Southern African Development Community (SADC), 1980 - 2010: An assessment of the opportunities and constraints to regional intergration.

 by Kudakwashe Kanhutu

Abstract

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic community on the African continent made up of 15 nation states. It aims to achieve economic development, peace and security for its populations  through integration. There is an acceptance by SADC elites and academics that integration is the best way to deal with the challenges in the region that cannot be solved unilaterally. Still, the fact that SADC integration has not deepened, raises the question that, if states see integration as the best route to achieve their goals, why have they half-heartedly taken this route?

This paper relies on theories of integration to try and ascertain the nature of the opportunities and contraints to regional integration. The answer seems to be steeped in SADC’s history, which fostered a respect for sovereign equality as inviolable. Indeed, a respect for sovereignty can be seen to be the main factor that compounds other factors such as underdevelopment and nationalist rivalry. My paper suggests that while most of the factors are largely systemic, generational changes may lead to the most important one, classical sovereignty, being tamed. Elites without liberation struggle credentials may, in the future, be able to forge deeper integration. I am basing this on a reading of the difficulties engendered by any history that involves experiences of injustice or aggression. In the EC/EU experience, France and Britain were still trying to prevent German reunification as late as 1990, based on their reading of Germany’s aggression from the 1930s.  

List of Contents

Abstract………………………………………………………….1

Abbreviations ………………………………………………..….4

Introduction …………………………………………………..…5

Motivation…………………………………………………….....7

Relevance and Significance…………..………………………....8

Integration Defined………….…………………………….…….9

Measuring Success?......................................................................9

Methodology……………………………………………..……..10

Chapter One

Literature Review………………………………………………11

Chapter Two

Theories of Integration…………………………………………15

Neofunctionalism………………………………………..……..16

Intergovernmentalism………………………………………….18

Chapter Three

Genealogy of SADC…………………..…………………….....19

FLS, SADCC to SADC……………………………......………21

The Frontline States…………….....……………..……………21

SADCC……………………………….…………………….…23

SADC………………………………………………….……...24

Chapter Four

Assessment of the Opportunities and Constraints…....……….25

Opportunities for SADC…………...……………….…………25

Constraints to Regional Integration………………...…………27

Sovereignty………………………………...………………….27

Incompatible Political and Economic Systems………..….…..28

Nationalist Rivalry……………...……………………………..29

Conclusion

What is the SADC Idea?……………..…………..……………30

What Stands in the Way?...........................................................31

Bibliography…………………………………………………..33

Appendices

Map of the SADC Region…………………………………….36

Abbreviations

ANC – African National Congress

AU – African Union

CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy

EAC – East African Community

EU – European Union

EC – European Community

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

FLS – Frontline States

FTA – Free Trade Area

IMF – International Monetary Fund

LC – Liberation Committee

MNR – Mozambique National Resistance

MPLA - Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola/People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola

OAU – Organisation for African Unity

REC – Regional Economic Community

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SADCC – Southern African Development Coordination Conference

SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme

UN – United Nations

UNITA - União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola/National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

Southern African Development Community (SADC), 1980 – 2010: An assessment of the opportunities and constraints to regional integration.

Introduction

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a 15 member, nation state sub-regional grouping on the African continent whose core objectives, as stated in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty, are; ‘achieving development and economic growth, ensuring peace and security, and evolving common political values, systems and institutions among member states.’[1] SADC is now a treaty based organisation, with a legal personality as of 17th August 1992, having in its genealogy – of necessity – operated under a very loose framework.

SADC has its roots in the Frontline States (FLS) 1974 – 1994, which in turn led to the formation of SADC’s direct forbearer: the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 1980 - 1992. Each permutation reflects a change in the challenges facing the sub-regional block. The main imperative that gave rise to the FLS and SADCC was the need, in the first instance, to coordinate actions that would liberate Southern African states still under the yoke of colonialism.[2] With the achievement of independence in Mozambique (1975), Angola (1976) and Zimbabwe (1980), the overriding imperative became ending the region’s economic dependence on the Apartheid regime in South Africa; so as to realise the larger goal of ending Apartheid in South Africa. When apartheid ended in South Africa, the focus returned to ending economic dependence on the former colonial powers. The argument made here is that political liberation from colonial powers is not matched by liberation in the economic domain, the erstwhile colonial powers still dictate economic direction for Southern African states.

My paper seeks to understand what the opportunities and constraints are to regional integration in Southern Africa. The puzzle for me is whether SADC is evolving into a ‘security community’ capable of articulating a common foreign and security policy? SADC objectives and communiques have set these ambitious goals as their targets, so I want to understand the nature of the difficulties that are leading to suboptimal results for integration thus far. I begin my enquiry with theories of regional integration and their utility in understanding my subject matter. I then turn to the empirical: the dynamics of regional integration in the SADC block. Chapter 3 traces SADC’s historical development, and Chapter 4 discusses the actual constraints and opportunities. In Chapter 4; I first discuss the opportunities, then I will turn to the constraints. I will be trying to relate the opportunities and constraints to the theories so as to better ascertain whether these factors are systemic or agential.

The constraints are numerous in contrast to the opportunities. In list form, some of the challenges identified by Chingono and Nakana are; ‘nationalist rivalry; incompatible economic and political systems; mono-cultural agro-based economies; debt and dependency; unjust international economic structures; uneven benefits of integration; multiple memberships to Regional Economic Communities (RECs); lack of grassroots support; poor economic and political governance; disaffected stakeholders; and globalisation and its ambiguities.’[3] I will expand on some of these in Chapter 4; the assessment section of my paper. In terms of the opportunities, they are quite paltry; to my mind, what most qualifies as the opportunities tends to be challenges insofar as they are forcing states to seek a union so as to solve the challenge. One positive opportunity I will also expand on in the assessment section of my paper, is the end of the destabilisation of Southern Africa that had been characteristic of relations with Apartheid South Africa. Peaceful conditions must be an opportunity for  economic and political union.

Motivation

My interest in understanding SADC is grounded in the fact that I am from the region and thus  have a personal stake in understanding the dynamics at play in the region. In that regard, my study is an attempt to attain an enhanced understanding of the nexus between development and security in Southern Africa. Security has now been linked with development in current discourse. Each historical period has different challenges and conceptions of security. There is, in this epoch, a shift from the traditional understanding of security as territorial defence against  invasion by other states prevalent in the Cold War era, to an elevation of non-traditional threats. The current conception of security for international relations scholars and states is now human security. Human security is seen to be best provided for under conditions of economic development. A reading of the official pronouncements and academic commentary on SADC, yields the understanding that the highest goal they are aiming for is, indeed, human security.

I am also conversant with the extant tensions between human security and state security despite that states have signed onto the UN’s ‘freedom from want’ goals which are synonymous with the elevation of human security. From a knowledge of these tensions, the undercurrent to my study and my personal motivation, therefore, is what are the gains that can be realised for human security through regional integration? State security – properly conceived – should have human security as its bedrock. Indeed, there is an acceptance in current discourse that some of the challenges that can be existential threats to countries do not lend themselves to military solutions or, further still, cannot be countered by unilateral actions.[4] An example particular to SADC is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. With this realisation comes the understanding that an optimal performing SADC could be the best vehicle to meet these non-military threats in the current security environment.

Relevance and Significance:

SADC has a basis and role in international order as conceived in the UN Charter under Chapter VIII.[5] In this regard, my paper is a study of the building blocks of the new international order: in this instance, this can be formulated as, SADC – African Union (AU) – United Nations (UN). Indeed, Chapter VIII of the Charter envisages that these regional organisations could play a gatekeeper role for the UN insofar as they could be the first port of call for pacific settlement of disputes, and maintenance of international peace and security.[6] The African Union itself is cognisant of the fact that it cannot possibly manage every conflict and has thus outsourced responsibility to Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of which SADC is one of five.[7] Although the experience with ECOWAS (another AU component REC) and its recent inability to act over Mali belies the utility of RECs, the hope is still that “regional organizations have become important ‘gatekeepers’, influencing how issues are framed and the range of plausible policy options available to the Security Council.”[8]

A further pertinent point which makes my study relevant to EU policy, is the  advent of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Europe is forced by the current strategic environment to shift from a European to a global focus.[9] The pressure would be eased on EU resources needed for activities such as stabilisation, counter-terrorism, and combating general insecurity abroad, if an understanding of SADC dynamics means EU – SADC relations enhance the relative peaceful conditions in the region. The logic being that prevention is better than cure. I have in mind here the fact that SADC states do not create conditions of insecurity for Europe, while by comparison the instability in the Maghreb has a direct bearing on EU security; abductions of EU nationals and safe havens for terrorism. I therefore expect my study to be relevant, insofar as we can accept that in the new global strategic environment; insecurity anywhere can be insecurity everywhere.

Integration Defined

Some definitions suffice at this point. Ernst Haas defined integration as “the process whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”[10] What is relevant about this definition to SADC, is the question of awarding integrative institutions the power to make decisions that were previously the preserve of national governments. Another salient definition is offered by yet another thinker, Karl Deutsch, who conceived it as; “a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack.”[11] This definition is useful for understanding SADC because countries, especially developing ones, cannot exercise autarky in economic affairs, thus integration can create for them a larger market and award them all the putative benefits.

Measuring Success?

I have also chosen to pay attention to both integration as a process, for the sake of discussing imperatives and opportunities; and as an end state, so as to be able to measure the congruity between SADC’s stated goals and achievements. It is, however, difficult to measure success in human affairs based on end states as most endeavours are open ended. Indeed, an end state is impossible to articulate in human affairs as the desired ends are constantly evolving.

Success or failure therefore may be viewed in terms of the three possible outcomes of integration credited to Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold by Haas. These are; ‘(1) the fulfilment of a postulated task on the part of practices and/or institutions created for integrative purposes; (2) the retraction of such a task (i.e., disintegration); and (3) the extension of such a task into spheres of action not previously anticipated by the actors.’[12] Of the above points, 1 and 3 would be successes, while point 2 would be unmistakably a failure. The East African Community (EAC) founded in 1967 and which collapsed in 1977 would be an uncomplicated example of a failure, if it was not for the fact that it has since been re-established as of 2001.[13] The point I am making here is that a definite terminal condition is hard to articulate in human affairs.

Methodology

My research design is qualitative: I am treating SADC as one unit. This is a case study of a regional organisation, and I am interpreting this case through theories of integration and international relations, in deference to the disciplined - configurative case study strategy. I am relying on integration theory developed for the study of European integration, but I am aware of its limitations when applied to the developing world. Liberal intergovernmentalism is the other set of lenses I will be using in order to understand the features of SADC that defy the explanations made by neo-functionalism. My research method has been Historical Process Tracing, where I have been tracing SADC from its founding in 1980 till 2010. I have focused on imperatives and milestones, and what effects they have had on its constitution.

Chapter One

Literature Review

In this section I will look at what others who have studied SADC have said are the constraints and opportunities. The general gist of these assessments is that the nature of decision making in SADC is a great constraint to integration, I find this to be valid. I will start with a paper that discusses general difficulties for third world integration, then go through to those that are specifically studying SADC. As will be shown in the theories and history section, regional integration in the third world is made difficult by the lack of conditions that encourage integration. The foremost problem condition is underdevelopment which tends to make integrative schemes untenable winner-takes-all schemes. The first paper I review understands this complication and proposed a model that would help integration in spite of underdevelopment. The proposed scheme has some features that can be said to be reflected in the SADCC/SADC experience.

Writing in Underdevelopment, Dependence and Integration, Andrew Axline lists the difficulties of trying to integrate when countries are underdeveloped: some of the outstanding problems he identifies in such schemes are trade diversion and polarization.[14] Trade diversion occurs when a regional grouping ends up replacing cheaper imports from outside the block with expensive ones from partner countries.[15] Polarization, relatedly, refers to the fact that integration may actually reinforce inequalities whereby ‘economic growth tends to concentrate in “poles of growth,” the countries which are most economically advanced.’[16] I will not go into the specifics of each problem, but what they imply is that the poorer states will be effectively eschewing one form of economic dependence (on the West) and replacing it with another (on the regional hegemony).[17] This, indeed, is a challenge for integration in Southern Africa, as South Africa; the more advanced economy, tends to get the lion’s share of benefits from integration.

Axline proposes that instead of a laissez faire integration scheme typical of advanced economies, the third world would benefit from a scheme that combines integration with  redistributive and corrective mechanisms for net losers in the scheme.[18] This is reflected, in one way at least, by the way SADCC/SADC initiated its integration. Instead of having a supranational authority coordinating technical tasks, the regional group assigned countries technical tasks to coordinate so as generate income from the sector.[19] For example Swaziland was assigned Human Resources Development, Zimbabwe; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources, while Zambia was assigned Mining. This model has been used throughout the SADCC/SADC years, with some changes that empower the SADC Secretariat (a supranational body) only being proposed as late as 2001. 

Chingono and Nakana’s paper aptly titled The Challenges of Regional Integration in Southern Africa does a great job of listing, classifying and explicating the constraints to SADC integration. I have already listed the constraints in the introduction and will expand on some of them in Chapter 4 of this paper, so I will not say more on their work here. Instead I will now turn to some works that have attempted to locate the suboptimal performance in a lack of ownership of the process and involvement by civil society. Writing in People, States, and Regions Gina van Schalkwyk raises the point that for human security to be achieved there has to be an input from the referent object of human security; civil society. She says that although the rhetoric of human security has found its way into government documents the practice does not reflect rhetoric.[20] She then notes the tensions between human security and regime security, and observes that governments still put regime survival before human security.[21] An impediment to integration. The reason she thinks is to blame for this, is the nature of decision making (consensus among heads of states, which I argue below is the hallmark of intergovernmentalism), weak SADC institutions, and a lack of accountability to the general populace.[22]

The same theme of lack of accountability to the general populace is taken up by Takawira Musavengana in his paper The Proposed SADC Parliament. He observes that the parliament has not been given the same powers or even explicit recognition in the SADC Treaty.[23] His point of enquiry is whether the SADC Parliament could take the role of holding the executives accountable as happens in national politics. He notes the further difficulty that due to partisan politics in national politics, the SADC parliament could end up being a rubber stamp for the executives as is typical in authoritarian regimes.[24] The obstacle he sees as potent, as in Gina van Schalkwyk’s paper, is the intergovernmental structure of SADC which vests all powers in the Summit of Heads of Governments and Council of Ministers.[25] From the foregoing, it would seem the general populace are completely prevented from making an input into SADC policies, but not necessarily, as Anne Hammerstad’s paper can show us.

In Securitisation From Below, Hammerstad explores the relationship between South Africa’s immigration policy towards refugees from the economic crisis in Zimbabwe. She records that the South African government turned a blind eye to the problem for the sake of consistency with its ‘quiet diplomacy’ (a SADC endorsed position) to the Zimbabwean crisis.[26] But, since the xenophobic riots in South Africa forced the government to reconsider its position, we can actually see public action ‘uploading’ their preferences to the policy makers. We can also take away from her paper the possibility of a conundrum for governments. In this instance, should the governments allow free movement of persons as part of deepening integration in the region, they could actually be creating conditions of insecurity for the region as advanced economies become inundated with job seekers. Which may result in the riots seen in South Africa in 2008.

Lastly, Rita Abrahamsen, argues in Development Policy and the Democratic Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa that Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that were imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were responsible for exacerbating underdevelopment and insecurity.[27] This paper is useful for my dissertation, for it exhibits that external factors are also potent constraints for integration. The outstanding theme in the works I reviewed seemed to be that the intergovernmental nature of SADC is the greatest factor in regional integration. I explicate this factor more throughout the paper starting with the next chapter which explores theories of regional integration.

Chapter Two

Theories of Integration

The main purpose for including the theories I have included is that they help explain what initiates and motivates integration, and furthermore they evince the classic debate extant in integration studies. Theoretical approaches to the study of regional integration tend to raise the debate as to whether states are being inexorably subsumed into regional federal unions or if they retain their freedom of choice on whether to integrate or not. Some theories emphasize the supranational side of integration, where they posit that once integration starts, it takes a life of its own and actually forces governments to bend to its logic. Of the two theories I am relying on, neofunctionalism can be argued to fall on this side of the debate.  The other side of the debate says that ‘international institutions are epiphenomenal to state power and interests.’[28] This second camp is consistent with realist/neorealist conceptions of international relations which say that integration is an instrument for state power and will only be allowed to go ahead on that basis.[29]

For regional integration as in other aspects of international relations, it is a truism that no single theory can perfectly explain all the features of a subject matter. Southern Africa especially, readily admits this truism as the imperatives and conditions for integrating are ever so different from those of post-World War II Europe which shaped integration theory. Haas even accepted that his neo-functional model when applied to the developing world, had ‘sufficed only to accurately predict difficulties and failures in regional integration, while in the European case some successful positive prediction has been achieved.’[30]  It is with this in mind that intergovernmentalism will be given consideration in this paper along with neofunctionalism. I now turn to the theories proper and their utility for SADC.

Neofunctionalism

The main premises of neofunctionalism, based on a reading of European integration in the 1960s  are as follows; (1) integration begins with the areas of ‘low politics’ but which are important for the economic sectors; (2) this is followed by the creation of a high authority to oversee this process; (3) which then creates pressures for integration in related sectors; the ‘spillover’ effect.[31] From the foregoing, the next logical step is a deepening of economic integration which then leads to the need for more supranational institutions and inevitably, to political integration.[32] According to neofunctionalism, institutions once created ‘can take a life of their own and progressively escape the control of their creators. Concerned with increasing their powers, employees of regional institutions become agents of further integration by influencing the perceptions of participating elites (both private and public), and therefore governments’ (national) interest.’[33] SADC already has a Secretariat and a Tribunal; supranational bodies created in deference to such integration logic. However, whether these institutions have managed to dictate the pace of integration since their creation, is a different matter altogether.

The foremost proponent of this theory, Haas, postulated that ‘the decision to proceed with integration, or to oppose it, depends upon the expectations of gain or loss held by major groups within the unit to be integrated.’[34] There is thus, a realisation that there is an important role for political elites or interest groups in starting the integration process. The expectation was that once integration had been initiated in one area, it would then create pressures for integration in other areas; the ‘spillover’ effect.[35]

The imperative driving European integration was a need to obviate the national rivalries that had led to the two world wars and which could potentially lead to a third world war. Their preoccupation therefore was with attainment of peace predicated on economic enmeshment. This would be done by altering, drastically, the notion of sovereignty that had been extant since the Peace of Westphalia. While peace can be said to be generally  desirable to achieve economic goals, there may be other goals that can still be placed above peace. For example, the FLS, SADC’s precursor, started life helping armed struggles aimed at winning self-determination for the black majorities in Southern Africa.  The point I am making here is that clearly, imperatives for integration in Southern Africa were quite different from those of Europe. Southern African states were more concerned with gaining and consolidating sovereignty which they had been denied by colonialism until the 1960s and as late as 1980 and 1990 for Zimbabwe and Namibia respectively. This difference in imperatives may be one reason why SADC may defy perfect encapsulation by the neofunctionalist theory.

The other reason concerns a lack of the three background conditions Haas noted need to be present for meaningful integration to even be initiated. In fact, the question whether the tenets of neofunctionalism could be used to explain integration in other regions in the developing world where these three background conditions may be absent, elicited pessimism from Haas. For him, the ‘three background conditions that made for successful integration were pluralistic social structures, substantial economic and industrial development and common ideological patterns among participating units.’[36] Conditions which are generally lacking in the developing world. So a better explanation for the third world integration schemes may rest on premises other than neofunctionalist ones. The integovernmentalism approach might help in explaining the dynamics of SADC integration.

Intergovernmentalism

Stanley Hoffman is the foremost earlier critic of neofunctionalism. Intergovernmentalism rests on the premise that national governments are still the primary determinant of whether integration goes ahead or not.  Hoffman thought that neofunctionalism underestimated the importance of sovereignty as a barrier to integration as was evinced by the ‘empty chair’ policy of Charles de Gaulle in the European experience.[37] This is based on the realist/neorealist conception of international politics in which states only use integration for their own national interests. The thinker most often credited with the current form of intergovernmentalism is Andrew Moravcisk. His liberal intergovernmentalism theory posits these two main premises in relation to the study of European integration;

The first is that states are actors. The EU, like other international institutions (SADC), can be profitably studied by treating states as the critical actors in the context of anarchy. That is, states achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, rather than through a centralized authority making and enforcing political decisions…. The second basic liberal intergovernmentalism assumption is that states are rational. Rationalism is an individualist or agency assumption. Actors calculate the utility of alternative courses and choose the one that maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under the circumstances. Collective outcomes are explained as the result of aggregated individual actions based on efficient pursuit of these preferences – albeit subject to the information at hand and uncertainty about the future.[38] (emphasis own).

Thus the decisions to establish international institutions lies in the hands of governments who will only do so given that a calculation of their self-interests yields that integration is the best way to achieve certain goals or meet the imperatives at hand. Moravcsik then advances a three stage framework which explains the decision to integrate: states ‘first define their preferences, then bargain to substantive agreements, and finally create (or adjust) institutions to secure those outcomes in the face of future uncertainty.’[39] States hold all the cards in this formulation, hence intergovernmentalism.

In integration in developing countries, one problem that can arise is that of polarization, whereby the more economically advanced countries will attract development while the less developed ones become ‘poles of stagnation.’[40]  The question does arise then that since benefits are not likely to be equally distributed, what incentives are there for lesser powers to join an integration scheme. A model developed by economic theory for third world integration suggests a mechanism for distributing benefits to those states who may be losers due to such a union,[41] and SADC integration dynamics show that such a distributive model has been attempted. I have outlined this model in the literature review section. I now turn to SADC’s evolution through history so as establish the foundation for its practices.  

Chapter Three

Genealogy of SADC

“The first day of our political independence is the first day of the longer and harder struggle for economic independence” – President Samora Machel of Mozambique.[42]  

The purpose of this section is to show how the SADC evolved in response to the different challenges and opportunities as they presented themselves to the grouping. It lays the ground for the next chapter which seeks to explain these dynamics with a specific focus on the constraints and opportunities in relation to my chosen theories. I lay out what the major factors affecting SADC were at each stage of its development. Grounding the organisation in its historical background also allows us to see how its modus operandi in its early days still does impact on its present day mode of operation. Respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity seems to be one such practice that SADC holds on to despite changes in the global strategic environment.

So this chapter is concerned with the historical development of SADC, but starts to elicit what the opportunities and constraints have been throughout its history in preparation for a full assessment of them in Chapter 4. While SADC does aspire to all the lofty goals that can be found in the preamble of the UN Charter as well in the Treaties establishing the European Union, there are greater limits to achievement of these goals by underdeveloped countries. As an example, the outstanding limitation must be a lack of own resources; the total SADC budget for  2007/8 was USD$18.9 million.[43] This can be contrasted with budget for the EU, which, for the same year, was USD$155. 4 billion.[44]  Underdevelopment itself can be seen as the first constraint to successful integration, for without funding, the regional projects cannot be accomplished.

The founders of SADC were aware of the absence of choice under conditions of underdevelopment so knew that economic development would be vital for SADC.[45] The logical foundation for SADC thus should have been economic development first, then any other integrative measures should have rested on the success of that. This logic was  however inverted out of necessity, for according to Maxi Schoeman, SADC began life as a political project.[46] The first imperative for SADC’s formation was the need to coordinate actions for the liberation of Southern African states; a political project as can be seen if we trace the genealogy of SADC back to the FLS days.

FLS, SADCC to SADC

The imperative behind the Frontline States was liberating Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe from colonialism and the ending of apartheid in South Africa. Thus in 1994, with the attainment of majority rule in South Africa the FLS became defunct.^[47] The FLS ran concurrently with SADCC/SADC  for a while but did not last much longer after its mission was accomplished. The main imperative that sustained SADC after the demise of FLS is the one it claims for itself as seen in the Samora Machel quote above. The imperative is that political liberation which came with the ending of colonialism and apartheid is not accompanied by economic emancipation for the people of the region. It is SADC’s stated goal to achieve economic liberation for the majority of Southern Africa. Although economic liberation was implied during decolonisation, the foremost challenge was gaining political freedom, which was the reason for the formation of the Frontline States.

The Frontline States

The timeline of the Frontline States has this reading for the years of that the members joined; Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana (1974) Mozambique (1975) Angola (1976) Zimbabwe (1980) Namibia (1990) South Africa (1994). Noteworthy, is the fact that the year of a country’s joining, with the exception of the founding states, is also the year of liberation from colonialism/apartheid. The overriding imperative for the formation of the forbearer of SADC was that of coordinating political actions that would bring liberation to Southern Africa. The FLS was not divorced from the work that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was doing in attempting to achieve decolonisation. While the OAU’s Liberation Committee (LC) was charged with this remit, the feeling was that it was too formal and too broad to meet the needs of the sub-region effectively.[48] So what was needed was an organisation of states, closer to the countries that remained under colonialism. A similar relationship still exists today between the AU and SADC, where the expectation is that solutions to problems administered at the sub-regional level would be more wieldy.

The FLS started life as an informal forum for discussing the common problems among newly independent states and those of liberation struggle movements. [49] Maxi Schoeman points us to the fact that the way the FLS operated, has a significant bearing on how integration has developed in SADC today. He posits that regional integration tended to be aimed at strengthening individual statehood and that pattern seems to have taken root.[50] Some of the FLS practices were as follows, (1) ‘each state contributed according to its means…. (2) There was constant and explicit recognition of each other’s independent sovereignty and that this was not to be compromised through cooperation …. (3) No formal agreements underpinned the establishment of the FLS and in the case of SADCC there would be no Treaty.’[51]

This kind of approach would place the FLS in the intergovernmentalism camp if we apply our two theories of integration to such a practice. The same practice, carried over to this day, means that sovereignty can now be used by states so as not to sign up to any supranational institutions that threaten its national interests. Which must constrain regional integration. As the liberation goals were being achieved, economic imperatives began to be the new challenges, especially in light of the fact of apartheid South Africa’s destabilising policies against the Front Line States.[52] The FLS response was to form SADCC, to focus specifically on the economic imperatives.

SADCC

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was thus formed in 1980. Its goals were that ‘of promoting regional co-operation through joint development projects, mobilising development assistance and reducing the economic dependence of member states on apartheid South Africa.’[53] In 1980, some countries that had not been part of the FLS were invited to join SADCC, these were Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Apartheid South Africa itself, was not a compliant opponent but was actively seeking to undermine and destabilise the Frontline States. According to Malcolm Evans they were involved in a ‘policy of Swaardmag (the power of the sword)’ whose aims were to ‘smash the stability of the Front-line States and blunt the development of SADCC while simultaneously striking at the African National Congress (ANC) and its host nations.’[54] Part of the FLS commitment had been the hosting of ANC members  who were fighting apartheid. Thus SADCC countries had to contend with insecurity sponsored by South Africa, the most notable being the use of proxy forces such as the ‘MNR in Mozambique, UNITA in Angola, the Lesotho Liberation Army, the Zambian Mushala group and various Zimbabwean dissidents.’[55]

Changes in the situation in South Africa also led to changes in the nature of the challenges facing SADCC. As majority rule beckoned with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990, the regional block began to reconfigure itself in anticipation of the pressing challenge of the time. Once the existential threat posed by South Africa had been tamed, the focus became achieving economic freedom which had, somewhat, been put on hold by the fight against apartheid. A majority ruled South Africa and its strong economy looked set to be an opportunity for integration. The decision was then taken to formalise the organisation since the expectation, as articulated in the Declaration and Treaty of the SADC,  was that the liberation of South Africa would, “…take the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation, to one of cooperation; in a climate of peace, security and stability.”[56] These new conditions were seen as opportunities for economic development insofar as there is acceptance that there is a vicious cycle between insecurity and underdevelopment.

SADC

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) came into being on 17 August 1992, replacing the SADCC. More countries have since joined the SADC; Mauritius (1995) DRC (1997), Seychelles (1997 left then re-joined in 2008) and  Madagascar (since suspended after a military coup). SADC was now accorded a legal personality by its founding Treaty, capable of entering into contract with other actors in international relations.[57] The main innovation then, was that there was now a codification of practice for SADC integration. The treaty sets out obligations and censure where member states fail to meet these obligations. The signing of the Treaty and the accession of more member states would suggest that states can see opportunities in SADC. Having looked at its development through history, we can now attempt to assess the opportunities and constraints to achieving the SADC idea.

Chapter Four

Assessment of the Opportunities and Constraints

This chapter looks at the nature of the opportunities and constraints for SADC integration. What conditions have spurred or hindered integration? To what extent are the difficulties systemic or agential? This section has as its foundation, the fact that we have already drawn out from our theory and history, what SADC integration hopes to achieve. The history of SADC has shown us that each challenge elicited the need for a collective response. Neofunctionalism points us to the fact that supranational institutions invested with the authority to act are likely to be more efficient than uncoordinated, piecemeal national government initiatives. Intergovernmentalism has been argued to insist that integration will only go ahead insofar as governments see a benefit for their national interest and not necessarily for the regional grouping per se.  With this in mind I first turn to the opportunities, then to the constraints to regional integration in Southern Africa.

Opportunities for SADC

The starting point has to be the rationale for integration in Southern Africa. Returning to one of the definitions we used for integration by Karl Deutsch; we see that integration awards units capacities that they would separately lack.[58] In this vein, Chingono and Nakana state that ‘the major rationale for regional integration is the belief that there is strength in numbers and in unity, and that this strength can speed up the pace of development as well as enhance security. Cooperation and integration are a strategy for overcoming perceived weakness and development obstacles.’[59] During the SADCC years, the strategy was cooperation which has turned to integration in the SADC years, but, for the same aim of overcoming weaknesses. Integration in the economic domain in Southern Africa is expected to make the region internationally competitive, which would lead to realisation of the overarching goals of ending dependence on Western economies, as well as poverty alleviation.[60] The gains for peace and security are implied by economic enmeshment which, most integration theories subscribe to.

Throughout the history of SADC from the FLS days, the one main constraint that had stood in the way of integration was the existence of apartheid and colonialism in some of the states that form the region, notably South Africa. Although SADC does not have a formal criteria for accession, it can be argued from practice, that the apartheid states and those under colonialism would not be admitted into the grouping. The ending of apartheid and attainment of majority rule in the whole region is therefore an opportunity for the integration scheme to be implemented. This was akin to the attainment of the third of the background conditions I mentioned in the theories chapter, which Haas said needs to be there for integration to go ahead. This third background condition is, ‘common ideological patterns among participating units.’[61] I would qualify this, for my paper, with the word relative. For SADC, as we will see in the discussion of the constraints, is not ideologically a unitary block – and never has – even during the armed struggles. Regardless,  success in achieving the liberation goals presented SADC with the opportunity to integrate, since, as stated in the SADC Treaty, peaceful conditions are conducive to economic growth and development.[62]

An end to South Africa’s destabilisation activities and the possibility of returning to full economic relations, is the biggest positive opportunity for SADC. For, according to Blumenfeld, SADCC’s dissociation with South Africa was also hurting their economies as the landlocked countries depended on South African ports for their access to the sea routes.[63] An end to South Africa’s support for destabilisation is also evident in the ending of the conflicts in Mozambique and Angola, which meant resources that were being used in conflict could be redirected towards development. Also, from the intergovernmentalism perspective,  the prevalence of issues in the current global strategic environment that cannot be solved unilaterally by SADC governments, can be argued as a spur for integration. I now turn to the constraints to integration which I have observed are more outstanding than the opportunities.

Constraints to Regional Integration:

The constraints to regional integration in SADC are the reasons why most of the goals articulated by the block have not been achieved. The disconnect between stated goals and actions is easy to see. Some of the missed targets are the Free Trade Area (FTA) which was supposed to have been achieved by 2008, and a SADC Customs Union which was earmarked for 2010.[64] In the political and security domain, the DRC war (1998 – 2002) and SADC’s response to it is an example of the divergences between the national governments, which does not bode well for the articulated regional cohesion when facing challenges to the block.

Sovereignty

The most potent stumbling block to regional integration is the holding of sovereignty as sacrosanct by governments in the SADC block. As I have noted above, this is rooted in the practice that began in the FLS days and was codified in SADC’s founding Treaty of 1992. Understandably, those who had been denied access to self-determination and were denied rights on the basis of non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states as articulated in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, will hold classical sovereignty in high regard once they achieve it. Therefore, African states generally hold sovereignty as inviolable. But pursued to its logical conclusion, classical sovereignty means that SADC cannot evolve the common political institutions, since the grouping cannot dictate to members which political ideology to follow. Below I will show what sovereignty entails for SADC, starting with the incompatibilities it fosters and maintains.

Incompatible Political and Economic Systems:

I have said above that the end of apartheid in South Africa meant there was a shift in political ideologies that could allow integration to become conceivable, without exception, in the region. I also hinted earlier that, even when the Southern African community (FLS/SADCC) was united against apartheid, they were not a monolithic block. Sesay argues that even in the early days; ‘they could be categorised into various shades and leanings. On the one hand Mozambique and Angola both styled themselves as Marxist-Leninist regimes, on the other Botswana and Zambia pursued state capitalism, Tanzania meanwhile, is dedicated to what Timothy Shaw has called a ‘transformationalist’ system, based on policies of self-reliance.’[65] He adds that these ‘differences in economic, ideological and social patterns (not forgetting of course the personalities of their leadership) led to various preferences within the FLS in their support for the liberation movements.’[66]

So, even when these countries were faced by the existential threat  that was apartheid South Africa, they still differed substantially in approach due to their different internal systems. An example of how potent these differences were for regional cohesion is that during the Angolan civil war, the FLS states supported different sides in the war. According to Sesay, ‘Tanzania and Mozambique supported the MPLA, but Zambia gave tacit support to UNITA.’[67] These differences were also premised on what the various states perceived as their national interest, largely economic interests since, indeed, developing world economies are usually seen as competitive.  

In this vein, Chingono and Nakana observe that ‘SADC national economies are not complementary, but instead structured in ways that promote competition for Western markets and investment.’[68] This is a situation where the same countries produce the same products for exports and by virtue of that have to compete for markets. This competition for markets and investment leads to an even more potent political constraint to integration; rivalry among member states.

Nationalist Rivalry: 

Nationalist rivalry is a really a clash of interests predicated on the differences in ideology, economic systems, political systems and expected benefits from integration.[69] There is thus, according to the same authors, (1) no common values beyond rhetoric; (2) states do not want to surrender sovereignty to binding rules; and (3) underdevelopment and size of economies and weak administrative capacity undermines any SADC initiatives. This then means that, in reality governments stand in competition with each other despite proclamations to the contrary.

Some examples suffice at this point which show how potent this constraint is. The first one is in the SADCC years. Kato Lambrechts records that Malawi was the only state in Southern Africa which maintained relations with apartheid South Africa.[70] This must have been based on Malawi’s calculation of what its national interest was from an economic and security standpoint. According to the rules of classical sovereignty, this is admissible. The second example is of what happened during the DRC war of 1998 – 2002, the SADC years. A split between two camps is said to have become evident, where there was one camp with Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola who favoured a hawkish solution, and in the opposite camp was South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique advocating a diplomatic solution.[71] Further, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola’s military intervention in the DRC war is argued to have been based on narrow national interests rather than the regional interest.

The important point to take from this chapter is that opportunities to regional integration are quite paltry, but the challenges are numerous and very potent. The outstanding constraint is sovereignty, which is an umbrella for all the constraints, insofar as we have seen that the nation state in SADC will place its national interest ahead of regional interests. From all the foregoing, we can now say what insights our assessment of opportunities and constraints to regional integration has yielded.

Conclusion:

What is the SADC Idea?

A look at the Declaration, Treaty and Protocol of the Southern African Development Community yields the insight that SADC is both an economic and political project. This is an attempt to integrate both the economic and the political domains. The SADC grouping thus takes upon itself the role of improving the welfare of the people through economic development and political best practices. The postulated evolution of common values is based on the tenets of liberal democracy with the attendant practices of observing human rights, freedom of association, freedom of worship and universal suffrage. This is a logical postulate considering that SADC states have a history of being denied these rights by colonialism and, their liberation struggles were about achieving these rights. Political rights and security of persons can only be achieved under conditions of prosperity. This is the SADC idea. My question can then be rephrased to: why has this idea not succeeded so far?

What Stands in the Way?

To answer that question my paper has relied on theories of integration as lenses to assess developments in the region between 1980 – 2010. The main theories I chose are neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. I chose these two theories as they can be seen to fall in opposing camps of the integration debate. I have argued that the integration debate is largely between these two camps: on the one hand, there is a view which sees integration as inevitably leading to federal or federal like units, and on the other, there is insistence that international organizations only exist to the extent that nation states find them useful, so there is no automaticity to integration. Both theories I chose illuminate some aspects of SADC even if it’s only to show what has not been done. SADC indeed has a Secretariat and a Tribunal, which are supranational bodies of a technical nature postulated by neofunctionalism. The fact that SADC states have, so far, refused to devolve power to these institutions leads us to explanations best made by intergovernmentalism.

I also looked at SADC’s evolution through history in response to prevailing imperatives. The end of apartheid and the relative peace that ensured was the great opportunity for integration, but classical sovereignty still remains a constraint. Throughout history, constriction to integration has thus been seen to be due to the fact that: SADC holds the principle of sovereign equality as sacrosanct (owing to its history) and, states have used SADC to consolidate sovereignty. This means that SADC cannot dictate best practices to member states. Since SADC is not ideologically a monolithic block – and never has – these differences translate into hindrances to achieving an optimal performing international organization. They then manifest themselves as national rivalries and other practices inimical to deepening integration.

In terms of looking forward to possible solutions, I also wanted to know whether the difficulties encountered by SADC are systemic or agential. I realise that such a neat dichotomy cannot be made since structure and agency cannot be easily extricated from each other. The one prediction I can make, based on the European experience, is that a generational change (an agential change) may also change the potency of classical sovereignty (a structural condition) as a stumbling block to integration. European integration in its early years was hindered by rivalries between France and Germany based on the recent memories of World War 2. It seems, to my mind, that sovereignty is still a strong referent object for Southern Africa, because it was only recently attained by current SADC political elites. This may change in the future as the sub-region’s identification with the liberation struggles wanes.

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