A Great Tradition Enters Its 40th Year!

"The army is the most outstanding institution in every country, for it alone makes possible the existence of all civic institutions" - Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke. 

I have only played the Saturday morning game at the University of Kent for 4 years (on/off) but it has been going on for the past 40 years.

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu

I was surprised to learn, very recently, that the game I play every Saturday morning 0930 - 1100ish at the University of Kent Sports Pavilion, has been going on for the past 40 years at least. I had thought that, at most, it was about 10 years old. But I was wrong, people have come and gone, and this institution still stands. I, myself, only joined this game in my 3rd year at Kent Uni, then went away to Durham University for about 1 year and 6 months and have since been back for just over a year now (and about to leave again). 

This game continues because of its simplicity. Anyone can play. You just pay your £3.00, pick your favourite colour of sports bib, wear it and become a player of one of the four teams playing against each other on the two half pitches. Usually 8 vs 8 (32 being the standard number of players who make it every morning). From 0930 - 1020 is the “first half,” the two winners in Game A and Game B face each other between 1025 - 1115ish, and the losers do the same in, what is effectively, the “second half.” The rules of the game are simple too; you can only score inside the blue line as we use the small goals without goalkeepers. You can, however, score from anywhere with a header. You should see the beautiful diving header I scored today (26. 12. 2015) from way outside the area! Of course the rules have evolved with time and necessity, I imagine if I stay on, they may ban scoring with headers from outside the area as this is very easy for me!

The attraction for me is that the game is on an artificial surface, so no more rolling in the mud like pigs as we did when we used to play the Sunday league game in winter on the grass in London and Luton not so long ago. The mud did not bother me then, but I am at that stage in my life when I must shed some of my rough tendencies (gradually). There are also hot showers at the Pavilion, so the £3.00 is not a waste at all. 

What really struck me about the time this Saturday morning game has managed to last, is the dedication to it of everyone who is involved, as no one makes a penny from it. Of course, I know, order and economic prosperity allows informal (not for profit) institutions like these to flourish (and this further reinforces economic prosperity as active, healthy individuals tend to be productive). Playing on a Saturday morning like this, you can also hear an off the cuff remark like; “it’s my second edited book to be published.” 

Photo Essay:

The new comer

The veteran

A mixture of veterans and new comers.

A mixture of veterans and new comers.

The full complement

The new comer

The new comer

The new comer

The new comer

Does Europe Still Need America For Its Security?

"There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the separate alliances through which in the unhappy past the nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interest" - Cordell Hull, 1945 Testimony before the U.S. Congress hearings on the United Nations Charter.

With Boss Lady - Professor Gulnur Aybet - my Course Director for the BA (Hons.) Conflict, Peace and Security at the University of Kent, Canterbury.

Europe needs America for its security – so, should it always be expected to follow an American lead in international affairs? Does Europe need America for its security today?

Introduction:

The assertion that Europe needs America for its security has to be assessed for currency in the 21st Century. There was a time when Europe, unquestionably, needed the American ‘security blanket’ (Galen, 1994). This was during the Cold War when two grave existential threats loomed large over the continent. Since the Cold War ended on Europe and America’s terms, it must follow that these existential threats have been tamed, and therefore the question of whether Europe still needs America for its security provision does arise. To be sure, the threats of the Cold War era could not have been successfully countered without America’s involvement, but it bears investigation whether this remains the case in the post-Cold War era.

My discussion of this question will be in two parts. In the first, longer part of my paper, I will use the historical process tracing, to show that Europe really need America between 1945 and 1991. In the second part, working with the assumption that the main threats of the Cold War are largely obsolete, I will try to find out what new threats exist now for Europe and, whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is still the optimal shield against these threats.

My position is that the demise of the Soviet Union does not mean the end of all security threats. There are new threats to Europe, and NATO has had to adapt itself to these new threats so as to remain relevant. My response to the other important part of my question, that of whether Europe has to unwaveringly follow America’s lead in international affairs, will be interwoven in both parts of this paper in the form examples of Europe’s response to crises. History, and international relations theories seem to put a question mark as to whether Europe can be expected to always follow America’s lead in international affairs. The crises with good insights for my discussion are the 2003 Iraq War in the post-Cold War period, and the 1973 Middle East crisis during the Cold War.

Part I. The Cold War Years: 1945 – 1991. 

This is but a brief excursion to the Cold War period. The purpose of which is to try and ground Europe’s security situation in its historical context. In this period we find this objective situation: a war ravaged Europe in economic dire straits. Thus, among the major consequences of World War II, these three below are significant for my paper: (1) Europe emerged from the war physically devastated and economically while; (2) America and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, rose to superpower status and, consequently, there was; (3) the emergence of the Cold War (McWilliams and Piotrowski, 2009). While these consequences mean Europe had to depend on the United States, I argue, as does Zoellick, that although national interests of allies may sometimes coincide, there is always the likelihood of a divergence of views on how best to pursue them (Zoellick, 1997). This will be reflected in this part of my paper by what has been called the ‘abandonment – entrapment dilemma’ (Sharp, 1987). 

Did Europe Ever Need America for its Security?

We could ask the question why is the subject of this paper not, for instance, “Africa needs America for its security?” A reformulation of the question as; why did the pre-eminent power in the world choose to ally itself to the extent it did with Europe at the end of World War II and not, say, with Africa or Latin America? The answer must be steeped in the fact that the two World Wars started, and, were largely fought in the European theatre. Twice, America had had to come to Europe’s rescue. Each time at great expense than would than would have been the case if preventive measures against the two world wars had been pursued through American power in the first place. American involvement was not altruism either, contiguity of values also played a part. The reason why America could not stand on the side lines is that due to values, economic, and geographic propinquities, European insecurity inevitably had a negative impact on America. In Deutsch’s conception of security community, America would not be able to stand aside and a let a continent with shared values (social and economic) be consumed by opposite social values (Tusiciny, 2007). This is possibly the line of reasoning that sustains NATO and tallies with that of other authors who have argued that NATO endures because what defines it is “not only what it is against but by what it is for” (Aybet, 2012).

For my current arguments, it is sufficient to agree with Josef Joffe’s position that it was not unthinkable that an even more devastating third world war would have started in Europe if left to tis own devices (Joffe, 1984). All of which would have been to the detriment of Europe, and America. So, certainly, due to two existential threats during the Cold War, Europe needed America for its security. The first existential threat was the insecurity prevalent between the European states that had led to the two catastrophic world wars in the first place. In this conception, Europe left to its own devices was a clear and imminent danger to itself, and thus needed a pacifier; America became that pacifier (Joffe, 1984). Any doubts about this formula can be dispelled by looking at the interwar years between 1918 and 1939, where American non-involvement on the continent is largely seen as the reason why a catastrophic second world war started (Joffe, 1984). The second threat is the external and well documented Soviet threat where, again, it is widely agreed that Europe could not have met this threat without American support. Many other authors concur with this view, such as David Compert who says ‘NATO brought lasting peace to Europe, previously the globe’s most dangerous continent’ (Compert, 1997). To sum up, the objective security conditions in Europe at the end of 1945 called out for external assistance and America heeded that call. It is only, inevitably, when interests diverge that may then find dissonance in transatlantic relations: effectively a refusal to follow the American lead.

The Abandonment – Entrapment Dilemma:

Glenn Snyder, in my view, captured the essence of this dilemma when he said,

Abandonment, in general, is ‘defection,’ but it may take a variety of specific forms: the ally may realign with the opponent; he may merely de-align, abrogating the alliance contract; he may fail to make good on his explicit commitments; or he may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected…. Entrapment means being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or share only partially. The interests of allies are generally not identical; to the extent they are shared, they may be valued in different degree (Snyder, 1984).

The above description serves my discussion well as it (1) explains the main features of the dilemma as I have chosen to apply it in this paper, and (2) highlights my earlier stated position that allies’ interests are not necessarily identical. From the above explanation follows the observation that while Europe feared American abandonment in the face of the Soviet threat, they were also worried about being entrapped in American conflicts which did not constitute vital interests to Europe. For Snyder then, the actions of the states would determine what they fear at the moment, such as moving towards the ally’s position when fearing abandonment or, for fear of entrapment; loosen their alliance commitment or refuse to support an ally’s position (Snyder, 1984). 

The Middle East Crisis of 1973 is a good example of the action prompted by fear of entrapment. Aybet (2001) records that ‘for the first time European allies had decided to follow a foreign poicy which was divergent to that of the US.’ In the 1973 Middle East Crisis, Europe’s position, as dictated by national interests, was that of wanting to minimise frictions with the Arab countries and with the Soviet Union (Aybet, 2001). In this instance Europe’s interests were divergent from that of the United States as Europe depended on Middle East oil while the United States did not; the result was that the United States followed a pro-Israeli stance while Europeans took a pro-Arab stance in the crisis (Aybet, 2001).

Even before this crisis, the possibility of diverging interest can be seen as early as during Charles de Gaulle’s time. In fact, France seems to be a good example of the European country that persistently questioned the wisdom of blindly following America in international affairs. Charles de Gaulle’s concern seems to have that American nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union amounted only to a nuclear war fought on European soil. In his quest for a French deterrent he questioned whether the Americans were willing to trade New York for Hamburg in a nuclear exchange with the Soviets (Laird, 1984). In a taxonomy of interests, Europe’s vital interests was to ensure that a nuclear war would not be fought on its soil while, in de Gaulle’s view, the same matter would be a secondary interest to the Americans (Roskin, 2012). With varying degrees of success therefore, Europeans, mostly at the behest of France, attempted to assert their position independent of the US. Examples of this would include the (French) third force concept, de Gaulle’s rejection of US nuclear forces on French soil, and his diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which was against the US position (McWillimas and Piotrowski, 2009). All this inverts the leader – follower relationship. Of course, the abandonment side of the coin means that Europe did not follow a fully contradictory policy to that of the United States. This would only come in 2003 when France threatened to veto, at the Security Council, the United States war on Iraq at the time (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2004).

Part II. The Current Security Environment. 

The charge to answer in this section can be formulated in this manner: Europe is no longer the dangerous and fragile continent I described in Part I of this paper, war between European states has become unthinkable. The economies are strong (pre – 2008 financial crisis) and interdependent, and most importantly; the Soviet Union was dismantled and in its place, Russia is a capitalist democracy which even has an office at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), NATO’s military headquarters. So why should an organisation former to counter Cold War threats remain in place after the Cold War ended? In short, does Europe need America for its security today? Ted Galen poses the same question more forcefully. It is his view that Europe is ‘clinging to the American security blanket’ (Galen, 1994). He further questions, among other things, why America still has troops stationed on European soil when the original purpose; to deter a Soviet invasion, no longer exists (Galen, 1994). He is not alone in this view as Jones (2004) also records Robert Kagan’s view that Europe has deliberately allowed itself to atrophy in matters of security provision because of its dependency on America. Which is what is called the problem of free riding in alliance theory (Joffe, 1984). It is not an unreasonable position to take, considering that as the Cold War ended on the Western block’s terms, the threats of that era must have ended at the same time. Indeed, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO should have found itself without a purpose. It is in this section that I will discuss what the new threats are and what the transatlantic security community has decided is the best way to counter the new threats.

New Challenges: 

The end of the Cold War brought with it new challenges. Among them is a paradoxical one; that envisaged by the concept of Critical National Infrastructure vulnerabilities, where European success in integration and development creates potent security threats (RUSI, 2008). Victory in the Cold War therefore did not mean an end to threats but, instead, a fostering of new threats which are more difficult to deal with than the symmetric ones of the Cold War era. The new challenges are therefore mostly of an asymmetric nature but cannot be ignored either. In list form, the new security threats to Europe are; terrorism, cyber-attacks, failed states, nuclear proliferation, climate change and demography (migratory pressures and an ageing population) (Williams, 2008). Climate change and demography certainly cannot be met by military force but their implications for security cannot be overstated. The other threats such as cyber-attacks are also difficult to meet with military force since attribution to a state is not easy to make, this was the case with cyber-attacks on Estonia (a new NATO member) in 2007 (NATO, 2010). My main point is that some of these new threats do not easily lend themselves to NATO’s traditional core capability, while some, such as countering nuclear proliferation can fall within the traditional remit. It is with this in mind that we may investigate whether NATO is no longer relevant and, by implication, whether Europe still needs America for its security. 

These new threats are very closely related and may still require capabilities only NATO can muster. Take for example the first time NATO’s Article 5 was ever invoked – in the September 11 attacks – the link between terrorism, failed states nuclear proliferation is easy to discern. Weak or failed states can host terrorists who are then able to attack Europe and America. The further suspicion is that these kinds of terrorists would use nuclear weapons should they lay their hands on them. Taken together then, the new threats to Europe are threats to values as well as physical security. While NATO’s original purpose was defence of territory, it has had to reconfigure itself to meet the new challenges. This reconfiguration is in line with Aybet’s remark I mentioned earlier about NATO also being defined by what it is for (Aybet, 2001). A strategic inflection point has, therefore, been observed and proof of this can be found in the 2010 Strategic Concept which, inter alia, records these new commitments;

NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security (NATO, 2010).

We see here then that the transatlantic relationship is still necessary insofar as it has evolved to mean more than territorial defence. To the question whether Europe still needs America for its security, the answer can be discerned from Professor Joseph Nye Jr.’s insightful remarks at Chatham House. He conceives the world as a three level chess game with different security threats on each level; on the level that has the asymmetric threats I outlined above, he concedes that no nation – even America – can go it alone (Nye Jr., 2010). So, if even American cannot manage to provide for its security in the new threats environment, it follows that NATO – of necessity – remains a good insurance policy. 

But even though the allies are united against these new threats, my earlier position is that allies will tend to have a divergence on threat perception and disagree on the best methods to deal with threats remains valid. I see the ‘Abandonment – Entrapment Dilemma’ as ‘loaded’ against abandonment in the post-Cold War era. To my mind, absent the Soviet nuclear threat, European states are more forceful against being entrapped by American interests which may not be vital to Europe. It is for this reason that France threatened to veto the US invasion of Iraq, Turkey refused the Americans transit and Germany was very vocal against it (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2004). Divergences can also be seen in Europe’s position on other issues such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (Cottey, 2007). The argument made here is that there are always different points of view as to how to best meet the threats. Europeans seeming to favour favour diplomacy and soft power while, America, due to its capabilities, may lean towards using force (Cottey, 2007).

Conclusion:

My paper has attempted to answer the question of whether Europe needs America for its security by arguing that in the Cold War era, Europe could not have withstood the Soviet threat without America’s support. World War II had devastated Europe and there were also fears that a third world war would start due to enduring animosities among European states. NATO became the vehicle of that security provision. I have argued that the fact that NATO has endured after the end of the Cold War is a testimony to the way the transatlantic relationship is an example of a security community with shared values beyond the immediate threats. Europe and America have the repositioned themselves against the new threats on the basis of retaining NATO’s core capabilities and adding to it the relevant ones for the current environment. I have used the 1973 Middle East Crisis and the 2003 Iraq War to show that even the closest of allies may have divergent interests and opinions, so Europe does not necessarily follow America’s lead. A fair way to characterise the transatlantic relationship would be to acknowledge that even in the same countries, there will different of thinking, some will be Atlanticists in outlook and some, like de Gaulle, will prefer an independent European position; but these are differences of degree rather than kind, as none truly doubt the usefulness of their alliance.

Conducting my researches from home during my time as a BA (Hons.) Conflict, Peace and Security student at the University of Kent, Canterbury.

Bibliography:

Aybet, Gulnur (2001), The Dynamics of European Cooperation, 1945 – 91. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Aybet, Gulnur (2012), The Evolution of NATO’s Three Phases and Turkey’s Transatlantic Relationship. Perceptions. Volume XVII, No. 1: 19 – 36.

Buzan, Barry and Gonzalez-Pelaez, Ana (2004), ‘International Community’ After Iraq. International Affairs 80. Vol. 80, No. 4: 31 – 52. 

Chatham House Videos. Professor Joseph Nye: Is America In Decline. Link on Google.

Compert, David G. and Larrabee, Stephen F. (1997), America and Europe: A Partnerships For A New Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Cottey, Andrew (2007), Security In The New Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 

David, Joshua (2007), Hackers Take Down The Most Wired Country In Europe. Wired Magazine, Issue 15, Number 09. Link on Google.

Galen, Ted (1994), Beyond NATO: Staying Out Of Europe’s Wars. Washington: Cato Institute.

Joffe, Josef (1984), Europe’s American Pacifiers. Survival: 64 – 82. 

Jones, Erik (2004), Debating The Transatlantic Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality. International Affairs. Vol. 80, No. 4: 595 – 612.

Laird, Robin F. (1984), The French Strategic Dilemma. Centre for Naval Analysis. Professional Paper 407: 1 – 33. 

McWilliams, Wayne C. and Piotrowski, Harry (2009), The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

NATO. “Active Engagement, Modern Defence.” NATO Lisbon Summit 19 – 20 November 2010. Link on Google. 

Roskin, Michael G. (2001), “National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy” in Cerami, Joseph R. and Holcomb Jr., James F. (eds). Guide To Strategy 2001. Link on Google.

RUSI (2008), “Protecting The Critical National Infrastructure.” RUSI Events. April 16, 2008. Link on Google.

Sharp, Jane M. O. (1987) After Reykjavik: Arms Control and the Allies. International Affairs. Vol. 63, No. 2: 239 – 257.

Snyder, Glenn H. (1984), The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics. Vol. 36, No. 4.

Tusiciny, Andrew J. Security Communities and their Values: Taking Masses Seriously. International Political Science Review. Vol. 28, No. 4: 425 – 449.

Williams, Michael (2008), The Future Security Environment. RUSI Research Paper. Link on Google.

A Question Of Loyalty

This story was first published in The Horizon Magazine in Zimbabwe, as I was very young when I wrote the story, I really can’t take all the credit. Forthwith, I acknowledge the help I got from Mr Peter Birkett, the British Airways Chief Security Officer who “taught me how to hijack planes.” Thanks also to Andrew Moyse, the Horizon Editor, for leaving out some of the laughable conversations I had included in the original script. Other than that, this is a story of my creation. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces also took a flirting interest in the story when it was published but it was all very cordial, very amicable. Read here therefore, the most beautiful story I have ever written. I closely followed the pattern of the master – Alistair Maclean – “no romance, it just slows down the action!”

This is the South African Airways Airbus A300 where the story narrated below may or may not have happened.

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu

The trip should have carried no drama at all. The flight to Johannesburg would be slightly under two hours and every time I had done the Jo’burg run, which is a relatively short hop and over land too, I was confident my safety was guaranteed, not that air safety was a major concern. As a high-ranking air force officer, I had seen so much combat action from military planes to the effect that civilian flight did not even stir my blood. I had no way of knowing that this particular trip would reshape my entire philosophy and forever change my laissez-faire attitude towards life.

As the big Airbus A300 aircraft swept off the runway into the night sky, my mind focused on the problems we were facing at home: nationwide workers’ strikes, university students’ demonstrations and a weak economy. It just wasn’t healthy. It was not my area of concern, but as I sized it up I conceded that disloyalty seemed to be taking over. Now, loyalty meant living to me. Those without loyalty left me cold and sad. I could not understand why one skilled at his work would do his country a disservice and go to serve abroad. University students and the workers’ strikes and the denunciation of government were cases of rebellion fit for animals, and wild animals at that. I believed everyone had a duty to the country, to the president and to God. I had taken the vow as a mere Red Cross youth member, as a Boy Scout, then again when I joined the air force and most recently when I took office within the defence forces. I therefore strongly felt everyone had to be loyal to the country and submit to government decisions and control. According to the bible, a leader of a country is installed by God and to despise his authority is blasphemy and a punishable sin.

But not for me. I was the one to stand up and be counted for my country. Fanatical loyalty was my daily bread, in my heart I believed that I was an integral part of government and therefore knew “government employee” would be my name until death. It was my view that the acute unemployment in the country existed only because school leavers were too choosy and afraid of hard work, so they stayed home and played havoc with the statistics. I had heard of innocent people wrongly sent to jail, but of course I had never heard of anyone who admitted to being guilty.

With that line of thought everything was cosy between the leadership of the country and me. I wished everybody would find solace in hard work and the spirit of aspiring to achieve a better status or go to jail to regain some manners relative to loyalty. The government always acted in the best interests of its citizens. Fantasy. I might as well have believed that the Devil took good care of his people.

Thirty minutes into the night flight I turned my attention to my fellow passengers. There were the two teenagers wearing hippy clothing and indecent haircuts. I grieved for the past. Further on, without having to strain my neck, there was the nervous couple in seats 23A and B. But it was behind them, in seats 24A, B and C, that my eyes rested. There was a mother and her two children – sweet twins aged about six. I gave them ten out of ten. A sense of peace and kindness descended upon me just watching the kids’ kitten like antics, 13 000 above planet Earth and they were so carefree.

I was about to turn to the newspaper the air hostess had handed me, when the pilot announced flatly that we had been hijacked by a lone gunman who was yet to make his demands known. Paralysis gripped me. First to go was the notion of air safety. How had the heavily armed gunman sneaked through airport security? A thousand years later, which I suppose was 15 minutes, the gunman made known his demands. He was a member of a commando unit and wanted two South African commandos, captured as cross – border saboteurs during the apartheid era, to be released and put onto a plane. These men were to be given weapons and flown by a civilian crew into South African air space and then para – dropped.

A time limit was given: in the 40 minutes we still had to touchdown in Johannesburg, a plane was to be refuelled and made to stand by. The South African authorities would make ‘phone call one’ – high priority phone call for exactly five minutes to the authorities of my country, where these commandos were being held. My country would then authorise the release of the prisoners, drive them to the airport and allow them to make sure there no security personnel masquerading as crew or hiding somewhere on board. After the airliner had taken off, the government of my country would only have lost two hours fuel and would have saved the 176 lives on board our aircraft. The operation was to take 40 minutes flat and anyone who slipped up on the deadline would be held responsible by the world for the 176 lives that would surely perish if the deadline was not met.

If the deadline was met, the lone gunman would receive a secret message, the first would come in 20 minutes to show that positive action was taking place and the second message after the plane had taken off with the prisoners on board. This meant there were many accomplices on the ground, who would phone Johannesburg’s control tower then get the passwords relayed to our aircraft. This was clearly a military operation. During my military service I had undergone anti – hijack training. I knew all about staying calm, assessing the situation, calculating the risk and taking appropriate action, but despite that my fear was all consuming and was reflected all around me by my fellow passengers. Returning to earth, out of control and at bullet-speed is never part of the bargain when we take to the sky. Also, the fact that the hijacker had not misdirected his energy running up and down aisles threatening every passenger in sight credited him as a highly trained and focused soldier, and identified him as a formidable foe.

But what really was there to my fear? My government knew that I and other passengers were on board. The terrorist’s demands would be met on the double and all 176 passengers would disembark at Jan Smuts Airport, shaken but with big smiles and a tale each for their folks. It was easy really, the two commandos, weak from the long stay in jail would bash their heads against rocks during the para – drop and foil their own escape.

I was deadly wrong. My trip was now a frightful flight with a big banner that said “governments do not make decisions under pressure from terrorists.” I could not believe it; my own government would actually make us go through such an ordeal just for the sake of a twisted political standpoint. It was said that terrorism should be discouraged in its infancy; if terrorists won a small victory they would insist on bigger things. Of course who ever said this was conveniently not on board the same plane as me. Looking across at the twins I was overwhelmed by helpless anger. They were worth a thousand terrorists’ political demands and yet my government had authorised “whatever measures might be necessary to free the hostages”!

Things were happening all at once, the gunman had instructed the pilot to dump almost all fuel as a negotiating tactic, our engines would clank shut any moment, and without thrust our aircraft was as impressive as a mouthful of dust. If our government intervened we would just make it to landing. I had lived my last and all my loyalty and confidence in government suddenly waned. I cursed the vulgarity of politics and with it our expendability; we were just pawns on a very big chessboard.

Promptly the gunman emerged in the aisle. He was a white man in his thirties and he wore a black combat outfit and his face was painted black. A handgun was stuck in his belt within easy reach and a sub – machine gun was slung casually over his shoulder, his ammunition belt was well supplied. However, he was not shooting. He had high explosive charges which he place randomly around the plane. One mistake and we would all be blown to smithereens. I visualized little pieces of metal and human flesh raining down on the slumbering city of Jo’burg. As he carried out his operation, his eyes were ever watchful and his reflexes fully alert. I knew a surprise attack would only end with the incapacitation of the perpetrator, and so to keep my mind off it I looked out of the window. I saw a fighter plane performing a steep climb with the blue blow – torch after burner flame trailing behind. Fancy dramatics I thought bitterly. When I looked back, the air pirate was standing, looking down at the twins. Their mother was clutching the twins desperately, protecting them from the menacing gaze. 

The gunman was a terrorist and would stop at nothing. I thought, he would now begin the killing and it seemed he had chosen the twins to be the first. God, how I wished I had stayed on the anti – hijack team. Now would have been my day. However, I still knew a thing or two, my hands were starting to grasp the metal head of my seat belt when the hijacker moved off, heading swiftly to the cockpit. I sat at ease.

Our descent was sharp but I hardly noticed. When we levelled off I could see the Jo’burg lights. Then the plane banked sharply and we began heading west, away from the airport, shortly after, all our lights were extinguished, even the anti – collision lights went off, at first I imagined the aircraft’s systems had gone down, but the steady hum of the engines told me we were still in circulation. I later learned that the commando had said he was a soldier and did not kill children. So the lights off procedure was to facilitate a parachute jump under the cover of darkness. After about a minute of total darkness the lights came back on again. The hijacker had spared our lives but had severed our communications equipment. His jump meant that we were lower than 3 300 metres but still nowhere closer to the airport.

The aircraft banked sharply again and the engines screamed as we regained altitude and increased speed. After a few minutes of climbing sharply the two powerful engines fell silent. But the pilot had anticipated that, for he levelled off the big metal bird. We were now gliding on our own momentum and still in danger of crashing. When we were again above Johannesburg, the plane nose-dived sharply but noiselessly and we had neither radio clearance for landing nor the ability to regain altitude. The aircraft wavered as if to nose dive to our deaths and with both hands on the armrests I resolved that if I came out of this alive, I would never be a government yes – man again and my loyalty would be based on reason. I despised ‘disloyal’ people because I had not yet climbed the hill they had climbed in life. But now I knew the state can be an unfeeling monster.

As if this revelation was the magic moment that accessed our landing, our big airbus appeared directly above Jan Smuts Airport like a ghost, a little lower and the airport building’s roof would have been shaved off by our fully extended landing gear. The pilot wing – tipped the runway and the airbus silently touched down but without thrust reversers, we hurtled on towards the end of the runway on a collision course with a fully laden Boeing 747 – 400 aircraft preparing to take off. The pilot locked on the brakes and with less than 20 metres to spare we shuddered to a halt. The two aircraft sat facing each other peacefully till our peace was shattered some minutes later by black – clad anti – hijack men who, violently blew off our doors and entered with smoke – screens and such fanfare. 

The last I saw of the anti – hijack men our pilot was screaming his head off at their commander for being dramatic for nothing and terrorising the passengers with the violence of their entry. I could have walked off with a big smile if the pilot was hollering at the president of my country. I knew then my loyalty was dead. To the end of my days I will never who is the worse, terrorists who threaten public lives, or politicians who sometimes have the power to avert disaster but sacrifice innocent lives just for the sake of a political stand point.

A copy of the original publication.