Thursday, 7 May 2015

If I Were To Choose The Country Of My Birth...

"For if one should propose to all men a choice, bidding them select the best customs from all the customs that there are, each race of men, after examining them all, would select those of his own people; thus all think that their own customs are by far the best" - Herodotus of Halicarnassus, The Histories. 

Below is the Preface to Rousseau's discourse on the origins of inequality. In itself, the preface is a self contained unit which describes what the ideal republic ought to look like. The works that become classics or become listed as canons, tend to do so on merit. Now read on... 

"The Republics" by Kudakwashe Kanhutu
by Jean-Jacques Rousseau 

Dedication to the Republic of Geneva 

MOST HONOURABLE, MAGNIFICENT AND SOVEREIGN LORDS, convinced that only a virtuous citizen can confer on his country honours which it can accept, I have been for thirty years past working to make myself worthy to offer you some public homage; and, this fortunate opportunity supplementing in some degree the insufficiency of my efforts, I have thought myself entitled to follow in embracing it the dictates of the zeal which inspires me, rather than the right which should have been my authorisation. Having had the happiness to be born among you, how could I reflect on the equality which nature has ordained between men, and the inequality which they have introduced, without reflecting on the profound wisdom by which both are in this State happily combined and made to coincide, in the manner that is most in conformity with natural law, and most favourable to society, to the maintenance of public order and to the happiness of individuals? In my researches after the best rules common sense can lay down for the constitution of a government, I have been so struck at finding them all in actuality in your own, that even had I not been born within your walls I should have thought it indispensable for me to offer this picture of human society to that people, which of all others seems to be possessed of its greatest advantages, and to have best guarded against its abuses. 

If I had had to make choice of the place of my birth, I should have preferred a society which had an extent proportionate to the limits of the human faculties; that is, to the possibility of being well governed: in which every person being equal to his occupation, no one should be obliged to commit to others the functions with which he was entrusted: a State, in which all the individuals being well known to one another, neither the secret machinations of vice, nor the modesty of virtue should be able to escape the notice and judgment of the public; and in which the pleasant custom of seeing and knowing one another should make the love of country rather a love of the citizens than of its soil. 

I should have wished to be born in a country in which the interest of the Sovereign and that of the people must be single and identical; to the end that all the movements of the machine might tend always to the general happiness. And as this could not be the case, unless the Sovereign and the people were one and the same person, it follows that I should have wished to be born under a democratic government, wisely tempered. 

I should have wished to live and die free: that is, so far subject to the laws that neither I, nor anybody else, should be able to cast off their honourable yoke: the easy and salutary yoke which the haughtiest necks bear with the greater docility, as they are made to bear no other. 

I should have wished then that no one within the State should be able to say he was above the law; and that no one without should be able to dictate so that the State should be obliged to recognise his authority. For, be the constitution of a government what it may, if there be within its jurisdiction a single man who is not subject to the law, all the rest are necessarily at his discretion. And if there be a national ruler within, and a foreign ruler without, however they may divide their authority, it is impossible that both should be duly obeyed, or that the State should be well governed. 

I should not have chosen to live in a republic of recent institution, however excellent its laws; for fear the government, being perhaps otherwise framed than the circumstances of the moment might require, might disagree with the new citizens, or they with it, and the State run the risk of overthrow and destruction almost as soon as it came into being. For it is with liberty as it is with those solid and succulent foods, or with those generous wines which are well adapted to nourish and fortify robust constitutions that are used to them, but ruin and intoxicate weak and delicate constitutions to which they are not suited. Peoples once accustomed to masters are not in a condition to do without them. If they attempt to shake off the yoke, they still more estrange themselves from freedom, as, by mistaking for it an unbridled license to which it is diametrically opposed, they nearly always manage, by their revolutions, to hand themselves over to seducers, who only make their chains heavier than before. The Roman people itself, a model for all free peoples, was wholly incapable of governing itself when it escaped from the oppression of the Tarquins. Debased by slavery, and the ignominious tasks which had been imposed upon it, it was at first no better than a stupid mob, which it was necessary to control and govern with the greatest wisdom; in order that, being accustomed by degrees to breathe the health-giving air of liberty, minds which had been enervated or rather brutalised under tyranny, might gradually acquire that severity of morals and spirit of fortitude which made it at length the people of all most worthy of respect. I should, then, have sought out for my country some peaceful and happy Republic, of an antiquity that lost itself, as it were, in the night of time: which had experienced only such shocks as served to manifest and strengthen the courage and patriotism of its subjects; and whose citizens, long accustomed to a wise independence, were not only free, but worthy to be so.  

I should have wished to choose myself a country, diverted, by a fortunate impotence, from the brutal love of conquest, and secured, by a still more fortunate situation, from the fear of becoming itself the conquest of other States: a free city situated between several nations, none of which should have any interest in attacking it, while each had an interest in preventing it from being attacked by the others; in short, a Republic which should have nothing to tempt the ambition of its neighbours, but might reasonably depend on their assistance in case of need. It follows that a republican State so happily situated could have nothing to fear but from itself; and that, if its members trained themselves to the use of arms, it would be rather to keep alive that military ardour and courageous spirit which are so proper among freemen, and tend to keep up their taste for liberty, than from the necessity of providing for their defence. 

I should have sought a country, in which the right of legislation was vested in all the citizens; for who can judge better than they of the conditions under which they had best dwell together in the same society? Not that I should have approved of Plebiscita, like those among the Romans; in which the rulers in the State, and those most interested in its preservation, were excluded from the deliberations on which in many cases its security depended; and in which, by the most absurd inconsistency, the magistrates were deprived of rights which the meanest citizens enjoyed.  

On the contrary, I should have desired that, in order to prevent self-interested and ill-conceived projects, and all such dangerous innovations as finally ruined the Athenians, each man should not be at liberty to propose new laws at pleasure; but that this right should belong exclusively to the magistrates; and that even they should use it with so much caution, the people, on its side, be so reserved in giving its consent to such laws, and the promulgation of them be attended with so much solemnity, that before the constitution could be upset by them, there might be time enough for all to be convinced, that it is above all the great antiquity of the laws which makes them sacred and venerable, that men soon learn to despise laws which they see daily altered, and that States, by accustoming themselves to neglect their ancient customs under the pretext of improvement, often introduce greater evils than those they endeavour to remove. 

I should have particularly avoided, as necessarily ill-governed, a Republic in which the people, imagining themselves in a position to do without magistrates, or at least to leave them with only a precarious authority, should imprudently have kept for themselves the administration of civil affairs and the execution of their own laws. Such must have been the rude constitution of primitive governments, directly emerging from a state of nature; and this was another of the vices that contributed to the downfall of the Republic of Athens. 

But I should have chosen a community in which the individuals, content with sanctioning their laws, and deciding the most important public affairs in general assembly and on the motion of the rulers, had established honoured tribunals, carefully distinguished the several departments, and elected year by year some of the most capable and upright of their fellow-citizens to administer justice and govern the State; a community, in short, in which the virtue of the magistrates thus bearing witness to the wisdom of the people, each class reciprocally did the other honour. If in such a case any fatal misunderstandings arose to disturb the public peace, even these intervals of blindness and error would bear the marks of moderation, mutual esteem, and a common respect for the laws; which are sure signs and pledges of a reconciliation as lasting as sincere. Such are the advantages, most honourable, magnificent and sovereign lords, which I should have sought in the country in which I should have chosen to be born. And if providence had added to all these a delightful situation, a temperate climate, a fertile soil, and the most beautiful countryside under Heaven, I should have desired only, to complete my felicity, the peaceful enjoyment of all these blessings, in the bosom of this happy country; to live at peace in the sweet society of my fellow-citizens, and practising towards them, from their own example, the duties of friendship, humanity, and every other virtue, to leave behind me the honourable memory of a good man, and an upright and virtuous patriot. 

But, if less fortunate or too late grown wise, I had seen myself reduced to end an infirm and languishing life in other climates, vainly regretting that peaceful repose which I had forfeited in the imprudence of youth, I should at least have entertained the same feelings in my heart, though denied the opportunity of making use of them in my native country. Filled with a tender and disinterested love for my distant fellow-citizens, I should have addressed them from my heart, much in the following terms. 

"My dear fellow-citizens, or rather my brothers, since the ties of blood, as well as the laws, unite almost all of us, it gives me pleasure that I cannot think of you, without thinking, at the same time, of all the blessings you enjoy, and of which none of you, perhaps, more deeply feels the value than I who have lost them. The more I reflect on your civil and political condition, the less can I conceive that the nature of human affairs could admit of a better. In all other governments, when there is a question of ensuring the greatest good of the State, nothing gets beyond projects and ideas, or at best bare possibilities. But as for you, your happiness is complete, and you have nothing to do but enjoy it; you require nothing more to be made perfectly happy, than to know how to be satisfied with being so. Your sovereignty, acquired or recovered by the sword, and maintained for two centuries past by your valour and wisdom, is at length fully and universally acknowledged. Your boundaries are fixed, your rights confirmed and your repose secured by honourable treaties. Your constitution is excellent, being not only dictated by the profoundest wisdom, but guaranteed by great and friendly powers. Your State enjoys perfect tranquillity; you have neither wars nor conquerors to fear; you have no other master than the wise laws you have yourselves made; and these are administered by upright magistrates of your own choosing. You are neither so wealthy as to be enervated by effeminacy, and thence to lose, in the pursuit of frivolous pleasures, the taste for real happiness and solid virtue; nor poor enough to require more assistance from abroad than your own industry is sufficient to procure you. In the meantime the precious privilege of liberty, which in great nations is maintained only by submission to the most exorbitant impositions, costs you hardly anything for its preservation.  

May a Republic, so wisely and happily constituted, last for ever, for an example to other nations, and for the felicity of its own citizens! This is the only prayer you have left to make, the only precaution that remains to be taken. It depends, for the future, on yourselves alone (not to make you happy, for your ancestors have saved you that trouble), but to render that happiness lasting, by your wisdom in its enjoyment. It is on your constant union, your obedience to the laws, and your respect for their ministers, that your preservation depends. If there remains among you the smallest trace of bitterness or distrust, hasten to destroy it, as an accursed leaven which sooner or later must bring misfortune and ruin on the State. I conjure you all to look into your hearts, and to hearken to the secret voice of conscience. Is there any among you who can find, throughout the universe, a more upright, more enlightened and more honourable body than your magistracy? Do not all its members set you an example of moderation, of simplicity of manners, of respect for the laws, and of the most sincere harmony? Place, therefore, without reserve, in such wise superiors, that salutary confidence which reason ever owes to virtue. Consider that they are your own choice, that they justify that choice, and that the honours due to those whom you have dignified are necessarily yours by reflexion. Not one of you is so ignorant as not to know that, when the laws lose their force and those who defend them their authority, security and liberty are universally impossible. Why, therefore, should you hesitate to do that cheerfully and with just confidence which you would all along have been bound to do by your true interest, your duty and reason itself? 

Let not a culpable and pernicious indifference to the maintenance of the constitution ever induce you to neglect, in case of need, the prudent advice of the most enlightened and zealous of your fellow-citizens; but let equity, moderation and firmness of resolution continue to regulate all your proceedings, and to exhibit you to the whole universe as the example of a valiant and modest people, jealous equally of their honour and of their liberty. Beware particularly, as the last piece of advice I shall give you, of sinister constructions and venomous rumours, the secret motives of which are often more dangerous than the actions at which they are levelled. A whole house will be awake and take the first alarm given by a good and trusty watch-dog, who barks only at the approach of thieves; but we hate the importunity of those noisy curs, which are perpetually disturbing the public repose, and whose continual ill-timed warnings prevent our attending to them, when they may perhaps be necessary." 

And you, most honourable and magnificent lords, the worthy and revered magistrates of a free people, permit me to offer you in particular my duty and homage. If there is in the world a station capable of conferring honour on those who fill it, it is undoubtedly that which virtue and talents combine to bestow, that of which you have made yourselves worthy, and to which you have been promoted by your fellow-citizens. Their worth adds a new lustre to your own; while, as you have been chosen, by men capable of governing others, to govern themselves, I cannot but hold you as much superior to all other magistrates, as a free people, and particularly that over which you have the honour to preside, is by its wisdom and its reason superior to the populace of other States. 

Be it permitted me to cite an example of which there ought to have existed better records, and one which will be ever near to my heart. I cannot recall to mind, without the sweetest emotions, the memory of that virtuous citizen, to whom I owe my being, and by whom I was often instructed, in my infancy, in the respect which is due to you. I see him still, living by the work of his hands, and feeding his soul on the sublimest truths. I see the works of Tacitus, Plutarch, and Grotius lying before him in the midst of the tools of his trade. At his side stands his dear son, receiving, alas with too little profit, the tender instructions of the best of fathers. But, if the follies of youth made me for a while forget his wise lessons, I have at length the happiness to be conscious that, whatever propensity one may have to vice, it is not easy for an education, with which love has mingled, to be entirely thrown away. 

Such, my most honourable and magnificent lords, are the citizens, and even the common inhabitants of the State which you govern; such are those intelligent and sensible men, of whom, under the name of workmen and the people, it is usual, in other nations, to have a low and false opinion. My father, I own with pleasure, was in no way distinguished among his fellow-citizens. He was only such as they all are; and yet, such as he was, there is no country, in which his acquaintance would not have been coveted, and cultivated even with advantage by men of the highest character. It would not become me, nor is it, thank Heaven, at all necessary for me to remind you of the regard which such men have a right to expect of their magistrates, to whom they are equal both by education and by the rights of nature and birth, and inferior only, by their own will, by that preference which they owe to your merit, and, for giving you, can claim some sort of acknowledgment on your side. It is with a lively satisfaction I understand that the greatest candour and condescension attend, in all your behaviour towards them, on that gravity which becomes the ministers of the law; and that you so well repay them, by your esteem and attention, the respect and obedience which they owe to you. This conduct is not only just but prudent; as it happily tends to obliterate the memory of many unhappy events, which ought to be buried in eternal oblivion. It is also so much the more judicious, as it tends to make this generous and equitable people find a pleasure in their duty; to make them naturally love to do you honour, and to cause those who are the most zealous in the maintenance of their own rights to be at the same time the most disposed to respect yours. 

It ought not to be thought surprising that the rulers of a civil society should have the welfare and glory of their communities at heart: but it is uncommonly fortunate for the peace of men, when those persons who look upon themselves as the magistrates, or rather the masters of a more holy and sublime country, show some love for the earthly country which maintains them. I am happy in having it in my power to make so singular an exception in our favour, and to be able to rank, among its best citizens, those zealous depositaries of the sacred articles of faith established by the laws, those venerable shepherds of souls whose powerful and captivating eloquence are so much the better calculated to bear to men's hearts the maxims of the gospel, as they are themselves the first to put them into practice. All the world knows of the great success with which the art of the pulpit is cultivated at Geneva; but men are so used to hearing divines preach one thing and practise another, that few have a chance of knowing how far the spirit of Christianity, holiness of manners, severity towards themselves and indulgence towards their neighbours, prevail throughout the whole body of our ministers. It is, perhaps, given to the city of Geneva alone, to produce the edifying example of so perfect a union between its clergy and men of letters. It is in great measure on their wisdom, their known moderation, and their zeal for the prosperity of the State that I build my hopes of its perpetual tranquillity. At the same time, I notice, with a pleasure mingled with surprise and veneration, how much they detest the frightful maxims of those accursed and barbarous men, of whom history furnishes us with more than one example; who, in order to support the pretended rights of God, that is to say their own interests, have been so much the less greedy of human blood, as they were more hopeful their own in particular would be always respected. 

I must not forget that precious half of the Republic, which makes the happiness of the other; and whose sweetness and prudence preserve its tranquillity and virtue. Amiable and virtuous daughters of Geneva, it will be always the lot of your sex to govern ours. Happy are we, so long as your chaste influence, solely exercised within the limits of conjugal union, is exerted only for the glory of the State and the happiness of the public. It was thus the female sex commanded at Sparta; and thus you deserve to command at Geneva. What man can be such a barbarian as to resist the voice of honour and reason, coming from the lips of an affectionate wife? Who would not despise the vanities of luxury, on beholding the simple and modest attire which, from the lustre it derives from you, seems the most favourable to beauty? It is your task to perpetuate, by your insinuating influence and your innocent and amiable rule, a respect for the laws of the State, and harmony among the citizens. It is yours to reunite divided families by happy marriages; and, above all things, to correct, by the persuasive sweetness of your lessons and the modest graces of your conversation, those extravagancies which our young people pick up in other countries, whence, instead of many useful things by which they might profit, they bring home hardly anything, besides a puerile air and a ridiculous manner, acquired among loose women, but an admiration for I know not what so-called grandeur, and paltry recompenses for being slaves, which can never come near the real greatness of liberty. Continue, therefore, always to be what you are, the chaste guardians of our morals, and the sweet security for our peace, exerting on every occasion the privileges of the heart and of nature, in the interests of duty and virtue.  

I flatter myself that I shall never be proved to have been mistaken, in building on such a foundation my hopes of the general happiness of the citizens and the glory of the Republic. It must be confessed, however, that with all these advantages, it will not shine with that lustre, by which the eyes of most men are dazzled; a puerile and fatal taste for which is the most mortal enemy of happiness and liberty. 

Let our dissolute youth seek elsewhere light pleasures and long repentances. Let our pretenders to taste admire elsewhere the grandeur of palaces, the beauty of equipages, sumptuous furniture, the pomp of public entertainments, and all the refinements of luxury and effeminacy. Geneva boasts nothing but men; such a sight has nevertheless a value of its own, and those who have a taste for it are well worth the admirers of all the rest.  

Deign, most honourable, magnificent and sovereign lords, to receive, and with equal goodness, this respectful testimony of the interest I take in your common prosperity. And, if I have been so unhappy as to be guilty of any indiscreet transport in this glowing effusion of my heart, I beseech you to pardon me, and to attribute it to the tender affection of a true patriot, and to the ardent and legitimate zeal of a man, who can imagine for himself no greater felicity than to see you happy. 

Most honourable, magnificent and sovereign lords, I am, with the most profound respect, 

Your most humble and obedient servant and fellow-citizen. 

J. J. ROUSSEAU 
Chambéry, June 12, 1754

Saturday, 2 May 2015

The State and Human Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Abstract.

This is the abstract to the researches that were conducted by Kudakwashe Kanhutu of Mashonaland Central (Zimbabwe), in fulfilment of the requirements of his Master of Science in Defence, Development & Diplomacy degree at Durham University in England. He will publish his full researches in the hope that he will instruct his fellow countrymen that when brother fights brother, no one wins but the outsider.

Zimbabwe: Pax Africana! The cover of my thesis is a tribute to my brother who fought in the DRC War.

Dedication 


To the people of Zimbabwe, may our peaceful polity long continue! 

Kudakwashe Kanhutu, Hatfield College, Durham University, School of Government & International Affairs, September 2014. 

Abstract 

The recurring civil wars and deaths of civilians from preventable causes in the DRC forms the puzzle for this paper: why has the state remained so weak over such a long period? This paper has cast the inability by the state's institutions to provide human security as state weakness. Human security is then used as a lens to interrogate where the international community and the local elites, through commission or omission, have been culpable for state weakness in the DRC. Human security is argued to be achievable under conditions where the state is legitimate and has a monopoly on the use of force - a strong state. This point necessitates a comparison between conditions faced by the consolidated European states in their creation and those which now confront the post-colonial states. The reasons for state weakness here are then argued to be on two levels: the international level and the state level. At the international level, the continued extractive relationship with the global North and the actions of the DRC's neighbours are inimical to the state's ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. At the state level, the most significant cause is the self-defeating short term strategies adopted by post-colonial elites to consolidate their power at independence. This paper argues that the ideal Weberian state, with its impersonal institutions, is the best possible way of achieving human security in the DRC and other post-colonial states. Human security provision would then be the remedy to legitimacy crises that arise due to the colonial legacy.

Professor David Held, who helped me formulate, even though I say so myself, an elegant thesis.

Sunday, 5 April 2015

Blood, The Ink For My Autopsy

"Poetry is finer and more philosophical than history; for poetry expresses the universal, and history only the particular" - Aristotle, Poetics.

Sub haina hurukuro

My position on the war to liberate my country from racist white minority rule, is that we fought a just war. This was our World War 1 and our World War 2, and we gave a good account of ourselves! Below, I relate some of the group dynamics the untrained eye would not perceive, nor the untrained mind conceive:

BLOOD, The Ink For My Autopsy

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu 

The plan had been hatched by a very far sighted person. As the struggle for liberation intensified, there was an urgent need for able bodied men to join the fight. This led to acceptance of hardened criminals and those who habitually traversed the borders of sanity, into the fighting ranks of ZANLA. The exigencies of recruiting for a war already underway did not allow the setting up of a Criminal Records Bureau, to painstakingly vet all cadres joining the struggle. However, one commander in the Dare reChimurenga (the War Council for ZANLA), had anticipated this problem with extra-ordinary foresight, and countered it with equal cunning. 

For the uninitiated, I am taking you back to the colonial period in the Southern African country formerly called Rhodesia, specifically between 1972 and 1980. This is the time when the black nationalists’ demand for a release from the yoke of white minority oppression reached its apex. The main form of the demand was an armed struggle called Chimurenga II, which saw black people leave their country for training in neighbouring Mozambique and Zambia then return to talk to the white oppressor in terms which were unequivocal. The two main fighting groups were ZANLA, which was dominated by the Shona tribe, and ZIPRA which was smaller owing to it being composed of the minority Ndebele tribe. We were fighting a war of liberating the whole black population from the indignity of being disenfranchised in our own land by foreigners. The leader of the white minority was that rabid racist, Ian Smith. 

I insist that the greatest compliment I ever received as a combatant in this war came from our sworn enemy, Ian Smith, in briefing his regular JOC meetings, he is said to have uttered that “Mabhunu’s fighting force shortens our projection for a thousand year rule”. I had adopted the nom de guerre Mabhunu Muchaendepi and the grudging respect of my enemy was not so much a source of pride, but confirmation that our methods were effective. 

I must say I was initially averse to what I perceived as a waste of scarce resources when I was informed I would be part of a unit, charged with terminating comrades on the battlefield who were compromising the war by being cruel to the black population we were fighting to free. It was a terrible anti-climax, to hear that my engagement with the white enemy would only be coincidental. I found it hard to believe I had shared caves with pythons, walked barefoot across game parks in the middle of the night to reach Mozambique, tottering, on legs swollen to twice their size, to fight, not the enemy; but my own fellow combatants. 

It felt like a betrayal of the spirit of Liberation, a betrayal of the nation of Zimbabwe, but any qualms I had were laid to complete rest once we began our training. Basic training was administered to all who arrived at Chimoio, this involved political education, weapons and physical training. Our commanders then assigned us to different fields we would man, based on their assessment and judgement of our abilities, an essential division of labour for any effective fighting force. 

It was in training I came into contact for the first time with, the criminals - granted a minority - who were to be my comrades in liberating Zimbabwe. I remember the vacant look in the eyes of some of these cadres, the inordinate eagerness to get weapons and return to the theatre of war. If I were to say today that I knew instinctively that these people were sadistic, any decent magistrate would throw me in jail owing to the paradigm shift since, but in a time of war, this instinct was indispensable and invaluable an attribute. 

Vindication for that instinct would come of course from a reading of the massacre of black civilians between Chipinge and Wedza which took place in such a short time after our pass out from Chimoio. We also knew when Rhodesian Army Selous Scouts, pretending to be liberation guerrillas, carried out the massacres to implicate ZANLA. Still, it evoked despondency to watch on the news while we were at advanced training in Libya, the hacked off legs, burnt corpses, pregnant women stabbed by bayonets lying lifeless in row after row, murdered by their supposed liberators. 

Ian Smith’s government, of course, to win the battle of hearts and minds, allowed reporters from all over the world to have a field day when such massacres occurred. Extreme double standards because when the Rhodesian Army, frustrated by how cunning the genuine liberators were, also massacred civilians in the hundreds, reporters would be banned from these areas. 

I would also venture that the reason Ian Smith began to doubt his government’s resolution for a thousand year white domination of the majority blacks was – has to be – the existence of a unit in ZANLA charged with protecting civilians from wayward liberators. Was this not a clear example of the advanced political acumen he was telling the world blacks inherently lack? Furthermore, the atrocities visited on civilians by Smith’s army went unpunished even when it was so obvious and undeniable. 

The Kaguvi Unit, my unit in the armed struggle and a brain child of Comrade Tongogara, evolved to become an army within an army, fighting a war within a war. The Unit developed its own ethos which bordered on a preference of actually losing the war than to gain victory by terrorising civilians. This sentiment, however, was not unanimous across the board, even in Dare reChimurenga (the War Council) some individuals opposed Comrade Tongogara in preference for the scorched earth policy instead. It is a fact that some of these people who were doctrinally opposed to Comrade Tongogara actually instructed the other guerrillas to be ruthless against the black population. Tactically, this may achieve some results but, strategically it is a disaster in the making. 

To be able to shed light on why my autopsy is being written in blood, let me posit that death has always knocked on my door insofar as my unit may have made eternal enemies in those we were up against in the armed struggle. The other major fault-lines of Chimurenga II were resolved at Lancaster House, but this in-group fault-line, of which I was a part of, became an orphan. The minority in our own midst that my unit fought against were never, to my knowledge, demobilised. I suspect they were responsible for Comrade Josiah Magama Tongogara's death. As we were at such doctrinal cross purposes with this minority during the armed struggle, I do not think that even achievement of independence changed that dynamic. It is only the untrained eye, with its tendency to view all organisations as monolithic, that would not perceive the gravity of such a situation. 

The Kaguvi Unit then, numbering 85 at our peak was the unit charged with ensuring discipline on the battle field, but has so far lost nearly all its cadres. Over the years, whenever a member of the Kaguvi Unit has died, I always wonder if some scores are still being settled from the Second Chimurenga. Do not waste your pity on me however, better people than me from my unit already died on the battlefield to liberate Zimbabwe; Comrades Mandebvu, Elliot Hondo, Comrade Mabhunu Muchapera, Hokoyo, Zvaipa, Tafataona, Dragon, Tichafa…

"Mapfupa angu achamuka" - The heroine of the First Chimurenga, Mbuya Nehanda's prediction that there would be a Second Chimurenga.

Wednesday, 4 February 2015

The Zimbabwean Identity: National Identity In The Internet Age

"Each blade of grass has its spot on earth whence it draws its life, its strength; and so is man rooted to the land from which he draws his faith together with his life" - Joseph Conrad.

I know from my National Identity Number that I am Zimbabwean, but is that enough?
by Kudakwashe Kanhutu

Having deliberately skirted the subject for the longest time, my next big project finally sees me discussing Zimbabwe in explicit terms. Though I have not engaged in any public debates about Zimbabwe thus far, I have always been well aware of all the discussions making the rounds in both the academic and social circles. The one thing I have noticed which the academic and pub discussions of Zimbabwe hold in common, is an abysmal ignorance of the Zimbabwean processes. 

If only these people had been born and lived there like I did, then they wouldn't be so ignorant of what is happening and why. If only they knew the motivations, the personality, the national identity, and the mentality of the quintessential Zimbabwean, then they would not be so mistaken in their discussions. On reflection, by thinking in these terms, I was actually being very conceited myself, because who really knows what a "quintessential Zimbabwean" (or for that matter a quintessential American, Frenchman, or Motswana) is anymore?

My conceit has not been idle either because I have had, since 2010, a blog where I write about every topical issue under the sun. On this blog I have (subtly) suggested that I am in possession of the knowledge of what the quintessential Zimbabwean looks like: I have, as my header, a banner of me engaging in various activities which I think Zimbabweans surely positively identify with. Beneath this banner is the legend by Virgil: "behold a nation in a man compris'd."

The banner in question.
"Behold a nation in a man compris'd?"

This, surely, would be the high watermark of conceit if it wasn't tempered by the fact that I have realised, on my own, that it is not possible for one person or group of persons to claim to know what the national identity ought to be. We can only hope that at least fifty plus one per cent of the population identify with the image of national identity we possess in our minds. This realisation has made me ask myself the question: "what then is the Zimbabwean national identity?" Today's blog entry does not answer this question, instead I am just going to tell you how I intend to approach that question: through seeking out what is Zimbabwe's foundational story. 


A nation's literature is the repository of its identity.
All nations have a foundational story from whence their chief characteristics are drawn. The older nations can rely on fictional accounts such as that of Greece and its 10 year siege of Troy story (and the derivative accounts of Brutus who found Britain and built New Troy - now London - after vanquishing the nation of giants who lived there and; as well, Aeneas who found the Latin civilisation at Rome et cetera). The newer nations can only but rely on true accounts for events that unite them. Modern people have so many tools at their disposal to question fantastic stories such as those told by Homer in The Iliad. 


If you take for example the context from which I extracted that quote, "behold a nation in a man compris'd," you will understand my angle in arguing that a foundational story is the repository of a nation's identity. My first degree was in English Literature so my point of view with regards how we can know a nation's identity may be overly influenced by the tenets of that guild. Still, I think literature can explain how identities are formed from a nation's myths and how other factors cross-pollinate and impact local identities (this has always been the case even way before the invention of the internet age). 

Case in point: the quote "behold a nation in a man compris'd" comes from the Roman/Italian poet Virgil's epic poem; The Aeneid, itself a 'spin-off' from the Greek poet Homer's epic poem; The Iliad. I have already written elsewhere about this phenomenon - intertextuality - so will only make the point here that this borrowing from each other's stories in antiquity is the proof of the cross-pollination in foundational stories I mentioned above. 

Homer was the pre-eminent poet of antiquity and his poem, The Iliad, is the earliest literature book in existence, it tells the story of Greek heroes fighting a 10 year war at Troy. The siege at Troy ended when the Greeks devised an ingenious plan - the Trojan Horse plan. In The Iliad, Homer mentions the Trojan Horse plan in passing, it is Virgil who picks up this story in earnest and further expounds what really transpired - keep in mind that none of this actually happened. In Virgil's account, the only reason why the subterfuge of the Trojan Horse succeeded was because one Greek allowed himself to be captured by the Trojans so as to tell them the false story that the horse was a symbol of the Greeks' supplication to the might of the Trojan gods

Meantime, with shouts, the Trojan shepherds bring 
A captive Greek, in bands, before the king; 
Taken to take; who made himself their prey, 
T' impose on their belief, and Troy betray; 
Fix'd on his aim, and obstinately bent 
To die undaunted, or to circumvent. 
About the captive, tides of Trojans flow; 
All press to see, and some insult the foe. 
Now hear how well the Greeks their wiles disguis'd; 
Behold a nation in a man compris'd. 
Trembling the miscreant stood, unarm'd and bound; 
He star'd, and roll'd his haggard eyes around, 
Then said: 'Alas! what earth remains, what sea 
Is open to receive unhappy me? 
What fate a wretched fugitive attends, 
Scorn'd by my foes, abandon'd by my friends?' 

In this regard, Virgil tells us that Greeks, to a man, are purveyors of deceit. That their chief characteristic is deceit and subterfuge. Of course, he would say this because his poem represents the point of view of those who survived the Greek siege at Troy. What I took from this passage however, was the inkling that it is possible to assign to a nation, its characteristics: a national identity. This can be done by looking for the nation's foundational stories and what positive self image they project of themselves. While not everyone will be able to live up to this self image, it represents what the collective strives for, and whoever approximates that image will be held in high esteem by their nation. 

Now, the foundational story for the Roman (now Italy) civilisation is The Aeneid, while that for the Greek civilisation is The Iliad. From these stories the elites and those who are held in high esteem in these countries have learnt their conduct. Why, even though these stories did not happen, Plato and Aristotle, in their teachings often dipped into these accounts to put a point across. 

Plato tells us in Apology that: "Someone will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong - acting the part of a good man or of a bad. Whereas, upon your view, the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace; and when he was so eager to slay Hector, his goddess mother said to him, that if he avenged his companion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would die himself." While Aristotle is reputed to have taught Alexander the Great to emulate Achilles.

All I have said above is in support of one point and one point only: a nation's identity can be found in its literature. The nation's identity is also not static, it borrows from and is influenced by other nations' cultures and identities on point of contact. This is my entry point into the discussion of what constitutes the Zimbabwean identity in the Internet Age. I will look to Zimbabwe's literature and foundational stories and how they relate to other competing narratives. As Zimbabwe is only 35 years old, I think the main foundational story to rival the Greeks' The Iliad is that of Chimurenga II. It would seem that this is not much to go on but, fortunately, my English literature taught me to read road signs, monuments, dances, cultural ceremonies and so on the way one would read a book. 

A national flag is actually a thick-volume-book-length text

Tuesday, 3 February 2015

Does Customary Law Permit Pre-Emptive Strikes?

"No man's error becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist in it" - Thomas Hobbes.

A word of caution to myself in everything I do.

I would be very disconsolate if anyone, after reading this paper I only wrote to satisfy the requirements of my Defence Studies MSc, starts believing I even doubt the currency of the maxim; "might makes right."

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu


To what extent, if at all, has there emerged a customary legal rule permitting pre-emptive self-defence (as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force in international law)? 

Introduction: 

The idea that a customary legal rule permitting an action in international relations has emerged, requires us to take a closer look at how customary international law is formed. There are controversies as to how customary law forms, but these controversies do not overburden the subject of this paper as the law on the use of force is well developed. The major issue, with regards this branch of public international law, seems to be differences in the interpretation of what the letter of the law says. As the prohibition on the use of force is codified in the UN Charter’s Article 2 (4), the relationship between treaty law and custom will also yield some useful insights as to whether this Article, in conjunction with Article 51 of the same Charter, have altered or reinforced a pre-existing customary rule of pre-emptive self-defence. The Caroline case of 1837 is cited by most authors as definitive of what pre-emptive self-defence implies (Brownlie, 2008: 734; Sands, 2012: 352) and others actually use it to argue that the right to pre-emptive self-defence has thus always existed as customary international law (Van Den Hole, 2003: 95; Arend, 2003: 89; Franck, 2002: 97). 

This paper takes the view that the Caroline case is a specious argument when used as an example of the existence of a customary rule permitting pre-emptive self-defence. Pre-emptive self-defence as articulated in the Bush Doctrine has no legal basis, while anticipatory self-defence which adheres to the imminency, necessity and proportionality criteria of the Caroline case may be defensible in law.

The Prohibition on the Use of Force:

The most important prohibition on the use of force is Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which was affirmed to have attained jus cogens status by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case (Gray, 2010: 617). Article 2 (4) itself is not widely contested with regards self-defence, it reads that; “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (Gray, 2010: 617). Instead, it is the exception to this prohibition which raises disagreements among those who feel there is a long standing legal rule permitting pre-emption which was not modified by the coming into force of the UN Charter. 

Article 51 of the UN Charter allows the right to use force in self-defence as an exception to Article 2 (4). It reads; 

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and the responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (Gray, 2010: 625) 

The debate around whether pre-emptive self-defence is permitted after the Charter came into force revolves around the question whether Article 51 has reinforced or altered the customary right to self-defence. The protagonists in this debate look to the language of Article 51 and, depending on their interpretation, either argue that the right exists unaltered or it has been replaced by this treaty provision. I will turn to this debate after first having established how customary law is formed and its relationship to treaty law. 

Customary International Law: 

The definition of customary international law can be found in Article 38 (b) of the International Court of Justice Statute which refers to it as “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” (International Court of Justice). Thus, customary law refers to how “the way things have always been done become the way things must be done” (Thirlway, 2010: 101). This only becomes law if it is seen to be done out of a sense of legal obligation rather than as a courtesy towards other bearers of rights (Thirlway, 2010: 102; Malanczuk, 1997: 39). So, for the formation of customary law, there is a requirement of the existence of these two elements: an established, widespread and consistent state practice accompanied by, opinio juris sive necessitatis – the belief that to do so is required by law (Thirlway, 2010: 102). Evidence of widespread and consistent practice can be found in actual state practice and statements of legal principles, while opinio juris can be found in such things as United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, compatible treaties and, statements made by state representatives (Dixon, 2007). 

The first controversy in the formation of customary law arises with regards a paradox noted by Thirlway (2010: 102) that; “how can a practice ever develop into a customary rule if  States have to believe the rule already exists before their acts of practice can be significant for the creation of the rule?” There are two ways out of this paradox which are significant for the subject of this paper. The first way articulates the likely origins of opinio juris, as well as, more importantly: the role of other States’ acquiescence or objection in the creation of customary law. The second way out of the paradox is useful for establishing what the rule is in cases such as that of pre-emptive self-defence where there is bound to be insufficient practice. 

The first way out of this controversy is as advanced by Cassese (2005: 157) who wrote; 

usually a practice evolves among certain states under the impulse of economic, political or military demands. At this stage the practice may thus be regarded as being imposed by social or economic or political needs (opinio necessitatis). If it does not encounter strong and consistent opposition from other states but is increasingly accepted, or acquiesced in, a customary rule gradually crystallizes. 

For our subject at hand, a group of states may attempt to use force pre-emptively, compelled by military or political needs, if other states do not object persistently in various international fora available to them, or instead if they actually endorse this activity; a customary legal rule permitting pre-emptive self-defence will then emerge. 

The second way out of the above stated paradox is whereby opinio juris is made the essential element and State practice merely evidence, this then would be useful in establishing what customary law is in instances where there is insufficient practice anyway (Thirlway, 2010: 103). Case in point: pre-emptive self-defence would not satisfy the test of widespread and consistent practice anyway because of the nature of the activity. So, by looking at General Assembly Resolutions on the matter, we would then be able to establish whether, although there is no widespread practice, if; opinio juris supports the existence of the rule. It is from this formula that we can argue that anticipatory self-defence (as formulated in the Caroline case and not the Bush Doctrine) is a crystallized customary rule, despite limited practice, because its affirmation in international multilateral fora such as the UN High-Level Panel is evidence of opinio juris. The same formula thus rejects the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence as many states objected to it at the same UN High-Level Panel summit. Also, the 120 member countries of the Non Aligned Movement invariably issue statements objecting to this doctrine (Ruys, 2011: 342), so it could not possibly have emerged as a customary legal rule if there is such widespread and persistent objection to it. 

The other significant controversy that attaches itself to the discussion of the formation of  customary international law is; “regional or particular custom” whereby customary law can emerge because it is particular to either two states or a regional block such as in the early stages of the law concerning space (Klabbers, 2013: 28). These nuances do not apply to the subject of the use of force, because every state in the world is concerned by this branch of law. 

The Relationship between Custom and Treaty Law: 

Thirlway, (2010: 114) does not see any reference to a hierarchy of sources between custom and treaty in the text of Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute. The only possibility he sees of a hierarchy is in this formulation: lex specialis derogat generali: the special rule overrides the general rule (Thirlway, 2010: 113). In that regard, treaty law can be a higher source as “it will normally be the case that a treaty is lex specialis, and as such prevails over any inconsistent rules of customary law, or at least as existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty” (Thirlway, 2010: 114; Dixon, 2007: 38). An example would be the modifications made to any pre-existing customs that were contrary to Article 2 (4) when the UN Charter came into force (Ruys, 2011: 18). Conversely, should a customary rule accepted as jus cogens emerge, then “any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates” (Thirlway, 2010: 114; Dixon, 2007: 39). What this tells us about the relationship between the two sources is that, in theory, they are capable of replacing or modifying each other. With this in mind we can now turn to the debate about whether pre-emptive self-defence as customary law pre-dates the UN Charter, and if so, has it remained unaltered? This debate as noted above is, in essence, rooted in the different interpretations of what the text of Article 51 of the UN Charter implies. 

Anticipatory or Pre-emptive Self-Defence in International Law: 

Having looked at how customary law is formed and what that implies for this paper, it is important to now clarify the distinction this paper has made between anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence. Anticipatory self-defence and pre-emptive self-defence are different in this author’s eyes, even though the existing literature tends to use the terms interchangeably. 

Anticipatory self-defence, for this essay, is seen to be as was articulated by the United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster in his exchange of letters with his British counterpart – Lord Ashburton – over the Caroline incident (Franck, 2002: 97; Doyle, 2008: 12). In Webster’s formulation, justifiable anticipatory self-defence arises only when the defender can show the existence of “…necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation” (Brownlie, 2008: 98). This formula then means anticipatory self-defence is permissible when the conditions of necessity, imminency, and proportionality are met. The majority of states are not opposed to use of force that meets this criteria as can be the discerned from Bowen’s logic that “no state can be expected to await an initial attack which, in the present state of armaments, may well destroy the state’s capacity for further resistance and jeopardise its very existence” (Franck, 2002: 98). As was shown above in the section discussing how customary international law forms – despite insufficient practice – states’ opinio juris can be argued to support the existence of this custom. Evidence of such opinio juris can be found in the UN High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change which says that "a threatened State… can take military action as long as the threat is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate" (UK Parliament, 2013). What, on the other hand, is indefensible as customary law; is the so-called Bush Doctrine. 

Pre-emptive self-defence, properly conceived, refers to the doctrine articulated post 9/11 by President George W. Bush in his 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). The aspect that makes it necessary to distinguish this doctrine from the anticipatory self-defence as advanced by Webster in his Caroline incident communications with the British, is that the Bush Doctrine seeks to ignore all the criteria set by Webster and instead sets a new subjective standard. The 2002 NSS document pronounces that; 

The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively (The White House, 2002: 15). 

This pronouncement, insofar as it seeks to relax the rigour of imminency and necessity, finds no support among even the United States’ closest allies and, again, as was shown above in the section dealing with how customary law forms; objection by a majority of states to a practice or statement of intent will stop a customary legal rule from crystallizing. 

To the above Bush Doctrine, the UK Parliament (2013) rejected it and said “it is difficult to find any legal justification for pre-emptive self-defence in international law.” Furthermore, international lawyers and scholars such as Brownlie (2010: 734; Sands, 2012: 352) also say that this doctrine lacks a legal basis. Brownlie (2010: 734) also, further notes that Operation Iraqi Freedom, which came in March 2003 after the doctrine had already been pronounced, was not justified on the basis of this doctrine but, instead on a “revived” Security Council Resolution (SCR) 678. This does not bode well for the existence of a customary rule if the chief proponents of it did not rely on it in a situation which arguably fitted their set criteria. 

So, anticipatory self-defence as described above finds a basis in law but the Bush Doctrine of pre-emption does not. With regards to the question whether pre-emption is permitted under customary law today, we still have to look at the arguments advanced by the scholars who defend that position. Their arguments revolve around the proposition that the current technological advances in weaponry and, an expansive interpretation of Article 51 supports the legality of pre-emptive self-defence. 

Article 51 and Pre-emptive Self-Defence: 

The claim and counter claims as to what Article 51 means is between “restrictionists” and “counter-restrictions.” A “restrictionist” reading of Article 51 would require states to only act in self-defence after an armed attack has commenced or is so imminent that it satisfies the conditions of imminency, necessity and proportionality as set out in the Caroline incident (Doyle, 2008:). “Counter-restrictionists,” on the other hand, argue that there has always existed a legal rule permitting anticipatory self-defence and that this was not modified by Article 51 as the text still refers to the “inherent” right to self-defence (Arend, 2003: 92). 

They further argue that the term “armed attack” was just one circumstance that invokes the right to self-defence among others, and to this end they cite Judge Stephen Schwebel’s dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case that; “Article 51 does not say, if and only if an armed attack occurs” (Arend, 2003: 93). They then factor in technological advances in weapons delivery systems and increased destructiveness of modern weapons so as to allow the right of pre-emptive self-defence more or less as articulated in the Bush Doctrine (Doyle, 2008: 18; Arend, 2003: 97). 

The restrictionist view seems to be the one that is supported by international law as it currently stands. The condemnation by both United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council of the Israeli pre-emptive attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor at Osirak in 1981 is evidence that the expansive interpretation does not find support in international opinio juris (Gray, 2010: 628). With regards the concern that the current weapons of mass destruction and the changed environment since 9/11 require a different approach than the restrictionist view permits, this concern was dismissed too. Gray (2010: 631) observes that; “a UN High-level Panel of Experts was set up to respond to the new challenges to the collective security system after 9/11; in its Report of December 2004 it accepted the controversial right of anticipatory self-defence, but firmly rejected the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. It said that there is no right to self-defence if the attack is not imminent.” Thus, the counter-restrictionists’ arguments are not supported by existing law. 

Conclusion: 

This paper has attempted to answer the question whether a customary legal rule permitting pre-emptive self-defence has emerged as an exception to the prohibition to the use of force in international law. Proponents of the view that it has, claim that it has always existed as evinced by the Caroline case and, was not modified or replaced when the UN Charter came into force because Article 51 refers to the “inherent right” to self-defence. Further, they say it is urgent that this rule be recognized because the new threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction and the myriad threats from new actors demand that Article 51 be expansively interpreted. In this essay, such a position has been said to be disingenuous since the Caroline case which they cite actually set the strict criteria of imminency, necessity and proportionality. It also does not reflect customary law because there is neither widespread and consistent state practice nor opinio juris. Israel’s pre-emptive attack on Iraq in 1981 was rejected by the majority of states. The Bush Doctrine was also rejected by the UN and even the United States and its allies did not invoke this doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence when they invaded Iraq in 2003. Because customary law requires widespread state practice and acceptance, any multilateral forum that objects to this doctrine means it will not crystallize. This has been the case with pre-emptive self-defence. Those who are arguing that this rule exists are not arguing on the basis of law as it exists (lex lata) but perhaps with a view to either what the law ought to say (lex ferenda) or on the basis of military or political exigencies (opinio necessitatis).

This is not a good look: during an all nighter at the Durham University Library, this would be around 04:30 am



Bibliography: 


Arend, Anthony (2003), ‘International Law and Pre-emptive Use of Military Force.’ The Washington Quarterly, 26: 89 – 103. 


Brownlie, Ian (2008), Principles of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Cassese, Antonio (2005), International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Dixon, Martin (2007), Textbook on International Law. Oxford; Oxford University Press. 


Doyle, Michael (2008), Striking First: Pre-emption and Prevention in International Question. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Franck, Thomas (2002), Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 


Gray, Christine (2010), ‘The Use of Force and the International Legal Order,’ in Malcolm Evans (ed.), International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 615 – 647.  


International Court of Justice, Statute of the Court, http://www.icjcij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0&#CHAPTER_II  Accessed 20 March 2014. 

Klabbers, Jan (2013), International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Malanczuk, Peter (1997), Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. London: Routledge.

Ruys, Tom (2011), 'Armed Attack' and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 


Sands, Phillippe (2012), Operationalizing The UN Charter Rules on the Use of Force,’ in Antonio Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 343 – 348. 


The White House, (September 2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf Accessed 20 March 2014. 


Thirlway, Hugh (2010), ‘The Sources of International Law,’ in Malcolm Evans (ed.), International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 95 – 121. 

UK Parliament, (November 2013), Intervention: When, How and Why? http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/intervention/ int10.htm Accessed 20 March 2014. 


Van Den Hole, Leo (2003), ‘Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law.’ American University International Law Review, 19: 69 – 106.