What Does A Mediator Actually Do?

"Now you both come to me with this bad blood. What do you expect me to do? Am I a gangster?" - Don Michael Corleone, The Godfather III, 1990, mediating between Joey Zasa and Vincent Mancini.

With my coursemates for the Conflict Mediation CPD on 08/05/2014 - 10/05/2014. As  the William Edmundson Peace House mediation team.

I wrote this assignment after my Conflict Mediation CPD at Durham University very much at gun-point, it being my cherished idea that if people are foolish enough not to realise for themselves the benefits of cooperation, then they deserve whatever outcome of their conflictive behaviour. I, myself, will never be a mediator. For what? To babysit megalomaniacs?

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu

What does a mediator actually do?

Mediation is a conflict management tool which depends largely on non-coercive means to try and help conflict parties arrive at a mutually acceptable compromise. What a mediator actually does depends on their style, type of actor, conflict context and their capabilities. Some definitions include negotiations and the implementation of agreements as part of the mediation process while others just limit it to just the bringing of the parties together to talk and thus find a solution. What is generic about mediation is that it is a third party intervention by an actor who is not a party to the conflict otherwise it is not mediation. According to the literature, mediators do three things to help parties achieve resolution of conflict: they facilitate dialogue, formulate solutions, or manipulate conflict parties into adopting a solution. Of these three, facilitation is at the low end of the intervention scale and could be done by unofficial or private persons while on the other end, manipulation would best suit states given the amount of resources required to make it work.

What Is Mediation?

The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012: 4) defines mediation as “a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements.” A look at the various other definitions of mediation yields that, despite their slightly different emphases, there are these features in common: two or more actors in a dispute, and third party assistance with the conflict actors’ consent, where the parties will have realised that the conflict is costly and they cannot resolve it without outside help. Thus for mediation to work, the parties to the conflict should consent to it, as without this consent, mediation cannot apply as a conflict resolution tool. All mediation efforts then, despite the type of mediator, require an entry point; a point when both conflict parties realise that “the conflict is too difficult to terminate by themselves, and at the same time, that it is too costly enough that they both want to see it end” (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 332). This is also what Zartman called a hurting stalemate. 

The other definitions in existence imply that this is not a field where markers can be easily set up to clearly separate mediation from other contiguous activities such as negotiations and the implementation of agreements. This is especially true where a mediation strategy of carrots and sticks is employed. Instead, there are ‘spill-overs’ where the mediator may be found involved in negotiations or if they have the capability; implementation of the agreement. Most of the definitions indeed state that mediation is non-coercive and they try to separate it from the other activities, but in practice this distinction is not easy to maintain. What cannot be disputed is that mediation is an intermediary role by an actor who is not a party to the conflict. What the mediator will do is then determined by what type of actor they are, because indeed, some mediators will have to take on more tasks beyond ‘pure mediation.’ So, it is possible that what the mediator actually does is very dependent on what type of actor they are, their capabilities and thus the style that is congruous with their capabilities. 

There are three mediation styles listed in the literature of what mediators do. These are the mediator as facilitator, as formulator and as manipulator. The thread that makes these divergent styles part of the same activity we call mediation is that different conflict contexts and actor capabilities will demand different strategies. Thus as argued by Bercovitch and Gartner (2009: 6), mediation is a conflict management tool that actively interacts and is shaped by environmental factors such as; “available mediation strategies, by who the mediators are (e.g. personal and organizational attributes), by context, setting and nature of dispute (e.g. intrastate or interstate, intractable or short term), and of course, the nature of the environment in which the dispute takes place (e.g. a structured, well-regulated environment, or an unstructured environment).” For these authors these factors determine what a mediator will be channelled into doing.

The actual writing of this summative report after the CPD almost got derailed by the beginning of the 2014 World Cup.

Mediation Styles: Mediation as Facilitation.

Adam Curle refers to what can be thought of as ‘pure mediation’ whereby mediation “aims to remove often largely psychological obstacles that prevent hostile parties coming together for constructive negotiation, which is the process by which protagonists reach an agreement through discussion and bargaining” (Curle, 1986: 1). In his formula, he stresses that mediation employs non-violence as he thinks “it is an illusion to hold that peace can come through violence although it may come through power” (Curle, 1986: 1). This view coincides with the conception of the mediator as facilitator. Mediation in this regard, consists of the attempt by the mediator to help conflict parties see possibilities for ending their conflict through the mediator’s help, who will help build and maintain channels of communication as well as providing information so as to limit the adverse effects that arise due to incomplete information (Curle, 1986: 5; Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 47; Beardsley et. al., 2006: 63). 

In the role of facilitator, the mediator will arrange meetings, collect information, help prioritize issues and carry messages between the disputants if face to face meetings are not possible (Quinn et. al., 2009: 189; Berber, 2012: 401). The mediator as facilitator does not make any “substantive contribution to the negotiation process but, rather is restrained to insuring continued, and hopefully constructive, discussion and dialogue between or among disputants” (Quinn et. al., 2009: 189). This view is shared by Adam Curle as he thought that the barriers to conflict resolution are largely psychological, caused by mutual distrust among conflict parties and, therefore, establishing a channel of communication would help solve this problem (Curle, 1986: 1). 

Apart from distrust as a barrier to the ending of conflict, the other issues that arise due to incomplete information are those that relate to when conflict actors misrepresent their interests, weaknesses and strengths. Lake and Rothchild (1996: 47) conceived the problem that mediators help resolve in this regard as ‘information failures’ which they defined as when conflict actors possess private information and incentives to misrepresent that information. The tendency to misrepresent information arises because revealing true information would affect the group’s ability to achieve its interests, so the groups in conflict may exaggerate their strength while hiding their weaknesses, a recipe for escalation (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 47; Curle, 1986: 4). This then becomes an impediment to compromise, but careful probing of the facts and preferences by the mediator and then communicating this accurate information between disputants may help resolve information failures (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 48). A position that is also accepted by Beardsley et. al. (2006: 63) who wrote that:

If actors had complete information regarding their opponent’s capabilities and intentions, the actors would likely be able to identify mutually acceptable alternatives to violent conflict. Under incomplete information, actors may overestimate their own capabilities and likelihood of winning a conflict and make an offer below the opponent’s reservation point. Consequently, facilitative mediators ensure that the actors have access to all necessary information to best estimate the range of mutually preferable outcomes.

Curle then says this method relies on the mediator being able to befriend the conflict parties, so that through the established trust they will be willing to trust her with accurate information and, further, trust that she will only use that information in aid of resolving the conflict (Curle: 1986: 14, Horowitz, 2007: 53). The key role the mediator performs here is information provision, whereby if uncertainty is affecting the resolution of a conflict, mediation activities supply the information that remedies this (Savun, 2009: 96). Still, according to Beardsley et al (2006: 63) there are some scholars who maintain that facilitation should be thought of as an activity distinct from mediation.

Meeting - separately - the disputants in the conflict we were mediating on.

Mediation as Formulation:

Unlike facilitation which avoids promoting any particular solutions to the conflict, formulation involves a substantive contribution by the mediator who actually proposes new solutions to the conflict parties (Beardsley et al, 2006: 63; Quinn et. al., 2009: 190). Still, according to Quinn et al (2009: 190) and in accordance with the precept that mediation is a voluntary exercise; the mediator is not empowered to force the disputants to adopt his proposals. However, Berber suggests that there are other channels to influence the conflict parties to accept the proposals of the mediator without resorting to carrots and sticks. He notes that Lakhdar Brahimi said “leverage in mediation is not about putting a gun to someone’s head nor is it about promising something’’ (Berber, 2012: 402). Instead, he says “mediators formulate proposals and compromises, and they provide and withhold information as they attempt to convince disputants to adjust expectations” (Berber, 2012: 402). Thus by managing which information to disseminate or withhold, the mediators can get conflict parties to adopt their proposals. The mediator’s control of proceedings also extends in this style of mediation to determining “structural aspects of the meetings, control constituency influences, media publicity, the distribution of information, and the situation of the parties’ resources and communication processes” (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 339). 

Zartman refers to the mediator, regardless of style adopted, as a third-party catalyst who is needed to help conflict parties reach agreements they could not reach on their own (Zartman, 2001: 6). So by formulating her own ideas the mediator will still be in that role of catalyst since perhaps the parties will have been unable to come up with a solution that is mutually acceptable. Beardsley et al (2006: 63) puts this down to the fact that since parties to a violent conflict tend to view things in zero-sum terms, they are likely to reach an impasse even in negotiations about negotiations. With the process stalled in this manner, it will be incumbent upon the mediator to come up with different solutions.  

Planning and adjusting our mediation strategy away from the glare of the media.

Mediation as Manipulation: 

The final style is manipulative mediation whereby the mediator makes a substantive contribution and is empowered to force conflict parties to adopt his solutions by punishing the disputants for reneging and rewarding them for cooperating (Zartman, 2001: 6; Quinn et. al., 2009: 190). The mediator in this style not only formulates potential solutions but demands that they become adopted, and for this to happen she relies on her resources of power, influence and persuasion to manipulate the parties into agreement; as well, she becomes an enforcement mechanism for these agreements (Quinn et. al., 2009: 190). Richard Holbrook’s mediation at Dayton, Ohio is one example cited by Bercovitch and Gartner, (2006: 339) of what mediation as manipulation entails. 

Manipulative mediators thus offer incentives for conflict parties to end their fighting and disincentives for continued fighting. This is the carrots and sticks approach or mediation with muscle. In terms of carrots, the mediator may offer cash or preferential trade while on the sticks side; they may threaten economic and diplomatic sanctions as well as direct military intervention (Beardsley et. al., 2006: 64). Manipulation thus commits the mediator to other activities which, though contiguous, are different activities to mediation such as negotiations and implementation of agreements. This is also quite necessary because sometimes the barrier to settlement of a conflict is the problem of credible commitment where conflict actors cannot trust their safety to an agreement on paper but instead require a powerful outsider to guarantee their security (Walter, 1997: 339).

Our target: getting to an agreement!

What Mediators Actually Do:

To relate the above three mediation styles to the type of actors who may be suited to each style based on capabilities, facilitation would suit Track II actors such as individuals like Adam Curle himself. Formulation and manipulation would suit Track I actors such as the United States, United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations because of the resources that they need to bring to bear. Still, the assigning of styles to actors made above is not hard and fast, it is just for the sake of conceptual clarity since there is nothing that prevents an actor wielding middle power state resources from pursuing mediation as facilitation. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki, in mediating the Zimbabwe Crisis on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) between 2007 until the achievement of a Government of National Unity (GNU) on 11 February 2009, resisted any pressure to impose sanctions or invite direct military intervention on Zimbabwe, instead calling his approach “quiet diplomacy” (Al Jazeera, 2014). As well, with regards power and resources, it is quite possible to fail in your mediation efforts as did both Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi in Syria when they could ostensibly draw on the might of the United Nations Security Council. There are also instances where ‘threat power’ would be ineffectual but while ‘exchange power’ and ‘integrative power’ may achieve results (Ramsbotham et. al., 2012: 23). The recent mediation by Qatar for the release of an American soldier – Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl – who had been held captive for 5 years by the Taliban, in exchange for 5 Taliban Guantanamo Bay detainees is instructive with regards the limitations of ‘threat power.’ 

Leaving aside the differences in style, what the mediator will be really trying to do is end conflict as it is costly in human lives and to development. Individuals may be motivated by wanting to see an end to the suffering while states have their own motivations such as the desire to preserve international peace and security. The essence of what mediators actually do then is that they move belligerents away from violence and escalation by paying attention to these three elements: stakes, attitudes and tactics (Zartman, 2001: 7). In Zartman’s conception, stakes are the issues that matter to the parties and the skilled mediator should change these from zero-sum to a positive sum and conflict parties’ attitudes must be changed from conflictive to accommodative, while tactics means doing the right thing at the right time to bring about the desired result by the mediator (Zartman, 2001: 7)

This also serves as a handy metaphor - the mediator must be able to pay his undivided attention to the task at hand.

Conclusion:

This essay has argued that there are three types of mediation styles which when followed determine what a mediator does. The mediator as facilitator has been said to be what can be termed pure mediation as here the mediator allows conflict parties to reach an agreement they have forged themselves. All the mediator will have done is facilitate dialogue and help conflict parties see they have mutually compatible interests. The mediator as formulator is when the mediator proposes solutions of her own when there is a dearth of solutions between the disputants. While manipulative mediation which runs the large risk of making the mediator a conflict party is when the mediator uses her ‘threat power’ to bring disputants to adopt her proposed solution. What a mediator does is also influenced by the type of actor they are and the conflict environment. What is generic about mediation is that all mediators will be trying to end conflict by helping remove the stumbling blocks to peace that the parties cannot overcome without her help.

Bibliography:

Al Jazeera (November 2014), “Talk to Al Jazeera - Thabo Mbeki: Justice Cannot Trump Peace.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KvvWFXJkM-s Accessed 16 June 2014.

Beardsley, Kyle C., Quinn, David M., Biswas, Bidisha, and Wilkenfield, Jonathan (2006), Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 1: 58 – 86.

Berber, Bernd (2012), International Meditation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias. Conflict Management and Peace Science. Vol. 29, No. 4: 397 – 424.

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Bercovitch, Jacob and Gartner, Scott Sigmund (2009), “New Approaches, Methods and Findings in the Study of Mediation,” in Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds) International Conflict and Mediation: New Approaches and Findings, Abingdon: Routledge 1 – 13.

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Horowitz, Sara (2007), “Mediation,” in Galtung, Johan and Webel, Charles (eds.) Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 51 – 63.

Lake, David A. and Rothchild, Donald (1996), Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2: 41 – 75.

Quinn, David, Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Smarick, Kathleen and Asal, Victor (2009), “Mediation in Symmetric and Asymmetric International Crises,” in Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds) International Conflict and Mediation: New Approaches and Findings, Abingdon: Routledge pp 187 – 215.

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom, and Miall, Hugh (2012), Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts. Cambridge: Polity.

Savun, Burcu (2009), “Mediator Types and the Effectiveness of Information Provision Strategies in the Resolution of International Conflict,” in Jacob Bercovitch and Scott  Sigmund Gartner (eds) International Conflict and Mediation: New Approaches and Findings, Abingdon: Routledge pp 96 – 114.

United Nations (2012), Guidance for Effective Mediation. New York: United Nations available online here: http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Mediation.pdf Accessed 16 June 2014.

Walter, Barbara F. (1997), The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3: 335 – 364.

Zartman, William (2001), “Preventive Diplomacy: Setting the Stage,” in Zartman, William (ed.), Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. pp 1 – 18.