"There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the separate alliances through which in the unhappy past the nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interest" - Cordell Hull, 1945 Testimony before the U.S. Congress hearings on the United Nations Charter.
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| With Boss Lady - Professor Gulnur Aybet - my Course Director for the BA (Hons.) Conflict, Peace and Security at the University of Kent, Canterbury. |
Introduction:
The assertion that Europe needs America for its security has to be assessed for currency in the 21st Century. There was a time when Europe, unquestionably, needed the American ‘security blanket’ (Galen, 1994). This was during the Cold War when two grave existential threats loomed large over the continent. Since the Cold War ended on Europe and America’s terms, it must follow that these existential threats have been tamed, and therefore the question of whether Europe still needs America for its security provision does arise. To be sure, the threats of the Cold War era could not have been successfully countered without America’s involvement, but it bears investigation whether this remains the case in the post-Cold War era.
My discussion of this question will be in two parts. In the first, longer part of my paper, I will use the historical process tracing, to show that Europe really need America between 1945 and 1991. In the second part, working with the assumption that the main threats of the Cold War are largely obsolete, I will try to find out what new threats exist now for Europe and, whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is still the optimal shield against these threats.
My position is that the demise of the Soviet Union does not mean the end of all security threats. There are new threats to Europe, and NATO has had to adapt itself to these new threats so as to remain relevant. My response to the other important part of my question, that of whether Europe has to unwaveringly follow America’s lead in international affairs, will be interwoven in both parts of this paper in the form examples of Europe’s response to crises. History, and international relations theories seem to put a question mark as to whether Europe can be expected to always follow America’s lead in international affairs. The crises with good insights for my discussion are the 2003 Iraq War in the post-Cold War period, and the 1973 Middle East crisis during the Cold War.
Part I. The Cold War Years: 1945 – 1991.
This is but a brief excursion to the Cold War period. The purpose of which is to try and ground Europe’s security situation in its historical context. In this period we find this objective situation: a war ravaged Europe in economic dire straits. Thus, among the major consequences of World War II, these three below are significant for my paper: (1) Europe emerged from the war physically devastated and economically while; (2) America and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, rose to superpower status and, consequently, there was; (3) the emergence of the Cold War (McWilliams and Piotrowski, 2009). While these consequences mean Europe had to depend on the United States, I argue, as does Zoellick, that although national interests of allies may sometimes coincide, there is always the likelihood of a divergence of views on how best to pursue them (Zoellick, 1997). This will be reflected in this part of my paper by what has been called the ‘abandonment – entrapment dilemma’ (Sharp, 1987).
Did Europe Ever Need America for its Security?
We could ask the question why is the subject of this paper not, for instance, “Africa needs America for its security?” A reformulation of the question as; why did the pre-eminent power in the world choose to ally itself to the extent it did with Europe at the end of World War II and not, say, with Africa or Latin America? The answer must be steeped in the fact that the two World Wars started, and, were largely fought in the European theatre. Twice, America had had to come to Europe’s rescue. Each time at great expense than would than would have been the case if preventive measures against the two world wars had been pursued through American power in the first place. American involvement was not altruism either, contiguity of values also played a part. The reason why America could not stand on the side lines is that due to values, economic, and geographic propinquities, European insecurity inevitably had a negative impact on America. In Deutsch’s conception of security community, America would not be able to stand aside and a let a continent with shared values (social and economic) be consumed by opposite social values (Tusiciny, 2007). This is possibly the line of reasoning that sustains NATO and tallies with that of other authors who have argued that NATO endures because what defines it is “not only what it is against but by what it is for” (Aybet, 2012).
For my current arguments, it is sufficient to agree with Josef Joffe’s position that it was not unthinkable that an even more devastating third world war would have started in Europe if left to tis own devices (Joffe, 1984). All of which would have been to the detriment of Europe, and America. So, certainly, due to two existential threats during the Cold War, Europe needed America for its security. The first existential threat was the insecurity prevalent between the European states that had led to the two catastrophic world wars in the first place. In this conception, Europe left to its own devices was a clear and imminent danger to itself, and thus needed a pacifier; America became that pacifier (Joffe, 1984). Any doubts about this formula can be dispelled by looking at the interwar years between 1918 and 1939, where American non-involvement on the continent is largely seen as the reason why a catastrophic second world war started (Joffe, 1984). The second threat is the external and well documented Soviet threat where, again, it is widely agreed that Europe could not have met this threat without American support. Many other authors concur with this view, such as David Compert who says ‘NATO brought lasting peace to Europe, previously the globe’s most dangerous continent’ (Compert, 1997). To sum up, the objective security conditions in Europe at the end of 1945 called out for external assistance and America heeded that call. It is only, inevitably, when interests diverge that may then find dissonance in transatlantic relations: effectively a refusal to follow the American lead.
The Abandonment – Entrapment Dilemma:
Glenn Snyder, in my view, captured the essence of this dilemma when he said,
Abandonment, in general, is ‘defection,’ but it may take a variety of specific forms: the ally may realign with the opponent; he may merely de-align, abrogating the alliance contract; he may fail to make good on his explicit commitments; or he may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected…. Entrapment means being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or share only partially. The interests of allies are generally not identical; to the extent they are shared, they may be valued in different degree (Snyder, 1984).
The above description serves my discussion well as it (1) explains the main features of the dilemma as I have chosen to apply it in this paper, and (2) highlights my earlier stated position that allies’ interests are not necessarily identical. From the above explanation follows the observation that while Europe feared American abandonment in the face of the Soviet threat, they were also worried about being entrapped in American conflicts which did not constitute vital interests to Europe. For Snyder then, the actions of the states would determine what they fear at the moment, such as moving towards the ally’s position when fearing abandonment or, for fear of entrapment; loosen their alliance commitment or refuse to support an ally’s position (Snyder, 1984).
The Middle East Crisis of 1973 is a good example of the action prompted by fear of entrapment. Aybet (2001) records that ‘for the first time European allies had decided to follow a foreign poicy which was divergent to that of the US.’ In the 1973 Middle East Crisis, Europe’s position, as dictated by national interests, was that of wanting to minimise frictions with the Arab countries and with the Soviet Union (Aybet, 2001). In this instance Europe’s interests were divergent from that of the United States as Europe depended on Middle East oil while the United States did not; the result was that the United States followed a pro-Israeli stance while Europeans took a pro-Arab stance in the crisis (Aybet, 2001).
Even before this crisis, the possibility of diverging interest can be seen as early as during Charles de Gaulle’s time. In fact, France seems to be a good example of the European country that persistently questioned the wisdom of blindly following America in international affairs. Charles de Gaulle’s concern seems to have that American nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union amounted only to a nuclear war fought on European soil. In his quest for a French deterrent he questioned whether the Americans were willing to trade New York for Hamburg in a nuclear exchange with the Soviets (Laird, 1984). In a taxonomy of interests, Europe’s vital interests was to ensure that a nuclear war would not be fought on its soil while, in de Gaulle’s view, the same matter would be a secondary interest to the Americans (Roskin, 2012). With varying degrees of success therefore, Europeans, mostly at the behest of France, attempted to assert their position independent of the US. Examples of this would include the (French) third force concept, de Gaulle’s rejection of US nuclear forces on French soil, and his diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which was against the US position (McWillimas and Piotrowski, 2009). All this inverts the leader – follower relationship. Of course, the abandonment side of the coin means that Europe did not follow a fully contradictory policy to that of the United States. This would only come in 2003 when France threatened to veto, at the Security Council, the United States war on Iraq at the time (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2004).
Part II. The Current Security Environment.
The charge to answer in this section can be formulated in this manner: Europe is no longer the dangerous and fragile continent I described in Part I of this paper, war between European states has become unthinkable. The economies are strong (pre – 2008 financial crisis) and interdependent, and most importantly; the Soviet Union was dismantled and in its place, Russia is a capitalist democracy which even has an office at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), NATO’s military headquarters. So why should an organisation former to counter Cold War threats remain in place after the Cold War ended? In short, does Europe need America for its security today? Ted Galen poses the same question more forcefully. It is his view that Europe is ‘clinging to the American security blanket’ (Galen, 1994). He further questions, among other things, why America still has troops stationed on European soil when the original purpose; to deter a Soviet invasion, no longer exists (Galen, 1994). He is not alone in this view as Jones (2004) also records Robert Kagan’s view that Europe has deliberately allowed itself to atrophy in matters of security provision because of its dependency on America. Which is what is called the problem of free riding in alliance theory (Joffe, 1984). It is not an unreasonable position to take, considering that as the Cold War ended on the Western block’s terms, the threats of that era must have ended at the same time. Indeed, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO should have found itself without a purpose. It is in this section that I will discuss what the new threats are and what the transatlantic security community has decided is the best way to counter the new threats.
New Challenges:
The end of the Cold War brought with it new challenges. Among them is a paradoxical one; that envisaged by the concept of Critical National Infrastructure vulnerabilities, where European success in integration and development creates potent security threats (RUSI, 2008). Victory in the Cold War therefore did not mean an end to threats but, instead, a fostering of new threats which are more difficult to deal with than the symmetric ones of the Cold War era. The new challenges are therefore mostly of an asymmetric nature but cannot be ignored either. In list form, the new security threats to Europe are; terrorism, cyber-attacks, failed states, nuclear proliferation, climate change and demography (migratory pressures and an ageing population) (Williams, 2008). Climate change and demography certainly cannot be met by military force but their implications for security cannot be overstated. The other threats such as cyber-attacks are also difficult to meet with military force since attribution to a state is not easy to make, this was the case with cyber-attacks on Estonia (a new NATO member) in 2007 (NATO, 2010). My main point is that some of these new threats do not easily lend themselves to NATO’s traditional core capability, while some, such as countering nuclear proliferation can fall within the traditional remit. It is with this in mind that we may investigate whether NATO is no longer relevant and, by implication, whether Europe still needs America for its security.
These new threats are very closely related and may still require capabilities only NATO can muster. Take for example the first time NATO’s Article 5 was ever invoked – in the September 11 attacks – the link between terrorism, failed states nuclear proliferation is easy to discern. Weak or failed states can host terrorists who are then able to attack Europe and America. The further suspicion is that these kinds of terrorists would use nuclear weapons should they lay their hands on them. Taken together then, the new threats to Europe are threats to values as well as physical security. While NATO’s original purpose was defence of territory, it has had to reconfigure itself to meet the new challenges. This reconfiguration is in line with Aybet’s remark I mentioned earlier about NATO also being defined by what it is for (Aybet, 2001). A strategic inflection point has, therefore, been observed and proof of this can be found in the 2010 Strategic Concept which, inter alia, records these new commitments;
NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security (NATO, 2010).
We see here then that the transatlantic relationship is still necessary insofar as it has evolved to mean more than territorial defence. To the question whether Europe still needs America for its security, the answer can be discerned from Professor Joseph Nye Jr.’s insightful remarks at Chatham House. He conceives the world as a three level chess game with different security threats on each level; on the level that has the asymmetric threats I outlined above, he concedes that no nation – even America – can go it alone (Nye Jr., 2010). So, if even American cannot manage to provide for its security in the new threats environment, it follows that NATO – of necessity – remains a good insurance policy.
But even though the allies are united against these new threats, my earlier position is that allies will tend to have a divergence on threat perception and disagree on the best methods to deal with threats remains valid. I see the ‘Abandonment – Entrapment Dilemma’ as ‘loaded’ against abandonment in the post-Cold War era. To my mind, absent the Soviet nuclear threat, European states are more forceful against being entrapped by American interests which may not be vital to Europe. It is for this reason that France threatened to veto the US invasion of Iraq, Turkey refused the Americans transit and Germany was very vocal against it (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2004). Divergences can also be seen in Europe’s position on other issues such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (Cottey, 2007). The argument made here is that there are always different points of view as to how to best meet the threats. Europeans seeming to favour favour diplomacy and soft power while, America, due to its capabilities, may lean towards using force (Cottey, 2007).
Conclusion:
My paper has attempted to answer the question of whether Europe needs America for its security by arguing that in the Cold War era, Europe could not have withstood the Soviet threat without America’s support. World War II had devastated Europe and there were also fears that a third world war would start due to enduring animosities among European states. NATO became the vehicle of that security provision. I have argued that the fact that NATO has endured after the end of the Cold War is a testimony to the way the transatlantic relationship is an example of a security community with shared values beyond the immediate threats. Europe and America have the repositioned themselves against the new threats on the basis of retaining NATO’s core capabilities and adding to it the relevant ones for the current environment. I have used the 1973 Middle East Crisis and the 2003 Iraq War to show that even the closest of allies may have divergent interests and opinions, so Europe does not necessarily follow America’s lead. A fair way to characterise the transatlantic relationship would be to acknowledge that even in the same countries, there will different of thinking, some will be Atlanticists in outlook and some, like de Gaulle, will prefer an independent European position; but these are differences of degree rather than kind, as none truly doubt the usefulness of their alliance.
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| Conducting my researches from home during my time as a BA (Hons.) Conflict, Peace and Security student at the University of Kent, Canterbury. |
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