxims of those accursed and barbarous men, of whom history furnishes us with more than one example; who, in order to support the pretended rights of God, that is to say their own interests, have been so much the less greedy of human blood, as they were more hopeful their own in particular would be always respected. 

I must not forget that precious half of the Republic, which makes the happiness of the other; and whose sweetness and prudence preserve its tranquillity and virtue. Amiable and virtuous daughters of Geneva, it will be always the lot of your sex to govern ours. Happy are we, so long as your chaste influence, solely exercised within the limits of conjugal union, is exerted only for the glory of the State and the happiness of the public. It was thus the female sex commanded at Sparta; and thus you deserve to command at Geneva. What man can be such a barbarian as to resist the voice of honour and reason, coming from the lips of an affectionate wife? Who would not despise the vanities of luxury, on beholding the simple and modest attire which, from the lustre it derives from you, seems the most favourable to beauty? It is your task to perpetuate, by your insinuating influence and your innocent and amiable rule, a respect for the laws of the State, and harmony among the citizens. It is yours to reunite divided families by happy marriages; and, above all things, to correct, by the persuasive sweetness of your lessons and the modest graces of your conversation, those extravagancies which our young people pick up in other countries, whence, instead of many useful things by which they might profit, they bring home hardly anything, besides a puerile air and a ridiculous manner, acquired among loose women, but an admiration for I know not what so-called grandeur, and paltry recompenses for being slaves, which can never come near the real greatness of liberty. Continue, therefore, always to be what you are, the chaste guardians of our morals, and the sweet security for our peace, exerting on every occasion the privileges of the heart and of nature, in the interests of duty and virtue.  

I flatter myself that I shall never be proved to have been mistaken, in building on such a foundation my hopes of the general happiness of the citizens and the glory of the Republic. It must be confessed, however, that with all these advantages, it will not shine with that lustre, by which the eyes of most men are dazzled; a puerile and fatal taste for which is the most mortal enemy of happiness and liberty. 

Let our dissolute youth seek elsewhere light pleasures and long repentances. Let our pretenders to taste admire elsewhere the grandeur of palaces, the beauty of equipages, sumptuous furniture, the pomp of public entertainments, and all the refinements of luxury and effeminacy. Geneva boasts nothing but men; such a sight has nevertheless a value of its own, and those who have a taste for it are well worth the admirers of all the rest.  

Deign, most honourable, magnificent and sovereign lords, to receive, and with equal goodness, this respectful testimony of the interest I take in your common prosperity. And, if I have been so unhappy as to be guilty of any indiscreet transport in this glowing effusion of my heart, I beseech you to pardon me, and to attribute it to the tender affection of a true patriot, and to the ardent and legitimate zeal of a man, who can imagine for himself no greater felicity than to see you happy. 

Most honourable, magnificent and sovereign lords, I am, with the most profound respect, 

Your most humble and obedient servant and fellow-citizen. 

J. J. ROUSSEAU 

Chambéry, June 12, 1754

The State and Human Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Abstract.

This is the abstract to the researches that were conducted by Kudakwashe Kanhutu of Mashonaland Central (Zimbabwe), in fulfilment of the requirements of his Master of Science in Defence, Development & Diplomacy degree at Durham University in England. He will publish his full researches in the hope that he will instruct his fellow countrymen that when brother fights brother, no one wins but the outsider.

Zimbabwe: Pax Africana! The cover of my thesis is a tribute to my brother who fought in the DRC War.

Dedication 

To the people of Zimbabwe, may our peaceful polity long continue! 

Kudakwashe Kanhutu, Hatfield College, Durham University, School of Government & International Affairs, September 2014. 

Abstract 

The recurring civil wars and deaths of civilians from preventable causes in the DRC forms the puzzle for this paper: why has the state remained so weak over such a long period? This paper has cast the inability by the state's institutions to provide human security as state weakness. Human security is then used as a lens to interrogate where the international community and the local elites, through commission or omission, have been culpable for state weakness in the DRC. Human security is argued to be achievable under conditions where the state is legitimate and has a monopoly on the use of force - a strong state. This point necessitates a comparison between conditions faced by the consolidated European states in their creation and those which now confront the post-colonial states. The reasons for state weakness here are then argued to be on two levels: the international level and the state level. At the international level, the continued extractive relationship with the global North and the actions of the DRC's neighbours are inimical to the state's ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. At the state level, the most significant cause is the self-defeating short term strategies adopted by post-colonial elites to consolidate their power at independence. This paper argues that the ideal Weberian state, with its impersonal institutions, is the best possible way of achieving human security in the DRC and other post-colonial states. Human security provision would then be the remedy to legitimacy crises that arise due to the colonial legacy.

Professor David Held, who helped me formulate, even though I say so myself, an elegant thesis.

The AFRICOM That Africa May Tolerate

"Fas est et ab hoste doceri" [You can learn from anyone, even your enemy] - Ovid, 43 BC - 17 AD.

United States Africa Command - A Combatant Command tasked with protecting US interests in Africa.

Disclaimer:

This blog entry reflects on the Capstone Exercise at the end of my MSc. Defence, Development & Diplomacy degree at Durham University. The entry requires a strong disclaimer because my constituency will find it repugnant that I should say anything positive about the United States Africa Command. To my Comrades in the Republic and I, AFRICOM is a neo-imperialist tool that is a neo-imperialist tool. This role play that sees me speak in its favour is just an end of academic year simulation exercise and does not mean I confer any legitimacy in so doing to AFRICOM. I would however draw my compatriots' attention to the fact that in military affairs, emotions should play no part, we can copy what works even from our enemies and discard what doesn't. Hence Ovid's remark that opened this blog entry.

Durham University, School of Government and International Affairs - SGIA.

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu

The structure of this paper is as follows; Part A is a pre-Capstone Exercise paper I wrote explaining what my role would entail in the simulation. Part B is a reflection on the dynamics of the simulation so as to show what I learnt from the exercise. 

Part A: Pre – Module Report.

Complex Emergency in Dadaab: AFRICOM Security Advisor’s Role

Introduction:

This paper explains the role an Africa Command Officer would play if placed inside a complex emergency setting such as that of the Dadaab Refugee Camp in Kenya. It emphasises respect for institutional goals as the chain of command in the US Military is well established. Ultimately, all the effort and input from an AFRICOM officer is premised on achieving US foreign policy goals which are eliminating security threats to the US through enhancing partner (Kenya and Somalia) capacity to control their territories. This paper will view the Dadaab situation as a microcosm for applying US recommendations for improving partner capacity, while also paying attention to extraneous forces.

Organisational Background:

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany came into being on 1 October 2008. “AFRICOM is one of six of the U.S. Defense Department's geographic combatant commands and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for military relations with African nations, the African Union, and African regional security organizations” (United States Africa Command, 2013). The Command is therefore subservient to policy directives from the White House and exists to support those policies. The policies are articulated in the Presidential Policy Directive as (1) strengthen democratic institutions; (2) spur economic growth, trade and investment; (3) advance peace and security; and (4) promote opportunity and development (White House, 2012). The theme running through these directives is the understanding that there needs to be a holistic approach to achieving security for the partner countries. The concept applied towards realizing these goals is that of 3 – D (Defense, Development and Diplomacy) whereby “traditional military and police organizations continue to play major roles, but are closely coordinated with all the other instruments of power under the control of the civil authority” (Strategic Studies Institute, 2006). Unsurprisingly then our mission statement reads: “United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity” (United States Africa Command, 2013). Still, the Command is not without its critics.

Voices Against AFRICOM:

The fact that AFRICOM is headquartered on European soil and not in Africa is testimony to the opposition the Command faced in its inception as it was viewed by African States as an imperialist tool. There are accusations that AFRICOM is really about countering China’s rising influence on the continent; with The Guardian (2012) recording that, in an unguarded moment, a top AFRICOM official declared that the Command “was about preserving the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market." The further accusation is that the United States has adopted a strategy called “offshore balancing” whereby naval and air assets are used to support pliant local forces in protecting the United States’ interests (Axe, 2011). The same official, Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, quoted in the unguarded comment above has sought to clarify our position. The key points he raised are that AFRICOM does not create policy but executes its remit, which is; protecting American lives through working hand in hand with the diplomatic corps and listening to the concerns of its African partners (Moeller, 2010). The question has been asked as to why a military command is the United States’ chosen vehicle for engagement with Africa but a look at the security situation in most African countries necessitates this, security being a basic condition for achievement of development (RT, 2014). With this in mind we can now envisage the role an AFRICOM officer will play in Dadaab: supporting our partners in building and maintaining their capacities. 

Partners: African States

Both the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia and the Kenya government face the security challenges posed by irregular militaries and violent extremists of Al Shabaab. These include terrorist attacks and kidnapping for ransom. In this regard there is a shared interest with AFRICOM’s remit of fighting Al Qaeda’s affiliates and protecting partner nationals from abduction. Here, under direction from the State Department (Ambassador to host state) and within the parameters of international law, the AFRICOM officer will provide the necessary assistance to the national security forces (Njubi, 2011). The unique capabilities that the United States brings are Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR). The AFRICOM officer will work closely with the local security forces to advance peace and security as this is the primary purpose of the Command. Al Shabaab was specifically mentioned by General Carter Ham, who said it would count as AFRICOM “mission failure” if it were able to train people who will carry out attacks on American soil (AFRICOM, 2011). The important aspect for the AFRICOM officer in Dadaab is to study the dynamics of the camp and, drawing on knowledge of counter-terrorism doctrine, share his assessment of what ought to be done to restrict Al Shabaab’s ability to use the camp for rest and recuperation or any other activities that cause insecurity. In this remit there is also a need to be cautious about aiding and abetting human rights abuses by the host state as this would not sit well with our other partners.

Partners: United Nations, European States & NGOs

Having satisfied the respect for sovereignty requirement of being there by invitation of host state, there is a need for coordination and coherence between the many actors so that we do not work at cross-purposes. There is bound to be some institutional frictions as development and relief agencies such as the Red Cross may feel association with the military impinges on their neutrality principle. For this purpose, AFRICOM will follow the lead of the State Department and USAID in this simulation.

Conclusion: 

This brief paper has highlighted that the AFRICOM officer in the simulation will be guided by the United States Presidential Policy Directives in his engagement with the Dadaab Simulation exercise. There is also a need to respect the African partners’ wishes and to follow the lead of the State Department.

Video Essay:

To elicit what AFRICOM thinks it is about, I watched a former Commander speak on his task here:

 

For mannerisms in the role play, I trusted Hollywood:

Durham University - School of Government & International Affairs - MSc Defence, Development & Diplomacy; MSc Conflict Prevention & Peace-Building  Class(es) of 2014. 

Part B: Post Module Report

Capstone Exercise:  Complex Emergency in Dadaab, Post-Module Report.

Introduction:

This report reflects on my participation in the humanitarian emergency simulation that took place at Durham Global Security Institute (DGSi), Durham University from 21st May – 23rd May 2014. The paper is divided into two sections, with Section I focusing on how effectively I played my role. This section sets out my goals, my plans for achieving them and then what constraints and opportunities I encountered in that regard. It also answers the question how much was my role a hindrance or help in achieving the stated group’s aims of providing humanitarian relief in a fast developing crisis situation. 

Section II is a discussion of the relevant theories and concepts from my core modules throughout the year. In this section I choose what I think are the most significant concepts from my year-long study at DGSi which guided my efforts and goals in the Capstone exercise. The most important concept for me is 3D policy coherence, which states that for political goals to be achieved, equal attention should be paid to the imperatives of defence, development and diplomacy since neglecting one domain creates problems that feedback negatively in the other domains. My role in the simulation was that of Colonel Mike Carter, a United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) Officer on a fact-finding mission related to security threats in the region. I had the freedom to act when the need arose, but in strict accordance with AFRICOM’s goals as articulated by the President of the United States in the Presidential Policy Directive.

Section I 

Personal Reflection on the Simulation:

The setting for the simulation was the Dadaab refugee camp in North-Eastern Kenya, close to the Somalia border. This camp was established in 1991 due to the total collapse of the state in Somalia and the violence that ensured, and now houses around 470 000 people. With either renewed fighting in Somalia or cycles of famine, the camp continues to receive more refugees seeking shelter from these threats. Our simulation took place at a time when the camp was receiving a new influx of refugees from the latest crisis in Somalia. The task of the whole group was to coordinate our different capabilities and specialities so as to successfully deal with an unfolding humanitarian crisis over four days. As the Kenya government and Transitional Federal Government in Somalia (TFG) do not have the requisite resources to manage these crises, the international donor community is very active in these camps, with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) being a very important player. I envisioned this as a microcosm where the donor agencies would fill in for government where its capacity has been so obviously stretched and so practice the aspects of good governance the donors tend to preach. 

For the organisation I was representing – AFRICOM – it was a chance to apply US recommendations for improving partner capacity in coordination with our other European and United Nations allies. The task set for AFRICOM by the President of the United States is that of supporting policies that attempt to advance both security and development in Africa as underdevelopment has, since 9/11, been seen to threaten the security of the United States. 

My own task, as Colonel Mike Carter of AFRICOM, was a fact finding mission related to the on-going instability in the region, with the activities of Al Shabaab being of the most serious concern as they are affiliated with Al Qaeda. The threats from Al Shabaab are kidnapping aid workers for ransom, using the camp as a staging post for revenge attacks against Kenyan government involvement in Somalia, attempting to recruit fighters among the population and hijacking of food and medicines meant for the camp’s population. My engagement was guided by the counter-insurgency idea that force has its utility but should be supported by other instruments of policy so as to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the population. As the United States is not actively at war in Kenya, my aims were to support any initiatives by the donor agencies that would help the population so as obviate Al Shabaab’s appeal as an alternative.

I was aware of the fact that there are frictions between the Department of Defense, which AFRICOM is a part of, and the State Department and USAID. These largely relate to the fact that the Department of Defense (DoD) is encroaching onto what is traditionally State Department/USAID territory and, also, the DoD tends to be given carte blanche where resources to carry out its missions are concerned. The other points of friction I anticipated were that organisations like the Red Cross who were players in this simulation would not want to be associated with AFRICOM because of their neutrality principle. To ensure that I would not be engaged in competition with my allies in the camp, I allowed the USAID local conflict advisor to take the lead as she was more in touch with the realities in the camp and also would be acceptable to actors who may be averse to dealing directly with the United States military. 

In terms of my goals of supporting any development initiatives that would undercut Al Shabaab’s appeal as an alternative I contributed D3 000 to the UNICEF education and WASH initiative, and D1 000 to the CARE emergency food and water fund when the food trucks were stuck in floods. The biggest project I contributed to was the Kenyan Government Police Training and Equipment supply programme. I contributed D16 000 towards this project. This project was proposed by the UK Conflict Advisor, but I had serious reservations about it because it proposed to change the salary structures of the police force by pledging to pay officers in Dadaab more than officers in the rest of the country. This, I felt, was assuming the task of the legislature where we had no right. Overall I was satisfied with my contribution as it adhered to the “Do No Harm” principle; all my contributions were for projects that aimed at human security not the undermining of it. 

Still, there were a lot of things that were outside our control. The hijacking of food trucks and subsequent distribution of food to the camp was an Al Shabaab tactic to win hearts and minds that we could not do anything about. The kidnapping of a high profile British UN representative was also out of our control and my only advice to UK Conflict Advisor was that use of force would not achieve her release and so instead he would have to negotiate with the captors. I also would have wanted to interact more with the security services but this was minimal since there was no military presence but just the police who were kept busy by their tasks throughout the simulation.

Section II

Theories and Concepts Guiding My Participation:

The first guiding principle comes from Rupert Smith’s conceptualization of what war is in the twenty first century: war amongst the people. He has conceived war amongst the people quite differently from traditional battlefield engagements in that “it is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force” (Smith, 2006: 4). There is therefore a fight to capture the hearts and minds of the people and usually this cannot be achieved by military means but instead by development and diplomacy tools. Smith (2006: 277) thought that the mistake politicians make is to think the military can create and maintain this condition through force, thus the other tools that are appropriate for it are chronically under-resourced.

In this conception he recognises the limits of force where military success can be achieved but yet the political goals are not attained (Smith, 2006: 5). He also outlines the structure that governs the conduct of Western militaries, with the political level being given primacy as the source of power and decision (Smith, 2006: 11). This winning of hearts and minds theme is what has guided the Pentagon’s engagement with Africa through the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). This command was thus presented as one that is not a traditional military command but one willing to listen and respond to its African partners’ needs (Bachmann, 2010: 566). AFRICOM more than any other command, is premised on trying to achieve human security for target populations.

Thus, the outstanding theme that guided my participation was 3D policy coherence, which Weiss et. al. (2009: 9) defined as the need for “institutions that once largely acted autonomously – defense, diplomacy and development – to exchange information, share resources and cooperate in strategy development and implementation.” The military efforts should be complemented by development and diplomacy, with the most appropriate tool for the situation being given primacy. For the United States, the actors involved are the Department of Defence, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State. Among these actors there will be conflicting institutional strategic outlooks that then need to be made to cohere. The Department of Defense would ordinarily prioritise physical security to the detriment of developmental issues like providing education and health. It is widely pointed as a flaw of consecutive White House administrations that they prioritise the Department of Defense and pay little attention to development issues since USAID is but an adjunct in the State Department and not a standalone institution (Weiss et. al., 2009: 26, Bachman, 2010: 569). Further, there is a view that institutional competition among these organizations blocks the attempt at coherence (Weiss et. al., 2009: 26). 

The United States only prioritised the security threats that can come from weak and failing states after the attacks of 11th September 2001, with President George W. Bush declaring “that America was now more threatened by weak and failing states than we are by conquering ones” (Patrick, 2009: 57). 3D policy coherence was touted as the means to successfully counter this new threat domain but instead departmental mandates and concerns have stood in the way of this (Patrick, 2009: 60).

Coming to the specific branch of the Department of Defense I was representing – AFRICOM – the same themes of 3D policy coherence are instructive, and importantly I paid attention to the criticisms that have been levelled specifically at AFRICOM. The main criticism against AFRICOM is that it is about countering the rise of China and “preserving the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market" (The Guardian, 2012). This view is shared by most African states who have opposed AFRICOM being located on African soil, so instead it is located in Stuttgart, Germany. In this view, the priority for the United States is providing for its physical and energy security and not achieving human security for the local population. The argument is that if AFRICOM was really about supporting the goals of the local population’s aspirations for living secure lives, then development assistance would be prioritized and not military assistance. This criticism, while valid, also runs into an equally valid rebuttal that security is a basic precondition for development and a sober look at the security situation in most African states will yield that military engagement will be necessary where state capacity is largely absent (RT, 2014). 

The other important thing to remember about my role is that my ability to act was circumscribed by institutional constraints. The United States military does not decide policy, the White House decides policy and the military is just a tool that executes that policy. Although in my role as an AFRICOM Officer here, the gist of the White House’s Africa policy conformed to the concept of 3D coherence I have outlined above. The White House Presidential Policy Directive (2012) sets out the US policy goals as (1) strengthen democratic institutions; (2) spur economic growth, trade and investment; (3) advance peace and security; and (4) promote opportunity and development (White House, 2012). These goals if well-coordinated should result in human security being achieved for African partners as well as threats to the United States thus being reduced. 

However, the other side of the coin is that where the United States national interests diverge with African states' interests, the United States will act in its interest first. What has aroused US interest in Africa according to Bachmann (2010: 567) is the “sudden strategic relevance of Africa” with this five factors being salient; “HIV/AIDS, terror; oil; armed conflicts; and global trade.” In a globalised world where threats are no longer territorially bound, these factors are important for the whole globe as disease, migration, terrorism and armed conflicts have been shown to affect neighbouring as well as distant countries. The downside to the securitisation discourse is that it tends to disempower the people in developing countries as, for example, defining migration as a threat can result in racist and exclusionary outcomes (Ibrahim, 2005: 165). The securitization of ungoverned spaces may also mean that the United States may partner with governments involved in rights abuses if they can help the US achieve its security goals, to the detriment of the local population.

The possible remedial measure to this problem is the deepening, broadening, and emancipatory praxis proposed by critical security studies. While I, of course, could not follow this proposal in the opposite direction to the stated goals of the United States where it leads, I was aware of the importance of this concept in my role play. The critical security studies framework questions the dominant discourse so as to establish the true causes of state fragility, whose security is being pursued/ignored and what can be done to emancipate the local population so that their human security concerns are not ignored in their engagement with the developed world (Gunning 2013). I was conscious of these concerns in the role and acted according to them, where I could.

Conclusions:

This paper was a reflection on the author’s participation in the Capstone Complex Emergency in Dadaab at the end of the Durham Global Security Institute (DGSi) 2013/14 academic year. The exercise brings all participants in the MSc programmes here together to act out how the skills they have learnt may apply in a fast unfolding humanitarian crisis. For the 2013/14 Capstone Exercise I played the role of Colonel Mike Carter, a US AFRICOM Officer on a fact finding mission to the camp so as to better understand the nature of the challenges posed by Al Shabaab and the deficiencies of the partner African states – Somalia and Kenya – in countering these challenges. I managed to contribute positively to the human security agenda in the camp by providing money for education, food and security sector capacity building. The concept that guided my participation was 3D policy coherence; advancing development and security at the same time so as to achieve human security. 

Photo Essay: 

In no particular order, pictures from the 3 day simulation at Durham University from 21 - 23 May 2014.

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